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This thesis aims at enhancing our understanding of a nancial crisis by using New
Keynesian frameworks with nancial frictions and applying Bayesian methods to
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
First, we use a Gertler and Karadi (2011) type closed economy DSGE
model to investigate a source and the transmission mechanism of a nancial crisis.
We show that a collapse in borrowersnet worth could lead to a real contraction
by limiting the the bankerscredit supply to non-nancial rms. In addition, our
simulation indicates that the central banks credit market intervention could be
an e¤ective tool in alleviating the nancial crisis by restoring the private nancial
intermediation.
Second, we simulate a sudden stop crisis in an emerging market economy
by using a small open economy DSGE model with nancial frictions. We show
that foreign lendersnegative perception on an emerging market economy could
actually lead to a recession via sudden stops in foreign capital inow and the rise in
cost of foreign borrowing. In addition, we establish that a sudden stop crisis could
be aggravated by (i) the substantial degree of nancial frictions in the economy,
(ii) the heavy reliance on foreign resources in capital production, (iii) the choice
of a xed exchange rate regime, and so on.
Finally, we estimate the above small open economy DSGE model by using
the data from South Korea and the US. We obtain sizable and signicant estimates
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The recent global nancial crisis episode posed a number of challenges for macro-
economics as a discipline. First, the fact that the collapse of the US housing
market bubble resulted in such a sharp contraction in real activity requires the
macroeconomic theory to be able to deal with the linkages between the nancial
markets and the real sector of the economy in a more systematic way. Second,
taking into account that emerging market countries which were not directly linked
to the event in the US housing market were signicantly a¤ected in the process of
the global nancial crisis, more investigation into the international dimension of
nancial crises is called for. Third, from a more practical perspective, there exists
a growing need for policy measures towards preventing or at least alleviating the
costs of nancial crises, other than the monetary and scal policies as conventional
stabilising tools.
Indeed, there has been a number of developments in modern macroeco-
nomics addressing these issues. First, there are a number of theoretical frameworks,
which incorporate the linkages between the nancial markets and the real economy.
For example, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
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and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2010) have introduced nancial frictions
into otherwise conventional New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium (DSGE) models, as have Yun (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003).1 These studies typically utilise an agency
problem in a loan contract as a source of nancial frictions, in which the cost of
external nance could be related to the borrowersbalance sheet conditions. Thus,
the external shocks deteriorating the balance sheet could discourage the capital
demand in the real sector through the increased cost of borrowing. However, as
Woodford (2010) argues, the recent crisis originated from an abrupt contraction
in credit supply rather than a reduction in credit demand owing to the problems
of borrowers. Thus, in order for the analysis of the recent crisis event to be more
relevant, one needs to allow for an abrupt contraction in credit supply and the
active role for nancial intermediaries in the process of the crisis. To this end, a
new generation of New Keynesian DSGE models with nancial frictions, such as
Curdia and Woodford (2009) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), explicitly incorpo-
rate nancial frictions in the banking sector which can impede an e¢ cient supply
of credit.
Second, the global nature of the recent nancial crisis makes the open econ-
omy framework increasingly important. Traditionally, the impact of the nancial
crisis on emerging market economies was analysed within models of currency crises
that were particularly common in emerging market countries in the 1990s.2 Ex-
isting literature on currency crisis covers a large range of issues, ranging from
1Standard New Keynesian DSGE models incorporate imperfect competition and price sticki-
ness a la Calvo (1983) in the goods market, into the real business cycle (RBC) framework, which
features perfect competition and fully exible prices.
2Examples of the currency crisis episodes in the 1990s include the crises in Mexico (1994-95),
a group of East Asian countries (1997), Russia (1998) and Brazil (1998-99).
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sudden stopsin capital inows as in Calvo (1998) and speculative attacksand
self-fullling pessimismas in Krugman (1999) to fear of oatingas in Calvo
and Reinhart (2002), among others. All these arguments enrich and deepen our
understanding of the mechanism and impact of nancial crises in emerging market
economies. However, these studies focus on events in the emerging markets as a
trigger of crisis, but lack a role for a global shock in contrast to the recent global
nancial crisis experience. Moreover, implications of the pre-crisis conditions of
an individual economy on the severity of the crisis are generally overlooked. In
contrast, the recent analyses of DSGE models for open economy settings have
provided more e¤ective and systematic framework to deal with such issues. For
instance, Gertler et al. (2007), Curdia (2007), and many others have proposed
good benchmarks for small open economy DSGE models.
Third, the fact that the nancial crisis broke out following a long period
of low and stable interest rate raises question marks over the e¤ectiveness of the
conventional monetary policy in response to a nancial crisis. That is, as Joyce,
et al. (2012) argue, while the conventional monetary policy has been e¤ective
in achieving low and stable ination, it has been unable to prevent asset market
bubbles from forming, which might pave the way for nancial crises. Hence, there
has been substantial interest in alternative policy measures against the nancial
crisis, such as quantitative easing (QE), macroprudential policy, and expansionary
scal policy.
Motivated by the above observations, this thesis attempts to enhance our
understanding of nancial crises by analysing the source and transmission of crises
and evaluating the role of the pre-crisis economic conditions and the e¤ectiveness
of the stabilising policy tools. Main questions we attempt to answer are: (i)
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what kind of shock would trigger a nancial crisis; (ii) how the shock would be
transmitted to the economy; (iii) how some pre-crisis conditions a¤ect the severity
of the nancial crisis; and (iv) how e¤ective the conventional and unconventional
policy measures would be in ghting a nancial crisis.
To these ends, we construct a DSGE model with nancial frictions for a
closed economy in Chapter 2. Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we propose
a DSGE model where nancial frictions result from the moral hazard or costly
enforcementproblem in the banking sector to consider the role of banking sector
explicitly, in addition to nominal rigidity in the nal goods market and capital
adjustment frictions in capital production. In addition, we allow for the important
features of the recent nancial crisis more explicitly. For example, we consider a
negative shock to the bankers net worth as a trigger of the nancial crisis, rather
than the conventional capital quality shock in producing rms. We argue that
a net worth shock presents a more realistic representation of the recent nancial
crisis, since the shock is directly involved in the events in the nancial market
rather than those in the non-nancial rmstechnology. In addition, in contrast to
Gertler and Karadi (2011), we derive the policy rule for unconventional monetary
policy or credit market intervention in a microfounded way. The resulting policy
rule involves a clear and realistic policy structure, where the central bank tries to
stabilise the contractions in private credit supply by enhancing the private bankers
balance sheet and restoring the private nancial intermediation.
Main ndings in Chapter 2 are as follows. First, we establish that a
collapse in the bankers net worth in the nancial market could lead to a real
recession in the economy, as the fall in the quality of capital in the non-nancial
rmstechnology in the existing literature could. Both shocks reduce the quantity
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of nancial intermediation and increase the non-nancial rmscost of external
nance by deteriorating the bankers balance sheet, which lead to a reduction
in output. Based on those observations, we argue that a fall in capital quality
of non-nancial rms may be one source of the decrease in bankers net worth.
We also nd that an economy with a high degree of nancial frictions is more
likely to be vulnerable to an unfavourable change in bankersnancial condition.
That is, if the bankers have a tendency to conduct moral hazard in normal times,
then the depositors might be doubtful about the bankersbehaviour. Hence, they
would be likely to reduce the credit supply and require a higher risk premium to
bankers in response to the deteriorations in the bankersbalance sheet, even if it
turns out to be temporary and marginal. As a result, an economy with a high
degree of nancial frictions would face greater uctuations in economic activities
even when a small and temporary negative shock hits bankers net worth. In
addition, policy experiments in Chapter 2 indicate that conventional expansionary
policy measures could alleviate the impact of a nancial crisis so long as they
are available to the authorities. However, there seems to be possibility that an
expansionary conventional monetary policy is unavailable to the policy authority,
such as zero lower bound (ZLB) of the nominal interest rate, especially in crisis
periods. In addition, we nd that an expansionary scal policy could be less
e¤ective than a monetary policy counterpart in stabilising the economy in the
aftermath of a nancial crisis. Not only could the former discourage the capital
demand through the so-called crowding-out e¤ect, but the former could also do
so by limiting the bankerscredit supply to non-nancial rms via the reduced
protability of nancial intermediation, as compared to the latter.3 In contrast,
3Clearly, this argument is based on the assumption that the nominal interest rate in the
5
the direct credit market intervention by the central bank could be an e¤ective tool
to combat the nancial crisis by moderating the credit contraction and the rise
in capital cost. Such a stabilising e¤ect of credit market intervention could be
achieved either by restoring the bankersbalance sheet or by alleviating the non-
nancial rmscapital cost. This result is supported by the working of nancial
accelerator mechanism where the external nance premium is positively related
with the bankersleverage ratio.
Next, Chapter 3 extends the DSGE model with nancial frictions in Chap-
ter 2 to the model for a small open economy setting to analyse sudden stop crises
in emerging market economies. Following Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler et al.
(2007), we postulate the conventional Townsend (1979) type costly state verica-
tion(CSV) problem between foreign lenders and domestic producing rms, i.e.,
entrepreneurs to consider the nature and e¤ect of an abrubt rise in cost of foreign
borrowings. Moreover, to investigate how foreigners pessimism could be self-
fullledas an actual crisis in emerging market economies, we consider a negative
shock to foreignersevaluation of domestic entrepreneursnet worth rather than
an exogenous foreign interest rate shock, following Curdia (2007) and Ozkan and
Unsal (2010). In addition, we conduct a set of experiments exploring the e¤ects of
the pre-crisis economic conditions in an emerging market economy on the severity
of sudden stop crises. These include examining the role of the degree of foreigners
trust in the emerging market economy, the exchange rate regime in place, and the
economys reliance on foreign resources in capital production technology.
Our ndings in Chapter 3 are as follows. First, we establish that the
pre-crisis period is high enough for the central bank to implement an expansionary monetary
policy.
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working of nancial accelerator mechanism in a small open economy setting is
similar to that in a closed economy. That is, foreign lendersnegative perception
regarding the nancial soundness of the borrowers in an emerging market economy
leads to a recession via sudden stops in foreign capital inow and the resulting rise
in cost of foreign borrowing. In addition, Chapter 3 identies a number of an
economys environmental conditions that could aggravate the impact of sudden
stops, which include: (i) the presence of substantial degree of nancial frictions
in the economy; (ii) the co-occurrence of a global recession and sudden stops in
capital inows into an emerging market economy; (iii) an economys heavy reliance
on foreign resources in production technology; and (iv) an economys choice of
the xed exchange rate regime. That is, if an emerging market economy fails
to gain the foreignerstrust in normal times, it could su¤er a sudden stop crisis
more severely, since the external nance premium imposed on the economy would
increase highly sensitively in response to a distortion in entrepreneurs balance
sheet (perceived by foreign lenders). Our results also show that when a global
recession overlaps with a sudden stop, the recovery from the crisis via an increase
in the export is unlikely to be realised due to a contraction in the aggregate demand
in foreign countries. In addition, when an emerging market economy relies heavily
on the foreign resources for capital production, the shrinking in capital demand
could be magnied due to the increased capital price as well as a rise in the cost
of foreign borrowing. In addition, our results indicate that the response of an
economy to a nancial crisis initiated by an unfavourable shift in foreign lenders
perception regarding an emerging market economy is also shaped by the exchange
rate regime that the economy adopts. That is, an emerging market economy
with a high degree of foreign currency denominated debt is likely to choose a xed
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exchange rate regime to prevent the rise in cost of foreign borrowing, as the fear of
oatingargument a la Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggests. However, if a currency
depreciation is limited under a xed exchange rate regime, an improvement in the
price competitiveness for domestic goods in foreign retail markets could be also
restricted in a sudden stop crisis. Our simulation results indicate that a negative
e¤ect of a xed exchange rate regime on the export demand for domestic goods
could o¤set the benet from stabilising the cost of foreign borrowings.
The above analyses in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are based on calibrated
DSGE models, and hence, the validity of the arguments depends on the parameter
values imposed in the model. In constrast, Chapter 4 estimates the small open
economy DSGE model in Chapter 3, to evaluate the empirical validity of the
arguments on sudden stop crises in emerging markets in Chapter 3. Following
the recent development in estimation methodology for DSGE models, we apply
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to the model in Chapter
3, by using the observed data from the US and South Korea in 1995:Q1-2013:Q1.
Our ndings in Chapter 4 are summarised as follows. First, we obtain a
sizable and signicant estimate for the sensitivity parameter of external nance
premium to entrepreneursleverage ratio, which suggests that there exists a sub-
stantial degree of nancial frictions in a loan contract between foreign lenders and
domestic entrepreneurs. Accordingly, the emerging market economy could su¤er
a severe sudden stop crisis, since the foreign lenders are likely to increase the risk
premium sensitively when they perceive a distortion in entrepreneursnancial
situation. Second, the parameter for the steady state share of domestic inputs
in investment good composite is estimated to be much smaller than that for the
steady state share of domestic goods in consumption bundle, which indicates that
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capital producers in the economy relies heavily on foreign resources in capital pro-
duction in normal times. In this environment, a currency depreciation due to a
crunch in capital inows could result in a rise in the capital good price which would
decrease the production additionally by the aggravated cost condition, on top of
the rise in the cost of foreign borrowing. Accordingly, the contraction in capital
demand in the economy could be much more severe than that in an economy with
a low degree of foreign resource reliance. Third, the Taylor rule coe¢ cient attached
on the nominal exchange rate is estimated to be positive but small, which sug-
gests that there does not exist a high degree of fear of oatingin the economy.
That is, the central bank in the economy does not adjust the nominal interest
rate as sensitively to stabilise the nominal exchange rate, as in a free oating ex-
change rate regime. Fourth, the result from variance decomposition based on our
Bayesian estimates indicates that foreign nancial shocks might be a prime source
of business cycle uctuations in the emerging market economy. In contrast, the
impacts of foreign aggregate demand turn out to be less important, which would
undermine the plausibility of the theoretical hypothesis that a sudden stop crisis
in the emerging market economy could be aggravated by the coincidence with the
global recession, to some degree.
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Chapter 2
Financial Crisis and Credit
Market Intervention
2.1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has revived interest in the linkage between the nancial
and real sectors of an economy, as a disruption in the nancial market propagated
to a sharp contraction in the economy. Indeed, researchers have attempted to
develop theoretical frameworks to properly allow for the role of nancial factors
in the business cycle; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Christiano, Motto,
and Rostagno (2010), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1995). They tried to incorporate
agency problem between borrowers and lenders in otherwise conventional New
Keynesian DSGE models as in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2003). However, as Woodford (2010) argues, to analyse the
recent crisis episodes one needs to allow for an abrupt contraction in credit supply
and the active role of nancial intermediaries, as well as the discouraged capital de-
mand by non-nancial rms. Moreover, from a practical standpoint, more e¤ective
policy measures have been required to ght the nancial crisis, since a conventional
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expansionary monetary policy measure is.not available to the authority in certain
environments, such as zero lower bound (ZLB) of the nominal interest rate, which
tends to take place in nancial crisis periods. In additionl, even though a conven-
tional monetary policy could achieve the low and stable ination for a long time,
it was unable to prevent asset market bubbles from forming, as Joyce et al. (2012)
argue, which has been widely accepted as a source of the recent crisis.
Motivated by the above observations, the objective of this chapter is
twofold: investigating the role of nancial frictions in a nancial crisis; and evalu-
ating the e¤ectiveness of policy measures to ght a nancial crisis. To these ends,
we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with nancial
frictions, following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
There are two advantages in using the model with banking sector as a benchmark
model. First, it explicitly allows for nancial intermediation where the banking
sector could play an active role in the process of a nancial crisis.1 In addition,
we adopt the costly enforcementproblem rather than costly state verication
(CSV) approach a la Townsend (1979) and Bernanke et al. (1999), as a source
of nancial frictions, which provides more realistic underpinnings for the current
moral hazard issue in the banking sector. In addition, while the previous literature
considers a negative shock to quality of capital in non-nancial rmstechnology
as a trigger of a nancial crisis, we allow for a negative shock to bankersnet worth
in their balance sheet. A negative net worth shock may result from a wide range
of factors which deteriorate bankersnancial conditions, one of which would be
an exogenous reduction in capital quality. We believe that our consideration as to
1On the contrary, in the model a la Bernanke et al. (1999), the nancial friction comes from
an agency problem between households (i.e., depositors) and non-nancial rms (i.e., nal capital
demanders), and the banking sector is dealt with as just a veil.
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a trigger of crises better represents the notion that a nancial crisis is triggered
by events in the nancial market. For example, a collapse in the stock market
bubble or bad news about the bankers could be more relevant for describing a
nancial crisis, rather than events in the real sector such as a fall in the quality of
capital. Third, we evaluate the e¤ectiveness of credit market intervention by the
central bank, which could be implemented when the function of the private nan-
cial intermediation is damaged. For this, the existing literature just assumes that
the central bank tries to stabilise the risk premium to prevent the capital demand
by non-nancial rms from being reduced. In contrast, we design the alterna-
tive credit market intervention rule in a microfounded manner, where the central
bank monitors the bankersnancial conditions and seeks to restore the private
nancial intermediation to stabilise the total credit supply to non-nancial rms
by enhancing the private bankersbalance sheet. This approach is based on the
perspective that many of the negative shocks in the nancial market deteriorate
the bankersnancial conditions, which results in a nancial crisis. Accordingly,
the central bank seems to monitor the private bankersnancial conditions rather
than the non-nancial rmsborrowing conditions to prevent a nancial crisis. We
also provide a comparative analysis of the credit market intervention based on this
credit market intervention rule and the rule in the existing literature, under which
the central bank is assumed to aim at stabilising the risk premium for non-nancial
rms.
Our main ndings in this chapter are summarised as follows. First, we
show that a collapse in the bankersnet worth could lead to a real recession in the
economy, as a decrease in the quality of capital in the non-nancial rmstech-
nology could. Both shocks reduce the credit supply and raises the cost of capital
12
nance for non-nancial rms by deteriorating the bankersbalance sheet, which
results in the production contractions. Second, we nd that the degree of nancial
frictions plays a signicant role in determining the severity of the nancial crisis,
in a way that a high degree of nancial frictions magnies the uctuations of key
economic variables. Thus, an economy with a high degree of moral hazard in the
banking sector in normal times is likely to be more vulnerable to a negative shock
in the nancial market and to undergo a severer nancial crisis, as the deposi-
tors in the economy could react more sensitively to a deterioration of bankers
nancial state, even if the nancial shock turns out to be temporary and small in
the end. Third, we nd that conventional monetary and scal policies could be
e¤ective in relieving the business cycle uctuations in a nancial crisis. However,
they seem to be unavailable sometimes, especially in nancial crisis periods, as
mentioned above. In addition, we nd the possibility that an expansionary s-
cal policy could be contractionary to capital demand in the presence of nancial
frictions. This follows from the fact that not only an expansionary scal policy is
limited in encouraging the production and capital investment due to the so-called
crowding-out e¤ect, but it also induces non-nancial rms to shift the factor
demand from capital to labour due to the discouraged credit supply for capital
acquisition which is triggered by the fall in the protability from nancial inter-
mediation. Fourth, our experiment uncovers that the credit market intervention
could be an e¤ective tool in ghting a nancial crisis by directly moderating the
contraction in total credit supply and the rise in cost of capital. In addition, we
nd that the credit market intervention rule to seek to restore the private nancial
intermediation by enhancing the bankersbalance sheet produces the qualitatively
similar result to the rule to aim to stabilise the risk premium by directly supplying
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the credit to non-nancial rms, in spite of the di¤erence in how to operate the
policy. This result is supported by the nancial accelerator mechanism where the
bankersleverage ratio is positively related to the risk premium.
From our study, we contribute to the existing literature as follows. First, in
order to simulate a nancial crisis more realistically and systematically, we consider
a shock arising from a nancial market such as a collapse of bankersnet worth,
rather than a non-nancial shock in the conventional study such as a reduction in
capital quality. Second, we derive the central banks credit market intervention rule
as an optimal behaviour, rather than just assuming it as in the existing literature.
Third, while the traditional studies focus mainly on the impact of expansionary
policies on the aggregate demand, we analyse the e¤ect on the aggregate supply
as well.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets
up a New Keynesian DSGE model with nancial frictions. Section 2.3 presents
the solution to the model and parameter calibration for simulation. In section
2.4, we conduct a set of experiments about the nancial crisis and the alternative
stabilising policies. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The model consists of households, bankers, non-nancial rms, and government,
which participate in markets for (wholesale and retail) goods, labour, capital,
and credit. Households consume the retail goods and supply the labour to non-
nancial rms. They also deposit their savings by purchasing the private and
public bonds and pay the lump-sum taxes to the government. Bankers engage in
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the nancial intermediation between households and non-nancial rms. They are
assumed to be able to divert the capital, which makes nancial frictions in the
deposit contract. Non-nancial rms comprise wholesale rms, capital producers,
and retail rms. Wholesale rms produce wholesale goods by using labour and
capital, which are acquired from households and capital producers, respectively,
and sell the wholesale goods to retail rms in a competitive manner. Capital
producers combine nal goods and the existing capital to update the capital goods
into brand new ones, which are sold to wholesale rms for the use of producing
wholesale goods. Retail rms di¤erentiate the wholesale goods into their own
varieties to gain a certain degree of monopolistic power, set the retail price for
each of them under Calvo (1983) type price rigidity, and sell them to households,
capital producers and government. Government conducts monetary and scal
policy: it sets the nominal interest rate and implements public spending which is
nanced by taxes and public borrowing. Moreover, it may directly intervene in
the credit market, if necessary. Each economic agents behaviour is described in
more detail below.2
2.2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of innitely lived households of length
unity, who consume, work and save. A representative household derives the lifetime




tU (Ct; Lt) (2.1)
2Appendix A2 presents the derivation and log-linearisation process of equilibrium conditions
of the model.
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where  2 (0; 1) is her subjective discount factor. Moreover, her utility function
is assumed to belong to the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) class, such as








where  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption and ' > 0 is the inverse elasticity of labour supply. The representative
household enters period t with one period (real) private and public bonds, Bt 1
and Dt 1, respectively, both of which yield the gross (real) non-stochastic return,
Rt 1 over the period t. In addition, during period t, she supplies her labour, Lt,
to non-nancial rms at the real wage rate, Wt, per labour unit, and receives real
dividends arising from the ownership of the rms, ot . Her budget is spent on the
consumption, Ct, the payment of (real) lump-sum taxes, Tt, and the purchase of
one period riskless bonds for the subsequent period, Bt and Dt. Thus her period
budget constraint is given in real terms by
Ct +Bt +Dt  WtLt +Rt 1Bt 1 +Rt 1Dt 1 + ot   Tt (2.3)
for all t = 0; 1; 2; : : :.
The representative household seeks to maximise the lifetime utility in (2.1)
subject to the period budget constraint in (2.3). The resulting rst order conditions














respectively. Euler equation in (2.4) establishes the negative relationship between
the ratio of the current consumption to the future one, Ct
Ct+1
, and the real interest
rate, Rt, everything else being equal. Labour supply function in (2.5) implies that
a fall in real wage, Wt, leads to reductions in labour supply, Lt, and consumption,
Ct.
2.2.2 Bankers
Bankers engage in the nancial intermediation between households and wholesale
rms. At the end of period t, a representative private banker, j, is assumed to
have available her own (real) net worth, N jt , which is the accumulation of her past
prots from the nancial intermediation. We also assume that she supplies the
credit, QtS
j
t , to wholesale rms up to the end of period t, where S
j
t is the amount
of nancial claims on wholesale rms and Qt is the real price of each claim. Then,
in order to nance the credit supply, she needs to borrow from households, Bjt ,
which is the di¤erence between the values of the credit supplied, QtS
j
t , and her








which shows that the size of credit supplied, QtS
j
t , increases with the borrowing
from households, Bjt , and the bankers net worth, N
j
t . In addition, over the period
t+1, the banker is required to pay the (gross) real riskless rate, Rt, on the borrowing
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from households, Bjt , and expects to earn the (gross) real capital returns, R
k
t+1,
from the nancial claims on wholesale rms, Sjt . Then, the bankers net worth
evolves over the period t + 1, according to the di¤erence between earnings on
assets and borrowing costs, as:














where we use the bankers balance sheet relation in (2.6) in the second equality.
With perfect capital markets, capital returns, Rkt+1, should be equal to riskless rate,
Rt, since the positive risk spread, Rkt+1  Rt, would induce bankers to expand her
assets by borrowing additional funds from households. In contrast, with imperfect
capital markets, the risk spread, Rkt+1   Rt, could be positive due to restrictions
on the bankersability to obtain borrowings from households.
Now we discuss the loan contracting problem between borrowers (i.e.,
bankers) and lenders (i.e., households) under capital market imperfections. First
of all, we introduce the following moral hazard or capital enforcement problem a
la Gertler and Karadi (2011). We suppose that at the end of t+ 1, a banker may
decide to divert a fraction ! of the gross return to capital project, Rkt+1QtS
j
t , to
transfer it to her family, say, in the form of large bonuses or dividends, and declare
bankruptcy.3 If the banker diverts the capital, depositors try to reclaim the funds,
3Gertler and Karadi (2011) suppose that the banker may divert a fraction of fund, !QtS
j
t , at
the beginning of the period. However, for analytical simplicity, we postulate the situation where
the banker decides to divert a fraction from a total revenue, Rkt+1QtS
j
t , at the end of period,
which does not make a critical di¤erence.
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but it is assumed that it is too costly for the lenders to fully recover the funds. In
the end, the bankers could still keep the diverted fraction ! and households could
only collect the remaining fraction 1  !. In this setup, the lenders are willing to
supply funds to the banker, when it is expected that the bankers do not venture
the moral hazard, which requires the expected returns to the banker from diverting
the funds to be smaller than those from not doing so. Accordingly, in order for









t  !Rkt+1QtSjt . (2.8)
If the constraint in (2.8) is binding, the assets that the banker can supply to















































where 	 and R
k
R




, respectively, and 	   1 is the sensitivity of the bankers




Equation (2.9) describes how the nancial accelerator mechanism works in
the model. First of all, the asset available for the banker, QtS
j
t , depends positively
on her net worth, N jt , so that a decrease in N
j
t would directly reduce credit supplu
to non-nancial rms, and so, capital investment in non-nancial rms. Second,
holding N jt constant, the bankers credit supply, QtS
j
t , is determined by the private




, increases, the banker would be willing to supply more credit
to non-nancial rms. Moreover, the sensitivity of the bankers leverage ratio,
	t, to the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, is captured by the parameter, 	   1, which is
inversely related to the capital diversion rate, !.5 That is, the low degree of
moral hazard, !, would result in the large value of 	   1, so that the banker
would expand credit supply, QtS
j
t , more sensitively in response to the given rise
in the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
. In other words, in the economy with a lower degree
of moral hazard, the bankers could be easier to obtain funds from households, so
that they could expand credit supply, QtS
j
t , sensitively in response to the improved




4Note that the private leverage ratio, 	t, in (2.10) does not depend on rm specic factors,
so that the nancial accelerator relationship in (2.9) holds in the aggregate level as well as in




t also imply the economy-wide nancial assets privately
intermediated, QtS
p
t , and the net worth for bankers in operation as a whole, Nt, respectively.
5It follows from the steady state relationship, 	 =
h




Next, we consider the bankerssurvival time and the credit market condi-
tions to derive the motion of the aggregate net worth, Nt. First of all, we assume
the nite horizon for the individual bankers with the survival rate of  each period,
which ensures that they never accumulate their own net worth enough to fully
self-nance the capital investment. In addition, new bankers enter the banking
sector in place of failed bankers, so that the aggregate net worth in the economy
at the end of period t, Nt, consists of net worth of the successful bankers, N et ,
and that of the newly entering ones, Nnt . We assume that the existing bankers
net worth, N et , is accumulation of prots from the nancial intermediation, i.e.,






, and that the newly entering bankers commence
the business with the xed amount of fund, F , which is transferred from the failed
bankers, as a start up fund, i.e., Nnt = (1  )F .6 In addition, the overall value
of bankersnet worth is subject to an exogenous shock, Vt,7 which is supposed to
follow a rst-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process given by
Vt = (Vt 1)
v exp f"v;tg , (2.12)
where jvj < 1, and "v;t is a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and standard
deviation v. Then, the motion of the aggregate net worth may be expressed as:
6The latter assumption ensures that the new bankers never operate their business solely by
external nance. However, as discussed by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler and Karadi
(2011), the contribution of newly entering bankersstart up funds to the net worth evolution is
quite small. Thus, for analytical simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume the amount
transferred to the newly entering bankers is constant over time.
7Vt includes all possible exogenouns shock to a¤ect the bankersnet worth. For example, we
may take a collapse of stock market bubble, adverse rumour about an individual banker, and so
























Nt 1 + (1  )F
  Vt. (2.13)
Equation (2.13) shows that the aggregate net worth, Nt, increases with the capital
returns, Rkt , the amount of nancial intermediation, 	t 1, and the initial size of
the net worth, Nt 1, while it decreases with the bankersnancing cost, i.e. the
riskless rate, Rt 1.
2.2.3 Wholesale Firms
Wholesale rms produce wholesale goods and sell them to retail rms in a com-
petitive wholesale goods market. By the beginning of period t, they are assumed
to acquire capital, Kt 1, from capital producers, which is combined with labour
hired from households to produce wholesale goods, Yw;t, over the period t, by the
following Cobb-Douglas function8
Yw;t = At (Kt 1)
 (Lt)
1  , (2.14)
where  is the share of capital in the production function. At denotes a level of
total factor productivity (TFP), which obeys a rst order autoregressive (AR(1))
8Note that wholesale rms are assumed to be perfectly competitive and employ constant
returns to scale (CRS) technology. These assumptions allow us to treat wholesale rms as a





a exp f"a;tg , (2.15)
where jaj < 1, and "a;t is a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and standard
deviation a. In order to nance the capital acquisition, wholesale rms issue the
same amount of claims, Spt 1, as the desired capital, Kt 1, to bankers, which incurs
the gross capital returns, Rkt . For wholesale rms, R
k
t is the cost of capital nance.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that there are no frictions in
transactions between wholesale rms and bankers. That is, bankers have perfect
information about the wholesale rms and there is no problem enforcing payo¤s.9




at the end of period t  1.10 In addition, after nishing the production in period t,
wholesale rms are assumed to resell the undepreciated capital goods, (1  )Kt 1,
to capital producers at the price of Qt, in order to update them into the brand
new capital goods. Then, wholesale rms(real) total cost function is given by:
TCw;t = WtLt +

RktQt 1Kt 1   (1  )QtKt 1

, (2.17)
9Within the model, only the bankers face the constraints on obtaining household funds. How-
ever, the constraints a¤ect the supply of funds available to wholesale rms, Qt 1S
p
t 1, and the
associated capital returns, Rkt , in the end. However, as long as wholesale rms pay the capital
returns, the nancing process is frictionless.
10As discussed below, in the presence of credit market intervention by the central bank, the





where St 1 and S
g
t 1 denote the total credit supply and the public credit supply, respectively.
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where  is the depreciation rate for capital goods.11
Given that wholesale rms operate as price takers both in the wholesale
goods market and in the factor markets, cost minimisation subject to the pro-
duction technology implies the following demands for labour and capital goods,
as:


















Pw;t+1 + (1  )Qt+1

, (2.19)
respectively, where Pw;t is the (real) wholesale good price.12 Labour demand func-
tion in (2.18) implies that labour demand, Lt, increases with a production expan-
sion, Yw;t, and a rise in the real wholesale good price, Pw;t, but decreases with a
rise in the real wage, Wt. Capital demand function in (2.19) suggests that capital
demand, Kt, increases with a plan for production expansion, Yw;t+1, and an ex-
pected rise in the wholesale good price, Pw;t+1, while it decreases with an expected
rise in the required capital returns, Rkt+1, other things being xed. In addition,
capital demand depends negatively on the current capital price, Qt, but positively
on the future capital price, Qt+1.
11Strictly speaking, the selling price of undepreciated capital, Qt, could di¤er from the market
price of capital, Qt. However, as discussed in Appendix A2.4, zero prot condition for capital
producers implies Qt ' Qt around the steady state. Hence, we use Qt for both the selling price
of undepreciated capital and the market price of capital, for notational simplicity.
12Note that, in equations (2.18) and (2.19), the assumption of competitive wholesale rms
requires the prot maximisation condition to be Pw;t = MCw;t, with the real marginal cost












provides more detailed derivation.
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2.2.4 Capital Producers
Capital producers supply capital goods to wholesale rms, which are used to pro-
duce wholesale goods by wholesale rms. In order to do so, they engage in repair
of existing capital goods and construction of new capital goods. In period t, com-
petitive capital producers purchase the undepreciated capital goods, (1   )Kt 1
from wholesale rms at the price of Qt, and combine them with investment goods,
It, which are a fraction of nal goods, to produce new capital goods, Knt . Follow-
ing Ozkan and Unsal (2010), we specify the production function for new capital














where  > 0 is the capital adjustment coe¢ cient. Then, together with existing
capital, (1   )Kt 1, new capital goods, Knt , are sold back to wholesale rms at
the price of Qt in period t, which are used for wholesale good production in period
t+ 1.




t + (1  )Kt 1, (2.21)
and capital producers(real) prot function is given by14
13In the presence of capital adjustment costs, the capital production function exhibits the
nature of constant return to scale (CRS) and diminishing returns to investment good, It, which
allows for variability in capital price, Qt.
14Note that the investment goods are just a fraction of nal goods so that we assume that
price index for investment goods, PI;t, is equal to the consumer price index, Pt, without loss of
generality. Accordingly, the real price of investment goods, PI;tPt , remains unity at all times.
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Then, the optimality condition for capital producersproblem with respect to the










which is referred to as a Tobins (1969) Q relation, modied to allow for the capital
adjustment costs. The capital supply function in (2.23) implies that, given the
existing capital stock, Kt 1, the capital investment, It, increases with the capital
price, Qt.
2.2.5 Retail Firms and Resource Constraint
In order to introduce price rigidity, which is one of the New Keynesiansmain
concepts, the model allows for monopolistically competitive retail rms, indexed
by j 2 [0; 1]. They purchase wholesale goods, Yw;t, from wholesale rms in a
competitive wholesale market; costlessly diversify them into their own varieties,
Yt (j), to gain a certain degree of price-setting power in the retail market; set the
(nominal) retail price, P t (j), on each variety in a monopolistically competitive
manner under the price stickiness a la Calvo (1983); and sell them to consumers,
i.e., households, capital producers and the government.
15Note that the assumptions of CRS technology for capital production and perfect competitive
capital market require capital producers to earn zero prot in equilibrium. In addition, in this
environment, it can be shown that the e¤ect of the existing capital stock on the capital producers
prot is negligible around the steady state, so that we may ignore the optimality condition with
respect to the existing capital stock, Kt 1. See Appendix 2.4 for the details.
26
Suppose that consumerspreference over varieties belongs to a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) class. Then, the retail good composite, Yt, and
the corresponding consumer price index (CPI), Pt, are represented by the following



















where P t (j) is the price for variety j, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among varieties. By construction, the retail good composite equals the wholesale
goods as a whole in equilibrium, given by:
Yt = Yw;t. (2.26)
Consumers expenditure minimisation suggests that each retail rm faces the







In this setting, they may set the price, P t (j), to maximise their prot subject
to the downward sloping demand curve for the variety j in (2.27). On the other
hand, in order to introduce the nominal rigidity, we assume that retailers face the
price stickiness a la Calvo (1983); that is, each retailer is able to reset its price,
P t (j), with a probability of (1  ) independently of the time elapsed since the
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last adjustment, while with a probability of  it is not able to do so such that they
keep the previous price, P t 1 (j). Then, the consumer price index in (2.25) can be
expressed as the weighted average of two sets of price index, such as the previous




1  + (1  )  P t1 i 11  , (2.28)
which provides the dynamics for the aggregate price in the economy.17
Now, we discuss the retail rms price setting behaviour to determine P t(j)
in (2.28). Suppose that an individual retailer, who is able to adjust the price at t,
chooses P t(j) to maximise the current value of expected future prots while P t(j)
remains e¤ective. Then, her (real) prot maximisation problem in period t, when























for k = 0; 1; 2;    , where k is the probability of keeping the retail price set at t,






is her subjective intertemporal
16It follows from the facts that all resetting rms will choose the same price, P t (j) = P t, since
the cost and demand conditions which they face are assumed to be identical, and that rms










17In addition, it can be shown that, in the neighbourhood of the steady state, equation (2.28)






substitution rate between t and t+k, and Pw;t+k is the retail rms (real) marginal
cost of purchasing the wholesale goods at period t+ k.18 The rst order condition



















where  = 
 1 is the retail rms desired (gross) mark-up, which is attached due
to imperfections in the retail market.19 Combining the aggregate price dynamics
in (2.28) with the optimal price setting rule in (2.31) yields the following short-run
dynamics for the consumer price index (CPI) (within the neighbourhood of the
steady state):
t = (Pw;t)
Et ft+1g , (2.32)
with   (1 )(1 )

and the CPI ination, t  PtPt 1 , which is referred to as the
New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in the literature. Equation (2.32) shows
that the CPI ination, t, rises with the ination expectation, Et ft+1g, and the
wholesale good price, Pw;t, i.e., the marginal cost of wholesale good production.
Finally, note that the retail goods supplied by the retail rms, Yt, are
18Note that, since both wholesale and retail rms act as price takers in the perfectly competitive
wholesale goods market, the retail rm js marginal cost of purchasing the wholesale goods,
MCt(j), is equal to wholesale rmsmarginal cost of producing wholesale goods, MCw;t, such
that MCt(j) = Pw;t = MCw;t.
19It can be shown that, in the neignhourhood of the steady state, equation (2.31) can be











consumed by households, capital producers and government, so that the economy-
wide resource constraint for retail goods is given by:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt, (2.33)
where Gt denotes the government spending, which is discussed below.
2.2.6 Government Policy
Now, we turn to government policies. Government consists of monetary and scal
authorities. The government attempts to stabilise the economy by using conven-
tional and unconventional policy measures.
Monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate, Rnt , conventionally, and
it may directly intervene in the credit market when it is necessary. First of all,
the central bank is assumed to adjust the (gross) short-term nominal interest rate,
Rnt , to stabilise the business cycle, by using the Taylor-type (1993) feedback rule














exp f"r;tg , (2.34)
where Rn and Y denote steady state values for nominal interest rate, Rnt , and out-
put, Yt, respectively. We assume that a monetary policy shock, "r;t, is a Gaussian
white noise process with mean zero and standard deviation r, and that the val-
ues for Taylor rule coe¢ cients, r 2 (0; 1),  > 1 and y > 0, are chosen by the
central bank. Accordingly, it positively adjusts the nominal interest rate, Rnt , in
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response to ination of consumer price index (CPI), t  PtPt 1 , and output gap, YtY ,
to stabilise the economys business cycle. In addition, short-term nominal interest
rate, Rnt , is linked to the real riskless rate, Rt, by the following Fisher equation:
Rnt  RtEt ft+1g . (2.35)
Moreover, the central bank is allowed to directly inject public funds, QtS
g
t ,
into the asset market, especially in a crisis period when the credit privately sup-
plied, QtS
p
t = 	tNt, is shrinking. Accordingly, in the presence of credit market
intervention, the private credit supply, QtS
p
t , is supplemented by the public credit
supply, QtS
g







Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that public credit supply, QtS
g
t ,
is a fraction, t, of the total credit supplied, QtSt, given by:
QtS
g















In addition, the public credit supply, QtS
g
t , is assumed to be nanced by issuing
the special government bond, Bgt , to households, which pays the riskless rate, Rt,
to households.
Now, we determine the central banks credit market intervention rule,
t. First of all, Gertler and Karadi (2011) suppose that the central bank supply
the public fund, QtS
g
t = tQtSt, to non-nancial rms at the capital returns,
Rkt+1, when the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, rises rapidly, since the risk premium tends to










where  is the steady state fraction of publicly intermediated assets and the feed-
back parameter, , is positive. Then, the central banks credit market intervention
could limit the rise in the cost of capital for wholesale rms, so that the reduc-
tion in capital demand, Kt, could be relieved. In this set up, the central bank
nances the public credit supply to non-nancial rms by issuing the public bond,




tQtSt from the public
credit supply, which provides another source of government revenue.
Alternatively, we suppose that the central bank seeks to alleviate the uc-
tuation in the total credit supply, QtSt, by increasing the degree of public fund
injection, t, since the nancial crisis results from the contraction in private credit
supply, QtS
p
t . In addition, we assume that the central bank is allowed to choose
the degree of the intensity to which to intervene in the credit market and what
variable to use as a control variable. Then, we follow the two step approach to ob-
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tain the practical credit market intervention rule: rst, we get the optimal credit
market intervention rule by solving the central banks problem to minimise the
uctuations of total credit supply; and then modify the rule to reect the central
banks practice to intervene in the credit market.
First of all, we establish the central banks problem to minimise the devia-
tion of the total credit supply, QtSt, from its steady state value, QS, with respect











Then, solving the above problem yields the optimal credit market intervention rule







which implies that the central bank could e¤ectively eliminate the uctuation in the
total credit supply, QtSt, by the central banks counteracting policy intervention,
so that the total credit supply, QtSt, remains at its steady state value, QS, at all
times in spite of the uctuation in the private credit supply, QtS
p
t . However, it is
noticeable that the central bank does not necessarily react completely and instantly
to the motion of private credit supply, as once the policy intervention by the central
bank alleviates the initial impact of a nancial shock, the economy could return
to the steady state following the more stable path by the endogenous interaction
of the economic variables. Considering this point, we modify the optimal credit
market intervention rule in (2.41) by introducing the intensity coe¢ cient,  > 0,
to respond to the motion in private credit supply, QtS
p









which may be interpreted as the myopic form of the optimal credit market inter-
vention rule above. Moreover, noting that the crunch in the private credit supply,
QtS
p
t , is triggered by the collapse of bankersnet worth, Nt, it is su¢ cient for
the central bank to monitor and enhance the motion of bankersnet worth, Nt, to
alleviate the nancial crisis. Thus, as a policy control variable, we use the bankers
net worth, Nt, rather than the private credit supply, 	tNt, and set the practical
credit market intervention rule for the central bank as:






where  > 0 is the intensity coe¢ cient of credit market intervention, t, in response
to the motion in bankersnet worth, Nt.20 The derived credit market intervention
rule in (2.43) suggests that the central bank injects the public fund, QtS
g
t =
tQtSt, to bankersbalance sheet when the bankersnet worth, Nt, collapses so
that the private credit supply, QtS
p
t = 	tNt, is expected to shrink. Thus, if
the central bank tries to enhance the private bankersbalance sheet, the private
bankersdi¢ culty in acquiring the householdsdeposit could be relieved and the
private nancial intermediation could be restored. In this setup, the central bank is
assumed to acquire the householdsdeposit, Dt, at the riskless rate, Rt, and inject
the public funds to private bankers at the same rate, Rt. Accordingly, the central
bank could earn zero prot from the public fund injection to private bankers, but
20The coe¢ cient, (1  ), is attached for an equality in the steady state, i.e.,  = 1  
(1  )  NN  .
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by conducting the credit market intervention for the central bank.
In addition, note that in case the central bank obeys the rule in equation















Equation (2.44) implies that the central bank could relieve the uctuations in
total credit supply, QtSt, by counteracting the private bankers net worth, Nt,
to a degree of credit market intervention parameter, , which would lead to the
alleviation of the recession in a nancial crisis.
Lastly, scal authority implements government spending, Gt, which com-
prises current public spending, Gct , and expenditures on public credit supply,
QtS
g
t = tQtSt, in the presence of credit market intervention, given by
Gt = G
c
t + tQtSt, (2.45)





g exp f"g;tg (2.46)
with
g < 1, and "g;t being a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and standard
deviation g. The total government spending, Gt, is nanced by lump-sum taxes,
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Tt, the (net) issue of the public bond, (Dt  Rt 1Dt 1). In addition, if the central
bank obeys the credit market intervention rule as in Gertler and Karadi (2011),





tQtSt. Thus, in this case, the government budget
constraint is given (in real terms) by





In contrast, either when the central bank does not intervene in the credit market
or when it does so by following the credit market intervention rule in (2.43), there
does not exist prot from the public nancial intermediation for the authority.
Thus, in such cases the government budget constraint is given by
Gt = Tt + (Dt  Rt 1Dt 1) . (2.48)
2.3 Model Solution and Calibration
In this section, we discuss the solution method for the dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model, and deal with simulation strategy and parameter
calibration for policy experiments.
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2.3.1 Solution and Simulation Strategy
In the general equilibrium for our model, the innite sequence of 21 endogenous
variables, fCt,Wt, Lt, Qt, St, Kt, Nt, Vt, Yt, Yw;t, At, Pw;t, It, Gt, Gct , 	t, t, t, Rt,
Rkt , R
n
t g is determined to satisfy the 21 equilibrium conditions, which are listed in
Appendix A1.1, given 4 temporary shocks, f"r;t, "v;t, "a;t, "g;tg. Technically speak-
ing, our DSGE model belongs to a rst order non-linear rational expectations (RE)
system class, whose solution consists of a set of rst order di¤erence equilibrium
equations relating the current variables to the past state of the system and current
shocks, which is referred to as the policy function. As shown in Uhlig (1999), the
analysis for the non-linear system may be conducted by the following procedure:
(i) identifying the equilibrium conditions to construct a non-linear rational expec-
tations (RE) system; (ii) transforming the non-linear rational expectations (RE)
system into the linear one by using a rst order Taylor expansion approximation
around the steady state; (iii) choosing the parameter values by calibration; (iv)
solving the rst order linear rational expectations (RE) system by applying the
numerical methods as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980), Klein (2000) and others; and
then (v) investigating the properties of equilibrium path by analysing the impulse
responses of the model economy to a certain shock.
Having transformed our non-linear model into the linear rational expecta-
tions (RE) system as in Appendix A1.2, by applying the log-linearisation technique
presented in Appendix A2, we may write the model in the following linear rst
order di¤erence equations system:
AEt fXt+1g = BXt + CZt+1, (2.49)
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whereXt is a 211 vector of (log-deviated) endogenous variables, Zt is a 4 dimensional
vector of (log-deviated) exogenous stochastic shocks, A andB are 2121 coe¢ cient
matrices, and C is a 21  4 coe¢ cient matrix. Then, after parameter calibration
discussed in the next section, we may solve the model numerically, by using, say,
Michael Julliards software DYNARE, given that Blanchard and Kahn (1980) con-
ditions are satised.21 Our numerical computation conrms that our model has a
unique solution given some reasonable calibration of parameters, including a set
of parameter values discussed in the next section.22
Having solved our DSGE model, we investigate the impulse responses of
the model economy to diverse shocks under alternative economic environments to
study the shock propagation process and the impact of the economic environmental
change. First of all, in order to gure out how a disruption in the nancial market
propagates to the real economy, we investigate the impulse responses to a negative
net worth shock (FA(NW) model). They are compared with the impulse responses
to a negative capital quality shock (FA(CQ) model) to study sources of nancial
crisis. In addition, we compare the responses to a negative net worth shock in
an economy with standard nancial frictions (FA(NW) model) with those in the
economy with a low degree of nancial frictions (LFA(NW) model), to explore the
role of nancial accelerators in a nancial crisis. Under the LFA(NW) model, the
21Blanchard and Kahn (1980) show that the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the
(stationary) rst order linear system is determined by the relationship between the number of
forward-looking (i.e., non-predetermined) variables in the system, nx, and the number of unstable
eigenvalues (i.e., eigenvalues outside the unit circle) of the coe¢ cient matrix W = A 1B, nu.
That is, there exists a unique solution (determinacy), if nx = nu; no stable solution, if nx > nu;
and an innity of solution (indeterminacy), if nx < nu.
22As shown in Appendix A1.2, our model has 6 forward-looking variables, such as bCt+1, bRkt+1,bYw;t+1, bPw;t+1, bQt+1, and bt+1 in equations (A1.22), (A1.25), (A1.29), (A1.32) and (A1.35)
in Appendix A1.2. Thus, Blanchard-Kahn condition requires the model to have 6 unstable
eigenvalues for the transformed matrix, W = A 1B, which turns out to be satised under some
reasonable parameterisation, including our set of parameters.
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degree of moral hazard in the banking sector, which is captured by the bankers
capital diversion rate, !, is low and the inverse sensitivity of the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, to the bankersleverage ratio, 	t, which is captured by the steady state value
of nancial accelerator, 	   1, is taken to be high. Next, we study the e¤ects of
conventional monetary and scal policies in a nancial crisis, by imposing both
a negative net worth shock and expansionary policy shocks at the same time on
the FA model (FA(NW+M) and FA(NW+F) models).23 Lastly, we investigate the
impact of the credit market intervention by the government. To this end, we in-
troduce the public credit supply, tQtSt, to the economy with the standard degree
of nancial frictions (FA+CI model), where the central bank expands the public
fund injection in response to a contraction in bankersnet worth, Nt, and a rise
in the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
. Specically, we assign non-zero value to the intensity
parameter of the credit market intervention, , and compare the impulse responses
to a negative net worth shock from the FA(NW)+CI(CS) model with those from
the model without credit market intervention (FA(NW) model). In addition, the
e¤ect of credit market intervention aiming to restore the private nancial inter-
mediation by enhancing the bankersbalance sheet, (FA(NW)+CI(CS) model) is
compared with that of credit market intervention aiming at stabilising the non-
nancial rmscost of external nance,
Rkt+1
Rt
, by supplementing the private nan-
cial intermediation (FA(NW)+CI(RP) model) to study the operating mechanism
of the central banks credit market intervention. Parameter values used for each
model are discussed in the subsequent part.
23This conguration is to facilitate policy experiments. Hence, even though the assumption
that the shock process in the policies, Rnt or G
c
t , has the same structure as a shock to the bankers
net worth, Vt, is somewhat lacking in reality, it does not impede the aim of the policy experiments
here.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Calibration (Common across Models)
Parameter Value Description
 0:99 discount factor
 1:2 inverse of intertemporal elasticity of consumptions
' 3:0 inverse of elasticity of labour supply
 0:975 bankerssurvival rate
 0:3 capital share in production function
 0:025 capital depreciation rate
 1:2 capital adjustment cost coe¢ cient
 0:75 probability of not adjusting prices
 6 elasticity of substitution among retail goods
r 0:7 Taylor rule coe¢ cient on interest rate smoothing
 1:7 Taylor rule coe¢ cient on ination
y 0:3 Taylor rule coe¢ cient on output gap
g 0:8 persistence in government spending shock
a 0:8 persistence in technology shock
v 0:8 persistence in net worth shock
R 1:0101 rate of return to risk free asset in the steady state
Rk 1:0201 rate of return to capital in the steady state
C=Y 0:5614 consumption-to-output ratio in the steady state
I=Y 0:1386 investment-to-output ratio in the steady state
G=Y 0:3 government spending-to-output ratio in the steady state
2.3.2 Parameter Calibration
We calibrate the parameters, f, , ', , !, , , , , , r, , y, , a,












g, which characterise the model economy. We assign to them
the standard values in the literature, including Bernanke et al. (1999), Smets
and Wouters (2003), Christensen and Dib (2007), Gali (2008) and Gertler and
Karadi (2011). Table 2.1 presents the calibration result which is common across
alternative models, (i.e., FA, LFA, and FA+CI models), and Tables 2.2 shows the
parameter values which are di¤erent by model. Table 2.3 compares the parameter
values calibrated for the FA model with those in the previous literature.
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Table 2.2: Parameter Calibration (By Model)
Parameter Description LFA FA FA+CI
! capital diversion rate 0:1905 0:381 0:381
	 private nancial accelerator in the
steady state
5:4798 2:6676 2:6676
 portion of credit market interven-
tion in the steady state
0 0 0:15
S=N total credit-to-net worth ratio in
the steady state
5:4798 2:6676 3:1384
Gc=G share of current expenditures in
government spending
0 0 0:8
 credit market intervention coe¢ -
cient
0 0 0:5
*LFA: model with low nancial frictions but without credit market intervention
*FA: model with standard nancial frictions but without credit market intervention
*FA+CI: model with standard nancial frictions and credit market intervention
First of all, we discuss the parameter values common across models. We
set the quarterly discount factor, , at 0:99, which also pins down the steady state
quarterly riskless rate, R, at R = 1

= 1:0101 (annually 4:1%). We x the inverse
of intertemporal elasticity of consumption, , and the inverse of labour supply
elasticity, ', at 1:2 and 3:0, respectively, in keeping with much of the literature.
We take a quarterly risk spread, Rk R, to be one hundred basis point, so that the





= 1:0099. The bankers
quarterly survival rate, , is set to be 0:975, so that the average duration of bankers
is 10 years (i.e., 1
1  = 40). As is also within convention, we take the share of
capital in production, , to be 0:3. In addition, we assign the conventional value
of 0:025 to the quarterly capital depreciation rate, , implying that capital stock is
depreciated about 10 percent annually. The coe¢ cient for capital adjustment cost,
, is assumed to be 1:2, so that the inverse of elasticity of investment to the capital
price, , is calculated as 0:03. The elasticity of substitution among varieties, , is
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set to be 6, so that retail rmsdesired mark-up is pinned down at  = 
 1 = 1:2.
In addition, we let the probability of retail rms keeping prices unchanged within a
quarter, , be equal to 0:75, implying that the average duration of retail price for a
certain variety is a year (i.e., 1
1  = 4). Accordingly, the coe¢ cient attached to the
retail rmsmarginal cost in New Keynesian Phillips curve in (2.32) is calculated
as  = (1 )(1 )

= 0:0858. In addition, the steady state value of the investment-
to-output ratio, I
Y
, is calculated as 0:1386.24 Then, by setting the steady state
share of government expenditure in output , G
Y
, to be 0:3, we calculate the steady








= 0:5614. In addition,
we assume that the central bank sets Taylor rule coe¢ cients, r, , and y, to
be 0:7, 1:7, and 0:3, respectively, which are in the range of conventional values in
the literature. The persistence parameters for shocks from technology, government
expenditure, and value of net worth, a, g, and v, respectively, are all assumed
to be 0:8, which also follows the conventional business cycle literature.
Next, the parameters which are di¤erent by model are calibrated as follows.
First of all, following Gertler and Karadi (2011), we set the fraction of capital
diverted by bankers, !, at 0:381, for the FA model, so that the corresponding
values for private nancial accelerator, 	, and bankersasset-to-net worth ratio,
Sp
N









implying that bankers supply to non-nancial rms approximately 2:7 times of
funds as much as their own net worth in the steady state, by borrowing from
households the di¤erence between the credit supply and their own net worth. In
contrast, for the LFA model representing an economy with a low degree of nancial
















, where we use the





Pw + (1  ) and Pw =  1 .
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Table 2.3: Parameter Calibration (Comparison by Author)
Parameter BGG SW Gali CD GK FA
 0:99 0:99 0:99 0:99 0:99 0:99
 1 1:0 1:2
' 3:0 2 1:0 3:0
 0:9728 0:9728 0:972 0:975
 0:35 0:30 0:33 0:3384 0:330 0:3
 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025
 10 0:692 0:59 69:12 1:2
 0:75 0:905 0:667 0:7418 0:779 0:75
 6 6 6 4:7 6
r 0:9 0:8 0:8 0:7
 1:1 1:7 1:5 1:4059 2:043 1:7
y 0 0:5 0:125 0:2947 0:125 0:3
! 0:381 0:381
g 0:95 0:85 0:8
a 1:0 0:85 0:5 0:7625 0:85 0:8
Rk  R 0:02 0:0075 0:01 0:01
K=N 2 2:2 2 4 2:6676
G=Y 0:2 0:18 0:2 0:3
*BGG (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999), SW (Smets and
Wouters, 2003), Gali (Gali, 2008, chapter 3), CD (Christensen
and Dib, 2007), GK (Gertler and Karadi, 2011), FA (the bench-
mark model)
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frictions, the bankerscapital diversion rate, !, is set at half the value in the FA
model, i.e., ! = 0:1905, which is linked to higher values of private nancial accel-




than those in the FA model. On the other hand, for the FA+CI model, repre-
senting an economy in the presence of credit market intervention by the central




as compared to the size of asset market, and 1   Gc
G
= 0:2 as compared to to-







= 3:1384, in the presence of credit market intervention. The
credit market intervention parameter, , is set to be 0:5, implying that the central
bank increases the portion of public credit out of total credit supply, t, by half as
much as the contraction in bankersnet worth, Nt, in terms of percentage. On the
contrary, the parameter, , is set to be zero for the FA and LFA models, implying
that the central bank does not react to the contraction in bankersnet worth.
2.4 Model Dynamics
2.4.1 Transmission of Financial Crisis
This part explores the transmission mechanism of a nancial crisis, implying the
real recession in the economy triggered by an adverse shock in the nancial market.
To this end, we suppose the situation where the bankersnet worth collapses unex-
25The steady state values of credit market intervention is tricky to calibrate, since credit market
intervention is an exceptional event. However, in order to facilitate analysis, we calibrate the
size of credit market intervention by considering the event in the United Kingdom in 2009. At
that time, the Bank of England purchased 200 billion worth of private assets while the sizes of
the UK Gilt market and the UKs government spendings are roughly 1; 300 billion pounds and
700 billion pounds, respectively.
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pectedly in the nancial market. The solid lines in Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show how the
model economy with the standard degree of nancial frictions (FA(NW) model)
reacts to a negative net worth shock. To study the role of nancial accelerator in a
nancial crisis, they are compared to the impulse responses to the same shock un-
der the environment with a lower degree of nancial frictions (LFA(NW) model),
which are represented by the dotted lines in Figure 2.1. In addition, to investi-
gate sources of a nancial crisis, the responses to a negative net worth shock are
compared to those to a negative capital quality shock in the model with standard
nancial frictions (FA(CQ) model), which are shown in the dotted lines in Figure
2.2. However, one needs to note that our investigation on uctuations from alter-
native models aims at understanding how the economy responds to the respective
shock. Thus, the comparison here does not have quantiative implication.
First of all, we examine the motions in the solid lines in Figure 2.1 to
investigate the transmission process of a nancial crisis. A decline in bankers
net worth, Nt, in (2.12) and (2.13) immediately reduces the credit supply to non-
nancial rms, QtS
p
t , in an amplied manner, due to the balance sheet constraint
in (2.9). That is, credit supply to non-nancial rms, QtS
p
t , is reduced due to
the deciency in funds, which is due to not only the initial decline in the bankers






, where the latter would make it more di¢ cult for them to obtain
funds from households. In addition, the bankers who face deciency in funds
would impose the higher price on credit supply, QtS
p




Both the contraction in credit supply, QtS
p
t , and the increased cost of capital,
Rkt+1
Rt
, would lead to contractions in capital demand, Kt, output, Yw;t (= Yt), and
investment, It, by (2.16), (2.19), (2.14) and (2.23). All in all, a disruption in the
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nancial market could lead to a production contraction in the real sector of an
economy.
Now, we turn to demand side of the economy. As shown in the solid
lines in Figure 2.1, the production contraction, Yt, reduces the factor demands,
Kt and Lt, by (2.14) and depresses the corresponding factor prices, Qt and Wt,
which decrease the real marginal cost, i.e., the real wholesale good price, Pw;t, and
the ination of retail price, t, by (2.32). In this event, the monetary authority
eases the nominal interest rate, Rnt , in response to the fall in CPI ination, t,
and production contraction, Yt, by the Taylor-type feedback rule in (2.34), which,
in turn, decreases the real riskless rate, Rt, by the Fisher equation in (2.35). In
addition, the fall in wage, Wt, reduces households consumption, Ct, by labour
supply function in (2.5), which is limited to some degree by the fall in riskless
rate, Rt, by Euler equation in (2.4). Overall, the production contraction, Yt,
corresponds to the reductions in consumption, Ct, and investment, It, by the
resource constraint in (2.33).
The above transmission mechanism of a negative net worth shock to the
model economy reects the way how the recent nancial crisis developed. That
is, it is widely accepted that the recent crisis originated from the collapse of the
bubble in the U.S. housing market, which distorted the nancial intermediaries
balance sheet and discouraged the economic agentsactivities by the reduction in
credit supply to non-nancial rms. That is what we have shown by our nancial
crisis simulation.26
Second, the role of nancial accelerator mechanism in a nancial crisis is
26However, note that our model does not capture the economic agentsspeculative behaviours
in the recent nancial crisis. Rather, it assumes that the economic agents try to minimise the
hazardous impact of a negative shock on their welfare.
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Figure 2.1: Responses to a Negative Net Worth Shock under Di¤erent Degree of
Financial Frictions
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to negative shocks
from net worth (NW) in the models with standard (FA) and low degree of nancial
frictions (LFA), respectively.
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investigated by comparison of impulse responses of the economies with di¤erent
degree of nancial frictions. The dotted lines in Figure 2.1 represent the impulse
responses to a negative net worth shock in the economy with lower degree of
nancial frictions, where the lower degree of moral hazard, !, exists in the steady
state and the sensitivity of bankers leverage ratio to the risk premium, 	   1,
is relatively high. That is, in the economy with a low degree of moral hazard,
households react less sensitively even if the bankers balance sheet is deteriorated,
so that bankers would have less di¢ culty in obtaining funds from households even
in the nancial crisis period. Accordingly, the bankers in the economy with a low
degree of nancial frictions feel it less necessary to reduce the credit supply to non-
nancial rms, QtS
p
t , or to raise the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, than those in the economy
with a high degree of nancial frictions. This is conrmed in Figure 2.1, where
the uctuations in the economy with a lower degree of nancial frictions (LFA
model) could be relieved, as compared to those in the economy with a standard
degree of nancial frictions (FA model). Based on the result, we may argue that
the economy with a higher degree of moral hazard in the nancial sector could be
more vulnerable to the shocks in the nancial market, and could experience the
nancial crisis more severely.
Third, we compare the impulse responses to a negative net worth shock
(NW), with those to a negative capital quality shock (CQ) a la Gertler and Karadi
(2011) in the FA model, to study the sources of nancial crises. The capital
quality shock, t, may be attached to capital, Kt 1, which provides a source of
an exogenous variation in the e¤ective amount of capital, tKt 1. The presence
of capital quality shock, t, a¤ects equations associated with capital, Kt 1, such
as asset market equilibrium condition in (2.16), production function in (2.14),
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demand and supply for capital in (2.19) and (2.23), and capital accumulation in
(2.21), as follows:
Qt 1 (tKt 1) = Qt 1S
p
t 1, (2.50)



























Kt = t [K
n
t + (1  )Kt 1] . (2.54)
The model with this conguration is denoted as the FA(CQ) model, and the im-
pulse responses to a negative capital quality shock are displayed in the dotted lines
in Figure 2.2, which are compared to the solid lines representing the responses to
a negative net worth shock (which are the same as the solid lines in Figure 2.1).
Comparison of pairs of lines in Figure 2.2 reveals that these two types of shocks
produce the uctuations with the same direction, regardless of the di¤erences in
the size of uctuation and paths to the steady state. In fact, an unexpected fall
in capital quality implies that the capital returns that bankers could expect is
lowered, which leads to an endogenous fall in bankersnet worth. The process
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Figure 2.2: Responses to a Negative Net Worth Shock and a Negative Capital
Quality Shock
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to negative shocks from
net worth (NW) and capital quailty (CQ) in the FA model with standard degree of
nancial frictions, respectively.
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afterwards are the same as the scenario with a negative net worth shock. That
is, the deteriorated bankersbalance sheet makes it di¢ cult for bankers to obtain
deposits from households, leading to either the shrinking in credit supply to non-
nancial rms or the rise in the cost of capital. Thus, we may argue that these
two shocks are similar in the e¤ect on the economy, in spite of the di¤erence
in the source of the shocks (i.e., shocks in the nancial market versus those in
production technology). Furthermore, the interpretation of the result might be
that the capital quality shock could be one of the sources to reduce the bankers
net worth, like many other sources in the nancial market, such as bad news for
the banker, a collapse of bubble in asset value, and so on.
2.4.2 E¤ect of an Expansionary Monetary Policy
Next, we investigate the e¤ect of an expansionary monetary policy in a nancial
crisis. We suppose that the central bank decreases the nominal interest rate,
Rnt , when the value of bankersnet worth, Nt, collapses so that a nancial crisis
as discussed above is expected to occur. To simulate this, we impose negative
shocks to both the central banksfeedback rule in (2.34) and bankersnet worth,
Nt, in (2.12) at the same time. The dotted lines in Figure 2.3 represent the
impulse responses to a negative net worth shock in the presence of an expansionary
monetary policy (FA(NW+M) model), while the solid lines display those in the
absence of the monetary policy (FA(NW) model), which are the same as those in
the previous nancial crisis experiment. Accordingly, the comparison between the
two impulse responses reveals the role of an expansionary monetary policy under
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a nancial crisis.27
Given that the central bank reduces the nominal interest rate, Rnt , to
stabilise the economy in the nancial crisis, household consumption, Ct, increases
via the reduced real riskless rate, Rt, by the Euler equation in (2.4). The expansion
in the aggregate demand would induce the increase in output production, Yt, by the
resource constraint in (2.33), which, in turn, encourages factor demands, Kt and
Lt, by the production function in (2.14). In addition, the fall in real interest rate,
Rt, would lead to a rise in risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, i.e., the protability from nancial
intermediation for bankers in the FA(NW+M) model. Accordingly, it encourages
bankers to increase the credit supply to non-nancial rms, QtS
p
t = 	tNt, which
increases capital demand, Kt, and the bankersnet worth, Nt, over time. Then,the
increase in capital investment, It, induced by the increase in capital, Kt, by the
capital supply in (2.23) makes another source of the aggregate demand growth by
(2.33). All in all, an expansionary monetary policy could be an e¤ective tool to
stabilise the economy in a nancial crisis, by stimulating the aggregate demand.28
However, the rises in the factor prices, Qt and Wt, induced by the expansions in
factor demands, Kt and Lt, would raise the marginal production cost, Pw;t, and
then, CPI ination rate, t, by the New Keynesian Phillips curve in (2.32), which
limits the central banks expansionary position by the Taylor rule in (2.34).
27One needs to note that the comparison of the impulse responses in each model does not have
quantiative implication. It just show how an economy responds to the respective shocks.
28However, this argument holds so long as the central bank is able to adjust the nominal
interest rate, Rnt , to stabilise the economy. In contrast, for example, under zero lower bound
(ZLB) of the nominal interest rate, the central bank is unable to decrease the nominal interest
rate, so that the validity of the argument might be undermined.
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Figure 2.3: E¤ect of an Expansionary Monetary Policy under a Negative Net
Worth Shock
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to a negative net worth
shock in the absence (NW) and presence (NW+M) of an expansionary monetary
policy in the FA model with standard degree of nancial frictions, respectively.
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2.4.3 E¤ect of an Expansionary Fiscal Policy
We turn to the e¤ect of an expansionary scal policy in a nancial crisis. We
suppose that the scal authority expands the current public spending, Gct , when
the value of bankersnet worth, Nt, collapses so that a nancial crisis is anticipated.
To simulate this, when the bankersnet worth, Nt, is hit by a negative shock in
(2.12), we impose the positive shock on the current public spending process in
(2.46) at the same time. The dotted lines in Figure 2.4 represents the impulse
responses to a negative net worth shock in the presence of an expansionary scal
policy (FA(NW+F) model), which are compared to the solid lines in Figure 2.4
representing those in the absence of the scal policy (FA(NW)), in order to study
the role of an expansionary scal policy in the nancial crisis.29
An exogenous increase in the current public spending, Gct , in the FA(NW+F)
model, immediately increases aggregate demand, Yt, by the resource constraint in
(2.33), as compared to that in the FA(NW) model, as shown in Figure 2.4. How-
ever, the expansion in the current public spending, Gct , also raises the real riskless
rate, Rt, which decreases household consumption, Ct, by the Euler equation in
(2.4). It could dampen the initial increase in aggregate demand, Yt, driven by the
expansion in government spending. Accordingly, the size of the increase in factor
demands, Kt and Lt, under an expansionary scal policy could be smaller than
that under a monetary policy counterpart. Furthermore, the raised riskless rate,
Rt, reduces the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, so that the bankers are less willing to increase
credit supply to non-nancial rms, QtS
p
t = 	tNt, due to the reduced improvement
in protability from nancial intermediation. It restricts the recovery in capital
29One needs to note that the comparison for this part does not have quantiative implication.
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demand, Kt, and investment, It, by non-nancial rms. Limitation of increases in
consumption, Ct, and investment, It, under an expansionary scal policy makes it
a less e¤ective stabilising measure in a nancial crisis than an expansionary mon-
etary policy, as the conventional crowding-out e¤ectargument suggests.30 Thus,
we conrm the di¤erence between the e¤ects of conventional policies on the aggre-
gate demand in the movement of the riskless rate, Rt. That is, an expansionary
monetary policy lowers the riskless rate, while an expansionary scal policy raises
it. Accordingly, the contraction in consumption is relieved under the former, while
that in consumption is further aggravated under the latter. All of these points are
consistent with the theoretical arguments in the existing literature.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the nancial accelerator mechanism ap-
plies only to capital, while it does not to labour. That is, the reduced risk premium
discourages only capital demand, by construction. Thus, facing the reduced in-
crease in the credit supply and the raised cost of borrowing for capital acquisition,
wholesale rms could become more reliant on labour than capital to correspond
to the increased aggregate demand driven by an expansionary scal policy. The
dotted lines in Figure 2.4 shows that a negative e¤ect on the capital demand by
the factor substitution is more than o¤setting a positive e¤ect by the increase in
the aggregate demand,31 so that the capital investments, Kt and It, shrinks despite
the expansionary scal policy. That is, an expansionary scal policy in a nancial
crisis could be contractionary to capital demand. In addition, the marginal cost
30In contrast, more recent studies argue that scal policy could be quite e¤ective under some
environment. That is, it could be so in case where Ricardian equivalence does not hold (Gali,
Lopez-Salido, and Valles, 2007) or where the economy reaches at the zero lower bound (ZLB)
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2009). However, the analysis in such an environment is
beyond the scope of the thesis.
31This result is partly due to the fact that the size of the increase in the capital has been
already reduced signicantly by the crowding-out e¤ect.
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Figure 2.4: E¤ect of an Expansionary Fiscal Policy under a Negative Net Worth
Shock
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to a negative net worth
shock in the absence (NW) and presence (NW+F) of an expansionary scal policy
in the FA model with standard degree of nancial frictions, respectively.
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of production, Pw;t, and the CPI ination, t, are determined by the relative size
of the rise in wage, Wt, and the fall in capital price, Qt. Figure 2.4 shows that
the former is greater than the latter, so that CPI ination rises slightly in our
experiment in the presence of the expansionary scal policy (FA(NW+F) model),
as compared to those in the absence of the scal policy (FA(NW)). This point has
not been highlighted in the previous literature.
2.4.4 E¤ect of Credit Market Intervention
Now, we analyse the impact of credit market intervention by the central bank in
a nancial crisis. We suppose that bankersnet worth, Nt, collapses so that it
is expected that the private credit supply to non-nancial rms, QtS
p
t = 	tNt,




, soars. In recognition of the collapse in bankersnet worth,
the central bank may inject the public funds, t, into private bankersbalance





with  > 0, in
(2.43), to restore the private nancial intermediation. Alternatively, the monetary
authority may use the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, as a policy target, and supply the public








with v > 0, in (2.39), to supplement the private credit supply.
The impulse responses from the setup where the central bank follows the credit





with  > 0, denoted by the
FA(NW)+CI(CS) model, are represented by the dotted lines in Figure 2.5. On the








with v > 0, denoted by the FA(NW)+CI(RP)
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model, are represented by the dash-dot lines in Figure 2.5.32
Figure 2.5 shows how the credit market intervention moderates the con-
tractions in a nancial crisis. First of all, to investigate the working of the credit
market intervention in the FA(NW)+CI(CS) model, we examine the dotted lines
in Figure 2.5. Since the central bank injects the public funds, QtS
g
t = tQtSt, to
bankersbalance sheet at the lending rate, Rt, the initial collapse in bankersnet
worth, Nt, is relieved. Then, based on the enhanced balance sheet, Nt, the bankers
could increase the credit supply to non-nancial rms, QtS
p
t = 	tNt, in an ampli-
ed manner, because bankers nd it easier to acquire funds from households. In
addition, the bankersenhanced balance sheet makes it less necessary for them to
raise the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, because they su¤er the deciency in fund deposit less.
The increased credit supply and lowered cost of capital allow non-nancial rms
to increase capital demand and production, so that the nancial crisis triggered
by the collapse of bankersnet worth could be e¤ectively relieved.
Next, the dash-dot lines in Figure 2.5 show that the credit market inter-







, could also be e¤ective




, soars rapidly, the central bank injects the public fund directly
to non-nancial rms at the market rate, Rkt+1. Then, non-nancial rms could
avoid the rise in cost of capital nance and deciency in fund for capital so that
the economic behaviours in the real sector could be e¤ectively isolated from the
disruption in the nancial market originated from the distortion in the bankers
balance sheet.
32One needs to note that our investigation on uctuations from alternative models does not
have quantiative implication.
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Figure 2.5: E¤ect of Credit Market Intervention under a Negative Net Worth
Shock
* The dotted and dash-dot lines represent the impulse responses to a negative net
worth shock under the credit market intervention with benchmark and alternative
rules (FA(NW)+CI(CS) and FA(NW)+CI(RP) models), respectively, while the solid
lines are those in the absence of the credit market intervention.
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It is noteworthy that these two rules are di¤erent in a way the central bank
operates. Under the rst rule, the central bank monitors the nancial conditions of
bankers, and tries to restore the private nancial intermediation by enhancing the
private bankersbalance sheet. From the credit market intervention, government




regardless of the source of funds. In contrast, the monetary authority following
the second rule checks the risk premium in the nancial market which is related
to the non-nancial rmscost condition for capital acquisition and seeks to sta-
bilise the risk premium by supplying the credit for capital directly to non-nancial




. However, these two rules are common in that both could
be good ways to ght the nancial crisis. In fact, Figure 2.5 clearly shows that
the contractions triggered by a nancial disruption are relieved in the presence of
credit market intervention, no matter which rule the central bank follows. This
is because these two seemingly di¤erent rules are closely related to each other, by
the nancial accelerator, 	t =
h
1  (1  !) Rkt+1
Rt
i 1









, are positively related,











We have constructed a New Keynesian DSGE model with nancial frictions to
investigate how a nancial disruption propagates to a real economy and how the
nancial intermediation of the banking sector plays a role in the process. We also
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explore how e¤ective the conventional monetary and scal policies are to stabilise
the economy when it is hit by a nancial crisis. In addition to the conventional
policy measures, we analyse the e¤ect of the credit market intervention by the
central bank, widely referred to as quantitative easing (QE). To these ends, we
examine the impulse responses of the model economy to diverse shocks under the
alternative environments: the shocks from bankersnet worth, wholesale rms
capital quality, the monetary and scal policies in the economies with a standard
and low degree of nancial frictions in the absence of credit market intervention
by the central bank and the economy with a standard degree of nancial frictions
in its presence.
Our ndings in this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, we
show that an unexpected collapse in bankersnet worth in the nancial market
could lead to a real downturn in the business cycle by either reducing the credit
supply to non-nancial rms or increasing the cost of capital imposed on the rms.
In addition, a negative shock to the capital quality in the non-nancial rms
production technology could also result in the nancial crisis via the deterioration
in bankersbalance sheet. Based on the results, we argue that one of the sources of
the collapse in bankersnet worth, which triggers a nancial crisis, would be a fall
in the capital protability. Moreover, we nd that a higher degree of moral hazard
in the banking sector could make the economy more vulnerable to a nancial crisis,
since households would reduce the deposit more sensitively to a deterioration in
bankersbalance sheet. Second, we nd that the conventional monetary and scal
policies are e¤ective in relieving the business cycle uctuations in a nancial crisis,
so long as they are available to the authorities. However, we also establish that
an expansionary scal policy could be less e¤ective in relieving the contraction in
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capital demand than the monetary policy counterpart. This is because the former
is not only involved in so-called crowding-out e¤ectby raising the real interest
rate, but it could also discourage the bankerscredit supply for capital acquisition
via the aggravated protability from nancial intermediation in a nancial crisis.
Third, we show that the credit market intervention by the central bank could
dampen the contractions in capital investment e¤ectively by either enhancing the
bankersbalance sheet or stabilising the cost of capital for non-nancial rms. In
addition, we argue that the credit market intervention rule seeking to enhance the
bankersbalance sheet produces the qualitatively similar result to the alternative
rule aiming at stabilising the risk premium, since the bankersleverage ratio and
the risk premium are positively related to each other by the nancial accelerator
mechanism.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature as follows. First, we
highlight the important role of a sudden collapse in borrowersnet worth as a trig-
ger of a nancial crisis, while the existing research usually considers non-nancial
shocks such as the capital quality shock. We argue that our consideration may
provide the more relevant and realistic description on a nancial crisis in the sense
that a shock in the nancial market leads to a real recession in the economy via
the nancial frictions. Second, we derive an optimal credit market intervention
rule for the central bank, while the previous research just assumes the rule by the
economic intuition. Moreover, under the derived credit market intervention rule,
the central bank injects the public funds into the private nancial intermediaries
to enhance their balance sheet, and hence, to restore the private nancial inter-
mediation. Thus, the rule we derive seems to reect the central banks practical
behaviour more realistically. Third, we point out the e¤ect of conventional policies
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on the production side via the impact on the bankersprotability from the nan-
cial intermediation, while the traditional study focused mainly on the demand side.
That is, on the one hand, we conrm that expansionary policies could encourage
the aggregate demand as the traditional one suggests; on the other hand, we show
that an expansionary scal policy could discourage the aggregate supply due to
the aggravated protability from nancial intermediation, while an expansionary
monetary policy could encourage it due to the improved one.
However, our research has some limitations on addressing the long-run
growth e¤ect of the shocks and capturing the economys structural change. For
example, in addition to triggering a nancial crisis, a negative shock to bankers
net worth could cause some structural changes in economic agentsbehaviours,
which implies that the steady state itself could be changed. Indeed, the economies
which are a¤ected by the recent global nancial crisis have become increasingly
vulnerable to even a trivial shock to the nancial markets as compared to the one
prior to the crisis, which suggests that the economiesdegree of nancial frictions
has increased in the wake of the crisis. Nevertheless, our research relying on a
DSGE approach assumes the coe¢ cients in the model are constant and are not
a¤ected by the shocks. It just considers the marginal e¤ect of the shocks on the
economy around the steady state due to the mean reverting property of the model.
Therefore, the research could go further to the one that considers structural or
long-run e¤ects of the shocks in the future.
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Appendix A
Appendix A1 The Model Solution
The model is a system consisting of 21 behavioural equations with 21 endogenous
variables such as fCt, Wt, Lt, Qt, St, Kt, Nt, Vt, Yt, Yw;t, At, Pw;t, It, Gt, Gct , 	t,
t, t, Rt, Rkt , R
n
t g and 4 exogenous shocks such as f"r;t, "v;t, "a;t, "g;tg. A1.1
identies the nonlinear equations characterising equilibrium in the model. These
equations may be approximated around the steady state to be transformed into
the linear equations, which is presented in A1.2. Derivation and log-linearisation
process for equations is presented in Appendix A2.
A1.1 Equilibrium Conditions













































Nt 1 + (1  )F
  Vt (A1.5)
6. Production function:















































Kt 1 + (1  )Kt 1 (A1.10)




where  = (1 )(1 )

12. Resource constraint:



















Rnt  RtEt ft+1g (A1.14)
15. Credit market intervention rule:






16. Asset market equilibrium:
Kt = St (A1.16)
17. Wholesale goods market equilibrium:
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Yw;t = Yt (A1.17)
18. Total government spending:
Gt = G
c
t + tQtSt (A1.18)




g exp f"g;tg (A1.19)
20. Technology shock process:
At = (At 1)
a exp f"a;tg (A1.20)
21. Net worth valuation shock process:
Vt = (Vt 1)
v exp f"v;tg (A1.21)
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A1.2 The Log-linearised Model
1. Consumption Euler equation:




cWt =  bCt + 'bLt (A1.23)
3. Credit supply:
bQt + bSt = b	t + bNt +  
1  
 bt
= b	t + (1  ) bNt (A1.24)
4. Financial accelerator:
b	t = (	  1) bRkt+1   bRt (A1.25)
5. Net worth evolution:
bNt = 
264  Rk	 bRkt  R (	  1) bRt 1+
	
 




bYw;t = bAt +  bKt 1 + (1  ) bLt (A1.27)
7. Labour demand:
cWt = bYw;t   bLt + bPw;t (A1.28)
8. Capital demand:
bRkt+1 = 1  (1  )Rk
bYw;t+1   bKt + bPw;t+1+ (1  )
Rk
bQt+1   bQt (A1.29)
9. Capital supply:
bQt =  bIt   bKt 1 (A1.30)
10. Capital accumulation:
bKt = bIt + (1  ) bKt 1 (A1.31)
11. New Keynesian Phillips curve:






 bCt +  I
Y





bRnt = r bRnt 1 + (1  r)bt + (1  r)y bYt + "r;t (A1.34)
14. Fisher equation:
bRnt = bRt + Et fbt+1g (A1.35)
15. Credit policy rule:
bt =   1  

 bNt (A1.36)
16. Asset market equilibrium:
bKt = bSt (A1.37)
17. Wholesale goods market equilibrium:
bYw;t = bYt (A1.38)
18. Total government spending:
bGt = Gc
G
 bGct + 1  GcG
bt + bQt + bSt (A1.39)
19. Current government expenditure process:
bGct = g bGct 1 + "g;t (A1.40)
20. Technology shock process:
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bAt = a bAt 1 + "a;t (A1.41)
21. Net worth valuation shock process:
bVt = v bVt 1 + "v;t (A1.42)
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Appendix A2 Derivation and Log-linearisation of Equilib-
rium Conditions
A2.1 HouseholdsBehaviour
Appendix A2.1 provides derivations and linearising process for the equilibrium con-
ditions related to the householdsbehaviours: the Euler equation in consumption
and labour supply function.
Solution to the HouseholdsUtility Maximisation Problem To solve the
householdsutility maximisation problem described in the text, we establish the













 t [Ct +Bt +Dt  WtLt  Rt 1Bt 1  Rt 1Dt 1   ot + Tt]
9>=>;
where t is the shadow price for the budget constraint in period t, i.e., the value in
terms of utility of relaxing the budget constraint at the margin. Di¤erencing the
above Lagrangian with respect to Ct, Dt, and, Lt, yields the following rst order
conditions (FOC):
[Ct] : (Ct)
    t = 0
[Bt] :  t + t+1Rt = 0
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[Dt] :  t + t+1Rt = 0
[Lt] :   (Lt)' + tWt = 0.





, which, in combination with the rst condition, yields the equation








which is called the Euler equation for the consumption.
In addition, substituting t = (Ct)
  in the rst condition into the third




which corresponds to an equation (2.5) of the text.
Linearisation of Euler equation and Labour supply Now, we linearise the
Euler equation in (2.4) and labour supply in (2.5) of the text by using a rst








. In the steady state where Ct = Ct+1 = C, we obtain the
steady state relation  = 1
R
. Then, using the fact that xt = exp flog (xt)g and




1! (x  x0) + f
00(x0)
2! (x  x0)2 +   + f
(n)(x0)
n! (x  x0)n, as discussed in Chiang (1974).
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xt ' x(1 + bxt),34 the left hand side (LHS) and the right hand side (RHS) of the







































1   bCt+1 +  bCto .
Combining the LHS and RHS yields the approximation for the Euler equa-
tion around the steady state as:
bCt = EtbCt+1   1

bRt ,
which is the equation (A1.22) in Appendix A1.2.
Next, we consider the labour supply, Wt = (Ct)
 (Lt)
'. It can be approxi-
mated around the steady state where W = CL' as:
34We denote the steady state value of an arbitrary variable xt as x, and a log-deviation from the
steady state as bxt  log xtx , which can be interpreted as a percentage change of xt, since xt  x+




' 4xtx , where we use the relation, log(1+y) ' y for the small
value of y in the last equality. Then, by using a rst order Taylor expansion, we may approximate


















1 +cWt = CL' 1 +  bCt + 'bLt ,
so that
cWt =  bCt + 'bLt,
which is the equation (A1.23) in Appendix A1.2.
A2.2 BankersBehaviours
Appendix A2.2 provides log-linearising process for the equations related to the
private bankersbahaviours. We deal with the bankersbalance sheet, (private)
nancial accelerator, and net worth evolution.
Linearisation of Balance Sheet and Financial Accelerator First of all,






t , in (2.6) of the text. Note
that in the steady state Q =

1     I
K
   1 = 1, since I
K
=  as discussed in
Appendix A2.4, and hence, Sj = N j +Bj. By using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the LHS and
RHS of the equation are approximated around the steady state as:
(LHS) ' QSj
h
1 + bQt + bSjt i
(RHS) ' N j
h
1 + bN jt i+Bj h1 + bBjt i .
Combining the LHS and RHS approximated, we obtain
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bQt + bSjt = N jSj
 bN jt + 1  N jSj
 bBjt ,









in (2.10) of the text. In the steady state, we obtain Sj = 	N j, so that the above
equation can be approximated around the steady state as:
bQt + bSjt = b	t + bN jt .
Now, consider the nancial accelerator, 	t =
h




(2.10) of the text, which may be rewritten as:
1
	t





Note that the corresponding steady state relation is given by 1
	
= 1  (1  !) Rk
R
.
By using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the LHS and RHS of the equation are approximated









1 + bRkt+1   bRt .







bRkt+1   bRt ,
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  1. Thus, the above
equation can be rewritten as:
b	t = (	  1) bRkt+1   bRt ,





















which is the equation in (2.11) of the text.
Linearisation of Net Worth Evolution We linearise the evolution of net




	t 1 + Rt 1gNt 1 + (1  )F ]  Vt, in (2.13) in the









Nt 1 + (1  )F .




Rk  R	 +RN + (1  )F and we
assume that V = 1, without loss of generality. Then, by using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the
LHS is approximated as N
V

1 + bNt   bVt around the steady state. Each term of




1 + bRkt + b	t 1 + bNt 1i ,
 Rt 1	t 1Nt 1 '  R	N
h




1 + bRt 1 + bNt 1i .




1 + bNt   bVt = Rk	N h1 + bRkt + b	t 1 + bNt 1i
 R	N
h
1 + bRt 1 + b	t 1 + bNt 1i
+RN
h
1 + bRt 1 + bNt 1i+ (1  )F .
so that
bNt = 
264  Rk	 bRkt  R (	  1) bRt 1+
	
 
Rk  R b	t 1 + 	  Rk  R+R	 bNt 1
375+ bVt,
which is the equation (A1.26) in Appendix A1.2.
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A2.3 Wholesale FirmsBehaviours
Appendix A2.3 provides a solution to wholesale rmsoptimal production problem
and log-linearising process for their behavioural equations: production function
and demands on labour and capital.
Solution to Optimal Production Problem Wholesale rms optimisation
problem is solved through two steps: determining the optimal allocation among
production factors by solving the cost minimisation problem; and then, determin-
ing the wholesale good price by solving the prot maximisation problem. First
of all, we consider their cost minimisation problem. Given that wholesale rms
operate in the perfectly competitive factor market, they take the associated factor
price, Wt and Qt given. The cost minimisation problem may be written (in real
terms) as in (2.17) and (2.14) of the text:
min
fKt;Ltg
TCw;t = WtLt +

RktQt 1Kt 1   (1  )QtKt 1

subject to
Yw;t = At (Kt 1)
 (Lt)
1  .
Let t be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the production function. Then
the rst order conditions are given by
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where we use the steady state relation, Qt ' Qt, which is discussed in Appendix








































RktQt 1   (1  )Qt
  tYw;t









Next, we consider the prot maximisation problem. Noting that wholesale
rms sell the wholesale goods to retail rms in a perfectly competitive way, they
act as price takers in the wholesale goods market, so that the (real) marginal
revenue from selling the wholesale goods is equal to the (real) wholesale good
price, i.e., MRw;t = Pw;t. In addition, production maximisation requires the (real)
marginal revenue to be equal to the (real) marginal cost, i.e.,MRw;t = MCw;t, and
hence, the wholesale good price to be equal to the marginal cost of production,
i.e., Pw;t = MCw;t = t. Then, all in all, we obtain the wholesale rmsdemands
for household labour and capital, respectively, as:











Pw;t+1 + (1  )Qt+1,
which are equations (2.18) and (2.19) in the text.
Linearisation of Production function We consider the production function,
Yw;t = At (Kt 1)
 (Lt)
1 , in (2.14) of the text. It can be approximated around




1 + bYw;t = A (K) (L)1  h1 + bAt +  bKt 1 + (1  ) bLti ,
so that
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bYw;t = bAt +  bKt 1 + (1  ) bLt,
which is the equation (A1.27) in Appendix A1.2.
Linearisation of Demands for Labour and Capital Consider the labour





Pw;t, in (2.18) of the text. In the steady state, we
have W = (1  )  Yw
L

Pw. Using the relation xt ' x(1 + bxt), the above equation
is approximated around the steady state as:
W






1 + bYw;t   bLt + bPw;ti
so that
cWt = bYw;t   bLt + bPw;t,
which is the equation (A1.28) in Appendix A1.2.






(1  )Qt+1, in (2.19) of the text. The steady state relation for capital demand es-











Then, using the relation xt ' x(1 + bxt), we obtain the approximated relations for
the LHS and RHS of the above equation around the steady state as:
(LHS) ' Rk
h








1 + bYw;t+1   bKt + bPw;t+1i+ (1  ) h1 + bQt+1i .
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Combining the LHS and RHS yields the approximation for the capital demand
function:
bRkt+1 = 1  (1  )Rk
bYw;t+1   bKt + bPw;t+1+ (1  )
Rk
bQt+1   bQt,
which is the equation (A1.29) in Appendix A1.2.
A2.4 Capital ProducersBehaviours
In Appendix A2.4, we discuss capital producersbehaviours: capital supply and
capital accumulation.
Solution to Capital ProducersProblem We consider the capital producers
prot maximisation problem described in (2.20), (2.22) and (2.21) in the text,
which may be written as:
c;t = QtKt  





t + (1  )Kt 1] 



























is interpreted as the capital rental rate, charged by the whole-
sale rms. Note that the assumption of the constant return to scale (CRS) in













competition in the capital market, implies zero prot in equilibrium, i.e., c;t = 0,
so that the equilibrium rental rate of the existing capital is specied as:
















=  (and hence, Q =

1     I
K
   1 = 1) at the steady
state, the rental rate of the existing capital stock is of second order around the
steady state, i.e.,

















   = 0,
so that Q = Q. Thus, in the steady state, the above capital producersproblem













The optimality conditions for the above prot maximisation problem with


































in (2.23 ) of the text, and the second one suggests that It+1
Kt
= , which is satised
in the steady state.












Kt 1 + (1  )Kt 1, in (2.20) and (2.21)
of the text, which can be rewritten as:
Kt
Kt 1










Note that, in the steady state whereKt 1 = Kt = K, the above equation is written
as the following steady state relation:
K
K
























Accordingly, we establish the steady state relation, I
K
= . Then, by using the
relation xt ' x(1 + bxt), the LHS and RHS of the capital accumulation equation
















1 + bIt   bKt 1  2
' 






'  + 
bIt   bKt 1 ,





can be ignored around the steady state since the squared value of a very small
value (such as bIt  bKt 1) is innitesimal. Combining the LHS and RHS yields the
approximation for the capital accumulation:
bKt = bKt 1 +  bIt   bKt 1
= bIt + (1  ) bKt 1,
which is the equation (A1.31) in Appendix A1.2.




















Note that in the steady state I
K
= , and hence, Q =

1     I
K
   1 = 1. Then,
using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the LHS and RHS of the above equation are approximated
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around the steady state as:
(LHS) ' 1  1
Q







1 + bIt   bKt 1  
' 
bIt   bKt 1 .
Combining the LHS and the RHS yields the approximation for the capital supply
function:
bQt =  bIt   bKt 1 ,
which is an equation (A1.30) in Appendix A1.2.
A2.5 Retail FirmsBehaviours
Appendix A2.5 provides derivation and linearisation of retail rms behaviour:
aggregate price dynamics and New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC).35









1  + (1  )  P t1 i 11  , in (2.25) and (2.28) of











35Discussion in this part is broadly based on Gali (2008, Chapter 3).
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Note that in the zero ination steady state, Pt 1 = Pt = P , so that P = P
since P =
h
P 1  + (1  )P 1 
i 1
1 
. Then, by using the relation xt ' x(1 + bxt),







1 + (1  )
 bPt   bPt 1i
' 1 + (1  )
 bPt   bPt 1 ,
and





1 + (1  )
bP t   bPt 1i
' 1 + (1  ) (1  )
bP t   bPt 1 .
Combining the LHS and RHS yields the linearised form of aggregate price dynam-
ics:
bt  bPt   bPt 1 = (1  )bP t   bPt 1 .
Derivation of Demand for the Individual Variety Consider the composite
















, in (2.25) of the text. Now, note that consumers
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expenditure minimisation problem implies choosing Yt (j) for any given (nominal)
expenditure level, Zt 
R 1
0













P t (j)Yt (j) dj   Zt

.





















 = tP t (j) .






































































































so that Zt = PtYt. Combining the above two equations yields the demand schedule







which is the equation (2.27) in the text.
Derivation and Linearisation of Optimal Price Setting Rule Now, we
consider the retailersprot maximisation problem described in (2.29) and (2.30)



































































 1  , is interpreted as the desired markup, in that the optimal price







Pw;t in the absence of price rigidity.36
Moreover, note that in the zero ination steady state all the agents in the econ-
omy choose the same quantities. Then, we obtain Pt = Pt 1 = P , P (j) = P and









. In addition, we establish that in the zero ina-







Imposing the steady state conditions upon the discount factor, t;t+k, and
the levels of output, Yt+k, and price, Pt+k, we obtain the approximation for the


























Then, by using the relation xt ' x(1+bxt), the LHS and RHS of the above equation
are approximated around the steady state as:
































where the last equality follows from the denition of the elasticity of substitution, . In ad-
dition, the prot maximisation in the competitive market requires MRt(j) = MCt(j) = Pw;t, so































































 bPw;t+k + bPt+k   bPt 1  (1  ) 1X
k=0
()k bPt+k# .
Combining the LHS and RHS yields the linear approximation for the optimal price
setting rule of the retailers around the steady state as:
bP t(j)  bPt 1 = (1  )Et 1X
k=0
()k
 bPw;t+k + bPt+k   bPt 1 .
Now, we may transform the above equation into a rst order di¤erence






 bPt+k   bPt 1
= (1  )Et
n bPt   bPt 1+ () bPt+1   bPt 1+ ()2  bPt+2   bPt 1+   o
= (1  )Et









Substitution of this into the previous price setting rule yields the following rst
order di¤erence equation:







n bPw;t + () bPw;t+1 + ()2 bPw;t+2 +   o
+Et
bt + () bt+1 + ()2 bt+2 +   	










= (1  ) bPw;t + bt + ()Et nbP t+1(j)  bPto .
Furthermore, noting that bP t(j) = bP t by the assumption of homogeneity, the
above equation can be written as
bP t   bPt 1 = (1  ) bPw;t + bt + ()Et nbP t+1   bPto .
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Derivation of New Keynesian Phillips Curve Now, by combining the ag-
gregate price dynamics, bt = (1  )bP t   bPt 1, with the retail rmsoptimal
price setting rule, bP t   bPt 1 = (1  ) bPw;t + bt + ()Et nbP t+1   bPto, we may
derive the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), as:
bt
1   = (1  )





bt = Et fbt+1g+  bPw;t,
with   (1 )(1 )

, which is the equation (A1.32) of Appendix 1.2. It shows that
the current ination is determined by the expectation on the future ination and
the current marginal costs.
Furthermore, by solving for bt forward by the repeated substitution, we
obtain the NKPC as the following forward-looking solution:
bt = lim
k!1









for  2 (0; 1), implying that the current ination is determined by the discounted
sum of the future expected marginal costs, bPw;t+k = dMCt+k.
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Resource Constraint Consider the resource constraint, Yt = Ct + It + Gt, in
(2.33). Note that in the steady state, Y = C + I +G. Then, using xt ' x(1 + bxt),
the above equation is approximated around the steady state as:
Y

1 + bYt = C 1 + bCt+ I 1 + bIt+G1 + bGt ,
so that we obtain
bYt = C
Y
 bCt +  I
Y
 bIt + G
Y
 bGt,
which is the equation (A1.33) in Appendix A1.2.
A2.6 Government Policy
In Appendix A2.6, we derive and log-linearise the equations for government poli-
cies.















exp f"r;tg, in (2.34).
Taking logarithms on both sides yields the approximation of the Taylor rule around
the steady state as:
bRnt = r bRnt 1 + (1  r)bt + (1  r)y bYt + "r;t
which is an equation (A1.34) in Appendix A1.2.
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Derivation and Linearisation of Credit Market Intervention Rule We
consider the central banks problem to minimise the uctuation in total credit










which is an equation (2.40) in the text. The rst order condition with respect to
the public credit supply, t, is:
0 = 2 (	tNt)
















so that in the presence of credit market intervention, i.e., t 2 (0; 1), the optimal







where we use the steady state relation, 	N
1  = QS = S. By introducing the
intensity coe¢ cient of credit market intervention,  > 0, as discussed in the text,
we specify the credit market intervention rule as:






which is an equation in (2.43) in the text.
Next, we linearise the above credit market intervention rule. By using
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xt ' x(1 + bxt), the LHS and RHS of the above equation are approximated around
the steady state as:
(LHS) ' (1 + bt)






 bNt   0i .
Combining both sides yields
bt =   1  

 bNt,
which is the equation (A1.36) in Appendix A1.2.
Linearisation of Total Credit Supply We consider the total credit supply,
QtSt =
	t
1 tNt, in (2.38) of the text, which can be rewritten as:
1  t = 	tNt
QtSt
.
Note that in the steady state,  = 1  	N
S
. By using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the LHS and
RHS of the above equation are approximated around the steady state as:






1 + b	t + bNt   bQt   bSt
' (1  )

1 + b	t + bNt   bQt   bSt .
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Combining the LHS and RHS yields
bt = 1  

 bQt + bSt   b	t   bNt ,
so that
bQt + bSt = b	t + bNt +  
1  
 bt
which is the rst equation in (A1.24) in Appendix A1.2.
Alternatively, we may simplify the approximated total credit supply, bQt +bSt = b	t+ bNt+  1  bt, by substituting the approximated the public credit supply,bt =    1   bNt as:








= b	t + (1  ) bNt,
which is the second equation in (A1.24) in Appendix A1.2.
Linearisation of Total Government Spending Consider the government
spending, Gt = Gct + tQtSt, in (2.45) of the text. Note that in the steady state,
G = Gc + QS, so that S = G Gc. By using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the LHS and RHS







1 + bGct+ S 1 + bt + bQt + bSt .
Combining the LHS and RHS yields
bGt = Gc
G
 bGct + 1  GcG
bt + bQt + bSt ,
which is the equation in (A1.39) in Appendix A1.2.
99
Chapter 3
Sudden Stop Crisis in Emerging
Markets
3.1 Introduction
Emerging market countries, which are characterised by a substantial degree of
trade and nancial openness, have usually been considered to be vulnerable to the
events which occur in foreign countries. For example, a negative change in foreign
investorsperception about an emerging market economy could cause the capital
inow to come to a standstill, a situation labeled as a sudden stop(Calvo, 1998),
leading to a drastic fall in economic activity. Indeed, emerging market economies
experienced a number of such episodes throughout the 1990s, such as Mexico (1994-
95), a group of East Asian countries (1997), Russia (1998) and Brazil (1998-99).
In addition, the recent global nancial crisis episode, triggered by the collapse of
the housing market bubble in the United States in 2007-2008, shows how emerging
market countries are a¤ected by the crisis which breaks out in the global nancial
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hub.
As regards these events, many authors have provided stylised facts about
sudden stop crises in emerging market countries through the theoretical and em-
pirical works. First of all, Calvo and Reinhart (2000), Bleaney (2005) and Curdia
(2007) found that when an emerging market economy is hit by a sudden stop, there
tend to be a great currency depreciation, substantial contractions in investment
and production, and a temporary growth in exports but a signicant reduction in
imports. In addition, Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), Uribe and Yue (2006)
and Chang and Fernandez (2010) showed that the foreign debt and balance-sheet
e¤ectplayed an important role in business cycle uctuations in emerging market
countries. Furthermore, as Calvo and Reinhart (2000) point out, this kind of cri-
sis tends to take place against a background of soft-pegged exchange rate regime,
which supports the fear of oatingargument a la Calvo and Reinhart (2002).1
However, in spited of those common features as to sudden stop crises, it is also
noteworthy that the specic pattern of crisis that an individual emerging market
economy exhibited varied with the countrys pre-crisis conditions, as Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2010) pointed out.
Motivated by the above observations, this chapter aims at enhancing our
understanding of sudden stop crises in emerging market countries. Our interest
covers: (i) what triggers a sudden stop of the capital inows into an emerging
1Fear of oatingrefers to the phenomenon that an economy is reluctant to adjust exchange
rates (de facto), even though it announces to adopt a free oating exchange rate regime (de jure).
This phenomenon is prevalent particularly in emerging markets, where there exists a large amount
of foreign currency denominated debt (domestic liability dollarisation, DLD). This is because of
the inability of these countries to borrow abroad in their own currency, which is referred to as
original sinby Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999). In these circumstances, the fear of oating
could occur due to the concern about the negative impact of the currency depreciation on the
economic activities, which is referred to as balance-sheet e¤ectin the literature.
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market economy; (ii) how the economy is a¤ected by the sudden stop; (iii) and
what kind of pre-crisis conditions a¤ect the sudden stop crisis. To these ends, this
chapter extends a closed economy New Keynesian DSGE model with nancial fric-
tions as in Chapter 2 to the one allowing for the nature of a small open economy2
to simulate a sudden stop crisis for an emerging market economy more realisti-
cally. We construct a New Keynesian DSGE model for a small open economy with
nancial frictions, which is based on Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007) and
Curdia (2007, 2009). These kinds of models link an event in the nancial sector to
responses in real economic activities under a small open economy setting, so as to
make them e¤ective in analysing sudden stop crises in emerging market economies.
Having constructed the DSGE model, we investigate the impulse responses of the
model economy to a negative change in foreign lendersevaluation on the domestic
entrepreneursnancial condition, to analyse the transmission of sudden stops to
emerging market economies. In addition, we conduct a set of experiments to study
what kind of roles the environmental conditions play in the development of the
sudden stop crisis in the emerging market countries. In particular, we investigate
the roles of exchange rate regime choice and an economys degree of foreign input
reliance in a sudden stop crisis under an open economy setting to enhance the
understanding of the impact of foreign shocks to an emerging market economys
business cycle.
Our main ndings are summarised as follows. First, we establish that
foreign lendersnegative perception regarding an emerging market economy could
2An emerging market economy described in the thesis implies a small open economy, unless
otherwise mentioned. Accordingly, the economic variables in foreign countries are assume to be
una¤ected by the domestic agentsbehaviours, except for the variations by the change in the
exchange rate.
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actually lead to a recession there via sudden stops in foreign fund inow and the
rise in cost of foreign borrowing. That is, foreignerspessimistic outlook could
be self-fullled, in the sense that the crisis in the emerging market economy is
triggered by none other than the foreigners own actions, as Calvo (1998) and
Krugman (1999) suggest. Second, we identify some environmental conditions in
emerging market economies that could make the sudden stop crisis aggravated.
The conditions include: (i) the presence of substantial degree of nancial frictions
in the economy; (ii) the coincidence of sudden stops and a global recession; (iii)
the choice of a xed exchange rate regime; and (iv) an economys heavy reliance on
the foreign resources for capital production. That is, (i) a high degree of nancial
frictions could make a sudden stop crisis aggravated, since in this circumstances
foreigners react susceptibly to even the temporary and slight distortions in en-
trepreneursnancial condition; (ii) when a global recession coincides with the
sudden stops, the recovery channel via the currency depreciation and the expan-
sion in export in a sudden stop crisis could be interrupted due to the lack of global
demand; (iii) when an emerging market economy relies heavily on foreign resources
for capital production, it could su¤er a sudden stop crisis more severely, as the
currency depreciation in a sudden stop crisis would raise the capital production
cost additionally so that the capital demand is further depressed; and (iv) a xed
exchange rate regime could be inferior to a oating exchange rate system in the
face of sudden stop crises, in case a negative e¤ect of a xed exchange rate regime
by limiting the improvement in price competitiveness for home goods o¤sets a
positive e¤ect by stabilising a rise in cost of foreign borrowing.
From our study, we contribute to the existing literature as follows. First,
we establish an important role of a negative change in foreign lendersperception
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on an emerging market economy as a more primitive source of a nancial crisis in
the economy. In addition, we conrm the so-called self-fullling pessimismargu-
ment a la Calvo (1998) and Krugman (1999) in a general equilibrium framework.
Second, we point out the potential weakness of the fear of oatingargument a la
Calvo and Reinhart (2002). That is, even if the argument holds in case a nancial
crisis in an emerging market economy is caused by a currency depreciation via
a balance sheet e¤ect, it may not in a di¤erent environment, e.g., in case their
balance sheet is directly distorted by a collapse of borrowersnet worth. Third,
we simulate the e¤ect of processing trade in a general equilibrium framework.
It suggests that if an emerging market economy relies highly on the foreign in-
puts, it is not likely to recover through the currency depreciation and the resulting
expansion in export, due to the aggravated production cost.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 sets up
a New Keynesian DSGE model for a small open economy with nancial frictions.
Section 3.3 presents the simulation strategy and calibration. Section 3.4 discuss
the transmission of the crisis and the role of pre-crisis conditions in the process of
crisis through a set of crisis experiments. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Model
The small open economy model consists of the domestic and foreign blocks. Since
we are assuming the small open economy, the behaviours in the foreign block is
considered exogenously given, and the transactions across border are governed by
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the law of one price (LOOP) and the uncovered interest parity condition (UIPC).3
The domestic economy is populated by households, entrepreneurs, capital produc-
ers, retailers, and government. Households consume domestic and foreign goods,
purchase domestic and foreign riskless bonds from domestic government and for-
eign nancial intermediaries, supply labour to domestic entrepreneurs, and pay
the taxes to the domestic government. Entrepreneurs produce wholesale goods
by combining labour hired from domestic households and capital acquired from
domestic capital producers, and sell them to domestic retail rms in a competitive
way. In order to acquire capital, entrepreneurs use their own net worth and the for-
eign borrowings. Capital producers combine the existing capital goods purchased
from entrepreneurs and domestic and foreign nal goods, to construct the brand
new capital goods. Retail rms purchase the wholesale goods from entrepreneurs,
di¤erentiate them to their own varieties, set the retail prices for the individual
varieties in the environment of monopolistic competition and price stickiness a
la Calvo (1983), and sell them to domestic and foreign consumers, i.e., domestic
and foreign households, domestic capital producers and the domestic government.
Government sets the nominal interest rate according to Taylor-type (1993) feed-
back rule and implement the government spending, which is nanced by taxes and
public bond issueing. Each agents behaviours are described in more detail below.4
3Note that it is assumed that there does not exist any frictions in the transactions across
border such as trade costs and capital immobility. This is a conguration for the analysis to be
focused on the nancial frictions arising from the information asymmetry between foreign lenders
and domestic borrowers.
4Appendix B2 provides derivation and linearisation process for equilibrium conditions for our
small open economy model.
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3.2.1 Households
Households consume home and foreign goods, work for entrepreneursrms, and
deposit their savings at domestic and foreign bonds. They derive the lifetime




tU (Ct; Lt) (3.1)
where  2 (0; 1) is their subjective discount factor. Moreover, their utility function
is assumed to be specied as:








where  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption and ' > 0 is the inverse elasticity of labour supply. Suppose that they
are allowed to access the international credit market (ICM) without any frictions,
and hence, they can use both the domestic and foreign bonds, Dt and Bt ,
5 for
consumption smoothing.6 Households are assumed to enter period t with domes-
tic and foreign (real) bonds, Dt 1 and Bt 1, which yield the gross (real) returns,
Rt 1 and Rt 1, respectively, over the period t. In addition, during the period t,
they collect the nominal wage, Wt, from supplying the labour, Lt, and receive the
real dividend arising from the ownership of rms, ot . Their budget is spent on
5Henceforth, foreign variables or variables denominated in foreign currency are denoted by a
superscript asterisk (*).
6Note that it is assumed that there does not exist domestic private nancial intermediaries in
the home country in order to focus our analysis on the implication of nancial frictions between
foreign lenders and domestic borrowers. This assumption reects that many of emerging market
economies do not have the su¢ ciently developed domestic nancial system. Accordingly, in our
model economy domestic households save their deposits either on the domestic public bonds,
Dt, or the foreign private bonds, Bt , and domestic entrepreneurs borrow funds from foreign
intermediaries only, as discussed later.
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consumption, Ct, payment of the (real) lump-sum taxes, Tt, and purchase of the
domestic and foreign bonds, Dt and Bt . Thus, their period budget constraint is
given in real terms by











t   Tt (3.3)
for all t = 0; 1; 2; : : :, where Pt is the domestic consumer price index (CPI) and
St is the nominal exchange rate, which is dened as the price of foreign curreny in
terms of domestic currency.
The households seek to maximise the lifetime utility in (3.1) subject to the
period budget constraint in (3.3). The resulting rst order conditions yield the
following Euler equation for consumption, labour supply function, and uncovered























Euler equation in (3.4) establishes the negative relationship between the ratio
of the current consumption to the future one, Ct
Ct+1
, and the real interest rate,
Rt, everything else being equal. Labour supply function in (3.5) implies that an
increase in the real wage, Wt
Pt
, induces an increase in the labour supply, Lt, ceteris
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paribus. Uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIPC) suggests that no matter
where they invest, asset holders should earn the same returns in terms of domestic
currency by the arbitrage. In addition, the uncovered interest rate parity condition
in (3.6) points to the nature of capital mobility. That is, it implies that a fall in
the domestic riskless rate, Rt, relative to the foreign one, Rt , would lead to the
capital outow and the domestic currency depreciation without any frictions.
Next, we turn to the domestic householdsconsumption allocation between
the domestic and foreign goods. Their consumption bundle, Ct, is composed of
domestic and foreign goods (in terms of domestic currency), denoted by CH;t and














where  2 (0; 1) is the share of domestic goods in consumption bundle in the steady
state,8 and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between CH;t and CF;t. The
corresponding consumer price index (CPI), Pt, is given by the following constant




1  + (1  ) (PF;t)1 
 1
1  (3.8)















, respectively, where j 2 (0; 1) denotes
varieties, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among varieties produced within a country.
In addition, the corresponding price indices for domestic and foreign goods, PH;t and PF;t, in


















8Accordingly, (1  ) represents the degree of openness of the economy.
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where PH;t and PF;t denote the nominal retail price indices in domestic currency
for domestic and imported goods, respectively. Then, domestic householdsexpen-
diture minimisation implies the following demands for domestic and foreign goods














Equations (3.9) and (3.10) suggest that they are positively related with the size
of the total consumption bundle, Ct, and negatively related with the real prices of





3.2.2 Rest of the World
Economic agents in foreign countries import domestic retail goods, export foreign
goods to home country, and engage in nancial transaction of the foreign currency
denominated bond. We have discussed the domestic consumersdemand for im-
ported goods in the previous part, and will deal with the domestic entrepreneurs
foreign borrowing in the subsequent part. This part explores the export demand
of home goods in the foreign countries.
First of all, we discuss some nature of domestic and foreign economies to
characterise the transactions across border. First, we assume that there does not
exist the local pricing, so that the law of one price (LOOP) holds for the home
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and foreign goods. Thus, the nominal prices of home and foreign goods in foreign
currency, P H;t and P

F;t, respectively, are linked to those in domestic currency, PH;t









In addition, note that, in the small open economy (SOE) setting, the rest of
the world is so large that the portion of transaction with an individual emerging
market economy is innitesimal and the e¤ects of the home countrys behaviours
are negligible. Then, we may assume that P F;t = P










and P t denote the foreign householdsconsumption bundle, foreign output level,
and foreign consumer price index, respectively. Moreover, the consideration of the
small open economy suggests that the foreign variables, such as the foreign output







international riskless rate, Rt , are given exogenously to the domestic behaviours,
according to the following rst order autoregressive (AR(1)) process:
9Strictly speaking, the law of one price (LOOP) holds for the individual variety, such
that P H;t (j) =
PH;t(j)
St
and PF;t (j) = StP F;t (j). However, we obtain the aggregate











































































r exp f"r;tg , (3.15)
where
y < 1, jj < 1 and jr j < 1, and "y;t, ";t, and "r;t are Gaussian
white noises with means all zeroes and standard deviations y , , and r,
respectively.
Next, we discuss the export demand for the home goods in the foreign
countries, CH;t. We assume that the foreign consumers preference over home
and foreign goods has an analogous structure to that of the domestic consumers
in (3.7) in terms of functional form, the elasticity of substitution among varieties,
and so on. Then, from the expenditure minimisation for foreign consumers, export








where  2 (0; 1) is the steady state share of home goods in the foreign consumers
consumption bundle, Ct , and 
 > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between home
and foreign goods for the foreign consumers. For analytical simplicity, we suppose
that the price elasticity of export demand for home goods in foreign countries is
the same as that for home goods in domestic country, i.e.,  = . In addition, we
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Then, under the assumptions of the small open economy (SOE) and the law of one
price (LOOP) for home goods, the export demand for home goods in (3.16) may













Y t . (3.18)
Equation (3.18) suggests that the export demand for home goods, CH;t, in foreign









Entrepreneurs are key players in the setup. They combine capital and labour to
produce wholesale goods and sell them to domestic retailers in a perfectly com-
petitive manner. They borrow from foreign lenders to nance capital acquisition.
Entrepreneurs accumulate the prots in the form of net worth. We discuss each
of entrepreneursactivities in more detail below.
10In addition, under the assumptions of law of one price (LOOP) and small open economy, the















. Thus, the import demand for foreign goods in (3.10) and the consumer price index in (3.8)





+(1  ) (St)1  , respectively.
Accordingly, we establish that the import demand is decreasing in the real exchange rate, while
the CPI is increasing in it.
112
3.2.3.1 Production of Wholesale Goods
Entrepreneurs purchase capital from capital producers in each period t   1, for
the use in the subsequent period t. Capital, Kt 1, is used to produce wholesale
goods, Yw;t, in combination with labour hired from households, Lt, in period t, by
the following Cobb-Douglas technology:
Yw;t = At (Kt 1)
 (Lt)
1  , (3.19)
with  denoting a share of capital in the production function.11 At is a shock
to total factor productivity (TFP), which is governed by the following rst order
autoregressive (AR(1)) process:
At = (At 1)
a exp f"a;tg , (3.20)
where jaj < 1, and "a;t is a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and standard de-
viation a. In addition, following Gertler et al. (2007), entrepreneurs are assumed
to borrow from foreign lenders at the rate of Rkt to nance the capital acquisition,
and to resell the undepreciated capital goods, (1  )Kt 1, to capital producers
immediately after nishing the wholesale good production. Then, their (real) cost








RktQt 1Kt 1   (1  )QtKt 1

, (3.21)
where Rkt is the required capital returns, Qt is the real capital price, and  is the
depreciation rate for the capital goods. We suppose that the entrepreneurs op-
11The assumption of constant returns to scale allows us to write the production function as
an aggregate relationship. Thus, we drop the rm specic subscript, for notational simplicity.
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erate as price takers both in the wholesale goods market and in the production
factor market. Then, cost minimisation in (3.21) subject to the production tech-






















Pw;t+1 + (1  )Qt+1

, (3.23)
where Pw;t is the real wholesale good price.12 Labour demand function in (3.22)
implies that labour demand, Lt, increases with a production expansion, Yw;t, and
a rise in the real wholesale good price, Pw;t, but decreases with a rise in the real
wage, Wt
PH;t
. Capital demand function in (3.23) suggests that, given other things
xed, capital demand, Kt, increases with a plan for production expansion, Yw;t+1,
and an expected rise in the wholesale good price, Pw;t+1, while it decreases with
rises in the required capital returns, Rkt+1, and the (current) capital price, Qt.
3.2.3.2 Optimal Contracting Problem
Next, we explore the entrepreneursdecision making to nance the capital acqui-
sition. At the end of period t, the entrepreneurs are assumed to have available
their own net worth, Nt, which is the accumulation of their past prot. Then, they
borrow from abroad the di¤erence between the capital demand, QtKt, and the net
12Note that since entrepreneurs sell the wholesale goods in a perfectly competitive market,
the real wholesale good price, Pw;t, is required to equal the real marginal cost of producing the
wholesale goods, MCw;t, i.e., Pw;t = MCw;t, in the equilibrium.
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worth, Nt,13 so that the (real) entrepreneursbalance sheet is given in domestic
currency by:
QtKt = Nt + StB

t , (3.24)
where Bt is the entrepreneurs (real) borrowing from foreign lenders in foreign






households and impose the gross capital returns, Rkt+1 on entrepreneurs.
Now, we discuss the loan contracting problem between foreign lenders
and domestic entrepreneurs.14 First of all, note that in the absence of nancial
frictions, credit market arbitrage implies that there would not exist any wedge
















However, the presence of nancial frictions would break the equality between Rkt+1
and Rt. To model the nancial frictions, we postulate the costly state verication
(CSV) problem a la Townsend (1979) and Bernanke et al. (1999). We suppose
that an individual entrepreneur su¤ers from an idiosyncratic shock, !t+1 2 (0;1),
to the capital returns, Rkt+1. In addition, it is assumed that !t+1 is independently,
identically and log-normally distributed across time and rms, with E f!t+1g =
1, and with F (!t+1) and f (!t+1) denoting the cumulative distribution function
(c.d.f.) and probability density function (p.d.f.) of !t+1, respectively. Hence,
13It is assumed that there does not exist domestic private nancial intermediation in the
economy to be consistent with the assumption for householdsbudget constraint in equation (3.3).
Accordingly, domestic entrepreneurs are allowed to borrow from foreign nancial intermediaries
only.
14The formal representation of the problem and the solution is presented in Appendix B2.2.
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the ex post gross capital returns would be !t+1Rkt+1, where R
k
t+1 is the ex post
aggregate return to capital, i.e., the gross return averaged across rms. Then,
given Rkt+1QtKt and StB

t , the debt contract is characterised by the contractual






In this setup, the costly state verication(CSV) problem implies that
borrowers can observe the realised capital returns, !t+1Rkt+1QtKt, while lenders
cannot do so without paying an auditing cost (or bankruptcy cost), which is





t+1QtKt. Then, if !t+1  !t+1, the entrepreneur would repay the loan
to foreign lenders at the contractual rate, Rbt , and collect the remainder of the
prot, i.e., !t+1RktQtKt   RbtStBt ; but if !t+1 < !t+1, she would declare to de-
fault (and hence, receives nothing), while foreign lenders keep whatever they nd
after paying the auditing cost, i.e., (1   b)!t+1Rkt+1QtKt. Then, foreign lenders
are willing to participate in the debt contract, when it is expected that the gross
returns from the loan is larger than the opportunity cost of funds. Accordingly,
foreign lendersincentive constraint is given (in domestic currency) by
[1  F (!t+1)]RbtStBt + (1  b)Rkt+1QtKt
Z !t+1
0
!t+1dF (!t+1)  RtBt St+1.
(3.27)
In addition, considering the entrepreneurs default threshold in (3.26) and balance
sheet in (3.24), we may write the foreign lendersparticipation constraint in (3.27)
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where   (!t) and bG (!t) denote the rates of total (expected) payment going to
foreign lenders and their auditing cost, respectively, given by:
  (!t+1)  [1  F (!t+1)]!t+1 +
Z !t+1
0
!t+1dF (!t+1) , (3.29)
and
bG (!t+1)  b
Z !t+1
0
!t+1dF (!t+1) . (3.30)
Then, the optimal contracting problem implies that the entrepreneur chooses the
level of borrowings to maximise her expected prot, (1    (!t+1))Rkt+1QtKt, sub-














From the optimal borrowing equation in (3.31), we establish the external nance

















with 	0 > 0. In addition, for analytical facilitation, we specify the external nance







where  > 0 denotes the elasticity of the external nance premium, 	t, with
respect to the entrepreneurs leverage ratio, QtKt
Nt
.15 Equation (3.33) implies that
if the foreign lenders perceive the increase in the entrepreneurs leverage ratio,
QtKt
Nt
, they would charge the higher risk premium, 	t, to entrepreneurs.









from equations (3.31) and (3.32). Equation (3.34) suggests that in the presence
of information asymmetry in the loan contract, the uncovered interest rate parity
in (3.6) is required to be augmented by the external nance premium factor, 	t,
which is increasing in the entrepreneursleverage ratio, QtKt
Nt
, by (3.33). Therefore,
if the foreign lenders evaluate an entrepreneurs balance sheet as being distorted,
the cost of foreign borrowing that the entrepreneur faces would be raised.
15As shown in Gertler et al. (2007),  can be calculated from the steady state values of the
risk premium, R
k
R , and the leverage ratio,
K




3.2.3.3 Net Worth Evolution
Lastly, we discuss the evolution of entrepreneursaggregate net worth, Nt. First
of all, following Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we
assume that entrepreneurs survive with the rate of  each period, and then, newly
entering entrepreneurs ll the places of failed ones with a xed amount of start up
funds, F .16 In addition, note that the successful entrepreneursnet worth is the
accumulation of their past prots, RktQt 1Kt 1   Rt 1	t 1Bt 1St. Accordingly,








+ (1  )F   Vt, (3.35)
where Vt is the foreign lendersevaluation factor on the entrepreneursnet worth,
Nt, which includes foreign lendersoutlook on entrepreneursprotability, the eco-
nomic situation in the emerging market economy, the availability of foreign cur-
rency, and so on and so forth. Under normal circumstances, foreigners trust the
book value of the entrepreneursnet worth, Nt, so that Vt = 1. However, in some
periods, which is characterised by a sudden stop crisis, foreign lenders might have
pessimism about the entrepreneurs, so that they would devalue the entrepreneurs
net worth, i.e., Vt < 1. We assume here that foreignersevaluation factor, Vt, is for-
mulated exogenously to economic variables in the model, and follows a rst-order
autoregressive (AR(1)) process, as:
16The assumption that entrepreneurs have the nite horizon, ensures that they never accu-
mulate their own net worth enough to fully self-nance the capital investment. In addition, the
assumption that they have their own net worth available from the start of the business guaran-
tees that entrepreneurs never operate solely by external nance. Under these assumptions, the
lendersparticipation constraint in (3.28) is binding.
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Vt = (Vt 1)
v exp f"v;tg , (3.36)
where jvj < 1, and "v;t is a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and standard
deviation v.
3.2.4 Capital Producers
Capital producers supply the capital goods, Kt, to entrepreneurs, which will be
used to produce the wholesale goods, Yw;t+1, in the subsequent period. They
combine investment goods, It, with the existing capital goods, Kt 1, to construct
the new capital goods,Knt . To be consistent with the assumption for entrepreneurs,
capital producers are assumed to acquire Kt 1 from entrepreneurs after nishing
the wholesale good production. In addition, the investment good composite, It, is
composed of domestic and foreign nal goods, denoted by IH;t and IF;t, respectively,














where i 2 (0; 1) measures the steady state share of domestic inputs, IH;t, in the
investment good composite, It, and i > 1 is the substitutability between IH;t and




1 i + (1  i) (PF;t)1 i
 1
1 i . (3.38)
17Composites for investment goods are assumed to be analogous to those for consumption.
















,where j 2 [0; 1] indicates
the goods variety and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution among varieties.
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Next, we discuss the supply of the aggregate investment, It. Following
Ozkan and Unsal (2010), we assume that the new capital goods, Knt , are produced













where  > 0 is the capital adjustment coe¢ cient. In this setup, the economy-wide
capital stock accumulates according to
Kt = K
n
t + (1  )Kt 1, (3.42)


















Then, the optimality condition for capital producers with respect to the choice of
18Note that the real capital price, Qt, is measured by domestic price, PH;t, since capital, Kt,
is assumed to be non-tradable; while capital producersreal prot function, c;t, is measured by
the CPI, Pt, since capital producers are allowed to adquire the investment goods, It, from bothe
domestic and foreign retail markets.
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Equation (3.44) suggests that the real capital price, Qt, increases with the real
investment good price, PI;t
Pt
, and investment good demand, It. In addition, note
that the real investment good price, PI;t
Pt
, is a¤ected by the relative size of i and
 and that of i and  from equations (3.8) and (3.38). Suppose that the capital
production relies heavily on foreign inputs as compared to consumption bundle,
i.e., i < , with the sensitivities, i and , being equal. Then, as compared to Pt,
PI;t is more sensitively a¤ected by the motion in foreign good price, PF;t = StP F;t.
Accordingly, a rise in the nominal exchange rate, St, would raise PI;t more than
Pt, which leads to rises in
PI;t
Pt
and Qt. In contrast, under the assumption that
i =  and i = , PI;t and Pt would show exactly the same changes, so that
PI;t
Pt
would remain at unity regardless of the motion in nominal exchange rate, St, and
the real capital price, Qt, would not be a¤ected by the nominal exchange rate, St.
3.2.5 Retail Firms
Now, in order to introduce rigidity for domestic price, PH;t, the model allows for
monopolistically competitive retail rms, indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. They purchase the
domestic wholesale goods, Yw;t, from entrepreneurs; costlessly diversify them into
their own varieties, YH;t (j), to gain a certain degree of price-setting power in the
domestic nal goods market; set the monopolistically competitive price, PH;t (j),
for variety j, under the price stickiness a la Calvo (1983); and sell them at the
122
prices, PH;t (j) and
PH;t(j)
St
, in domestic and foreign retail markets.19
Suppose that the domestic nal good composite, YH;t, and the correspond-




















where PH;t (j) is the price for variety j, and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution
among varieties. In addition, by construction, the wholesale goods as a whole,
Yw;t, are equal to retail good composite, YH;t, in the equilibrium, given by
YH;t = Yw;t. (3.47)
Consumersexpenditure minimisation implies that each retail rm faces the down-







so that given the demand curve, the retailers may set the price, PH;t (j) on their
own variety j, to maximise their prot.
19Note that we exclude the possibility of local pricing, so that the foreign retail price is deter-





in foreign currency. Hence, it
is su¢ cient to discuss the determination of the domestic retail price, PH;t(j), in order to establish




However, each retailer is also assumed to be confronted by Calvo (1983)
type price stickiness, i.e., it is able to reset its price at PH;t (j), with a probability
of (1  ) independently of the time elapsed since the last adjustment, and with a
probability of  it is not able to adjust the price so as to keep the previous price,
PH;t 1 (j) unchanged. Then, the aggregate price index in (3.46) can be expressed



















which provides the dynamics for the domestic price index in the economy. In this
setting, a representative retailers (real) prot maximisation problem at t, when























for k = 0; 1; 2;    , where k is the probability of keeping PH;t(j) unchanged from
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is the subjective rate of the intertemporal substi-
tution between t and t + k, and Pw;t+k is the retail rms (real) marginal cost of
purchasing the wholesale goods at period t + k.20 The rst order condition with







































where  = 
 1 is the retail rms desired (gross) mark-up, which is attached
due to imperfections in the retail market. Combining the aggregate domestic price
dynamics in (3.50) with the optimal price setting rule in (3.53) yields the following
short-run dynamics for the domestic price index (within the neighbourhood of the
steady state):
H;t = (Pw;t)
Et fH;t+1g , (3.54)
with   (1 )(1 )

and H;t  PH;tPH;t 1 , which is called as the New Keynesian
Phillips curve (NKPC) for the domestic retail goods. Equation (3.54) shows that
the ination of the domestic retail good price, H;t, rises with its ination expecta-
tion, Et fH;t+1g, and the (real) wholesale good price, Pw;t, i.e., the (real) marginal
cost of the wholesale good production.
20Note that the marginal cost of producing the wholesale good is equal to that of purchasing
it, since the wholesale goods market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
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Finally, the home goods supplied by the domestic retailers are consumed by
domestic and foreign households, domestic capital producers, and the government,
so that the economy-wide resource constraint for the domestic nal goods is given
by:
YH;t = CH;t + C

H;t + IH;t +Gt, (3.55)
where Gt is government spending.
3.2.6 Government and Balance of Payment
Now, we turn to government policies. The central bank is assumed to adjust the
(gross) short-term nominal interest rate, Rnt , in response to ination of consumer
price index (CPI),21 and deviations of output and nominal exchange rate22 from
their respective steady state values, to stabilise the business cycle uctuations.
Thus, it follows the Taylor-type feedback rule as in Taylor (1993) with interest
rate smoothing, given by:
21As Gali (2005) argues, in order for Taylor rule to be optimal in the small open economy, it
should be based on the domestic price index (DPI), PH;t, rather than the consumer price index
(CPI), Pt. However, in practice, the majority of monetary authorities do not seem to make a
policy decision strictly by DPI, so that we assume that it seeks to stabilise the CPI.
22The assumption that the central bank seeks to stabilise the nominal exchange rate is contro-
versial, since a large number of countries announce that they adopt the free oating exchange rate
system, i.e., s = 0. However, as Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Struzenegger
(2005) point out, these (de jure) oating systems tend to be heavily managed by the central
banks (de facto), especially in emerging market countries where much of the countrys debt is
denominated in foreign currency. According to the fear of oatingargument a la Calvo and
Reinhart (2002) suggest, such an environment would induce the emerging market countries to
seek to stabilise the nominal exchange rate to prevent the value of foreign currency denominated
debt from being deteriorated. The fear of oating is supported by many authors, including
Hausmann, Panizza, and Stein (2001), Calvo (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide (2007), and Bleaney
and Ozkan (2008). In this sense, we include the nominal exchange rate stabilisation term, s, in




















where Rn, YH and S denote the steady state values for nominal interest rate,
Rnt , domestic output, YH;t, and nominal exchange rate, St, respectively, and "r;t
is a monetary policy shock, which is a Gaussian white noise process with mean
zero and standard deviation r. The values for Taylor rule coe¢ cients on CPI
ination, output gap, and nominal exchange rate,  > 1, y > 0, and s  0, are
assumed to be chosen by the central bank, which characterise the degree of the
central banks commitment to each of policy target. In particular, the values of s
represent the economys choice of exchange rate regime. That is, s = 0 implies the
free oating system as the central bank does not intervene in the foreign exchange
market regardless of the motion in nominal exchange rate, while s =1 suggests
the xed exchange rate regime, since the monetary authority does not allow the
uctuation in nominal exchange rate. The nominal interest rate, Rnt , set by the
central bank is linked to the real riskless rate, Rt, by the following Fisher equation
Rnt  RtEt ft+1g . (3.57)
In addition, the scal authority implements the government spending, Gt,
which is nanced by revenues from lump-sum taxes, Tt, and (net) government
bond issueing, Dt Rt 1Dt 1. Accordingly, government budget constraint is given
by
127
Gt = Tt + (Dt  Rt 1Dt 1) . (3.58)
Furthermore, we assume that government spending, Gt, is exogenously given by
the following process:
Gt = (Gt 1)
g exp f"g;tg (3.59)
where
g < 1, and "g;t is a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and standard
deviation g.
Lastly, the resources of the economy are determined by the householdsbudget
constrain in (3.3). The substitution of the prots from entrepreneurs, capital pro-
ducers and retailers into the householdsdividend income, ot , yields the expression























In equation (3.60), the terms in the rst bracket are the items of the current ac-
count, and the terms in the second and third brackets are those of the nancial
account which arise from householdsnancial transaction as depositors to foreign
23Note that the prot from entrepreneurs is Et = Pw;tYH;t   WtLt   Rkt PtQt 1Kt 1 +
(1  )PtQtKt 1; that from capital producers is Ct = PtQtKt   PI;tIt   (1  )PtQtKt 1;
that from retailers is Rt = PH;tYH;t   Pw;tYH;t; and the government budget constraint is
Gt = Tt + (Dt  Rt 1Dt 1). In addition, we use the facts that PtQt = PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t;











nancial intermediaries and that of the domestic entrepreneurs as borrowers from
foreign nancial intermediaries, respectively. It is noteworthy that a domestic
currency depreciation improves the current account via the increased export and
the decreased import. It also improves the nancial account relating to house-
holdstransactions via the improved rate of returns from foreign investment for
the domestic depositors. In contrast, it aggravates the nancial account relating
to entrepreneurs transactions via the increased cost of foreign borrowings. By
construction, the improvement in current account corresponds to the aggravation
of nancial account through the householdsbudget constraint, and vice versa.
3.3 Model Solution and Calibration
In this section, we discuss the solution method, strategy for experiments, and
parameter calibration of the model.
3.3.1 Solution and Experiment Strategy
In the general equilibrium for our small open economy DSGE model, given 7
temporary shocks, f"r;t, "g;t, "a;t, "v;t, "y;t, ";t, "r;tg, the innite sequence of
34 endogenous variables, fCt, CH;t, CF;t, CH;t, Y t , YH;t, Yw;t, At, Lt, Kt, Nt, Bt ,









St, Vt, Gtg1t=0, is determined to satisfy 34 equilibrium conditions, which are listed
in Appendices B1.1 and B1.2. Following Uhligs (1995) procedure, we transform
the non-linear rational expectations system to the linear one, and solve the linear
rational expectations system by the numerical method after parameter calibration.
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For calibration, as discussed shortly, we assign the conventional values to the model
parameters, f, , ', , ,  ,  , , , , r, , y, s, a, g, v, y , , rg











g, following the literature on the small open economy DSGE model, including
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007), Curdia (2007 and 2009), Ozkan and Unsal
(2010), Elekdag, Alp, and Lall (2012), and Yie and Yoo (2011). Table 3.3 presents
the comparison of calibration in our model and those in the literature.
Having solved the small open economy DSGE model, we conduct vari-
ous experiments using the impulse responses of the model economy to the diverse
shocks under the alternative environments. First of all, we examine how an econ-
omy responds when foreign lenders evaluation of the entrepreneurs net worth
turns negative abruptly, to investigate the transmission of a sudden stop crisis. To
study the impact of a sudden stop crisis more clearly, the impulse responses to a
negative net worth evaluation shock in the model with benchmark nancial fric-
tions are compared with those to an abrupt rise in the foreign interest rate, which
are denoted as FA(NW) and FA(FI) models, respectively. In addition, we study
the e¤ect of a global nancial crisis by analysing the model economys reactions
when it is hit by an unexpected contraction in foreign output as well as a sudden
stop in foreign funds, which is labled the FA(NW+FO) model.
Next, we explore how the uctuations in an emerging market economy in
a sudden stop crisis are related to the economys pre-crisis conditions. First of all,
to investigate the role of nancial frictions in a sudden stop crisis, we compare the
responses in the FA(NW) model with those in an economy with a low degree of
nancial frictions, which are denoted as the LFA(NW) model. In the LFA(NW)
model, foreigners keep trust in an emerging economy even if the entrepreneurs
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balance sheet is temporarily distorted, so that the sensitivity parameter of external
nance premium to entrepreneursleverage ratio,  , is low. Second, the relative
performance according to the alternative exchange rate regime is evaluated when
an economy is hit by a sudden stop. For this, we compare the impulse responses
in the FA(NW) model with those in the FA(NW)+FR model, which represent
economies adopting a free oating exchange rate regime and a xed exchange
rate one, respectively. For the latter, we assign a very large value to the Taylor
rule coe¢ cient on the nominal exchange rate, s, suggesting that the central bank
adjusts the nominal interest rate to x the nominal exchange rate at a certain level.
Lastly, we analyse the e¤ect of an economys heavy reliance on the foreign resources
for capital production, by exploring the impulse responses in the FA(NW)+RR
model, where the steady state share of domestic inputs in the investment good
composite, i, is much smaller than that of domestic goods in the consumption
bundle, . In contrast, in the FA(NW) model, we impose the same values on i
and , so that the capital price would not be a¤ected by the nominal exchange
rate, by construction.
3.3.2 Parameter Calibration
Now, we discuss parameter calibration for each of the models more specically,
which is shown in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. We start with the parameters for the
benchmark FA model. For domestic and foreign households, we set the quarterly
discount factors in home and foreign countries,  and , respectively, to be all
0:99, which pin down the steady state quarterly riskless rates in home and foreign
countries, R and R, at R = 1

= 1:0101 and R = 1
 = 1:0101 (i.e., annually
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4:1%). We x the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of consumption, , and the
inverse of labour supply elasticity, ', at 1:5 and 3:0, respectively, in keeping with
much of the literature. The elasticity of substitution between home and foreign
goods, , and the share of home goods in the domestic householdsconsumption
bundle, , are set at 1:5 and 0:6, respectively. For entrepreneurs, we take the share
of capital out of the output production, , and the quarterly capital depreciation
rate, , to be 0:3 and 0:025, respectively. We take a quarterly risk spread, Rk R,
to be 300 basis point in the steady state, so that the steady state risk premium





= 1:0198. In addition, we set the capital-to-net
worth ratio in the steady state, K
N
, at 2, so that the sensitivity of external nance
premium to the capital-to-net worth ratio,  , is calculated as 0:0422, from the








. Entrepreneurs survival rate, , is set to be
0:975, which is conventional in the literature. For capital producers, we set capital
adjustment cost coe¢ cient, , at 1:2, so that the inverse of elasticity of investment
to the capital price, , is calculated as 0:03. In addition, the share of domestic
inputs out of the investment good composite, i, is set to be 0:6, which is the
same as the share of home goods in the consumption bundle, . For retail market
behaviours, the elasticity of substitution among varieties, , is set to be 6, so
that the retail rmsdesired mark-up is pinned down at  = 
 1 = 1:2. The
probability of retail rms keeping prices xed during a given period, , is equal
to 0:75, so that the coe¢ cient attached to the retail rmsmarginal cost, Pw;t,
is set to be  = (1 )(1 )

= 0:0858. In addition, the steady state value of
investment-to-output ratio, IH
YH
, is calculated as 0:0576.24 The steady state values




























Table 3.1: Parameter Calibration (Benchmark FA Model)
Parameter Value Description
;  0:99 home and foreign discount factors
 1:5 intertemporal elasticity of consumptions
' 3:0 inverse elasticity of labour supply
 1:5 substitutability between home and foreign goods
 0:6 share of home good in consumption
 0:3 capital share in production function
 0:025 capital depreciation rate
 0:975 entrepreneurssurvival rate
 1:2 capital adjustment cost coe¢ cient
i 1:5 substitutability between home and foreign inputs
 0:75 probability of not adjusting domestic retail prices
 6 elasticity of substitution among retail goods
r 0:7 Taylor rule coe¢ cient on interest rate smoothing
 1:7 Taylor rule coe¢ cient on ination
y 0:2 Taylor rule coe¢ cient on output gap
v 0:8 persistence in net worth evaluation shock
K=N 2 capital-to-net worth ratio in the steady state
CH=YH 0:2 export-to-output ratio in the steady state
G=YH 0:2 government spending-to-output ratio in the
steady state
are all assumed to be 0:2, so that the steady state value of consumption-to-output
ratio, CH
YH
, is calculated as 0:5424. For the monetary authority, we assume that
the central bank sets Taylor rule coe¢ cients, r, , and y, to be 0:7, 1:5, and
0:2, respectively. We assume the weak stabilisation of the nominal exchange rate
in the FA model, such that s is set to be 0:2. The persistence parameters for
shocks, such as a, v, g, y ,  , and r, are all set to be 0:8, as in the business
cycle literature.
Next, we discuss the parameter calibrations for the alternative models,
which are presented in Table 3.2. For the LFA model where the degree of nancial
frictions is low, we set the steady state value of the risk spread, Rk R, at 100 basis
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Table 3.2: Parameter Calibration (By Model)
Description FA LFA FA+FR FA+RR
Rk R risk premium in the steady state 0:03 0:01 0:03 0:03
 sensitivity of risk premium to lever-
age ratio
0:0422 0:0142 0:0422 0:0422
s Taylor rule coe¢ cient on exchange
rate
0:2 0:2 30 0:2
i share of domestic input in invest-
ment good
0:6 0:6 0:6 0:3
IH=Y H investment-to-output ratio in the
steady state
0:0576 0:0576 0:0576 0:0288
CH=Y H consumption-to-output ratio in the
steady state
0:5424 0:5424 0:5424 0:5712
* LFA: the model with low degree of nancial frictions
* FA+FR: the model with exchange rate stabilisation
* FA+RR: the model with high degree of foreign input reliance
point, so that the sensitivity of the external nance premium to the entrepreneurs
leverage ratio,  , is calculated as 0:0142. For the FA+FRmodel where the economy
adopts the xed exchange rate regime, we assume that the Taylor rule coe¢ cient
on the nominal exchange rate, s, is set at 30, where the nominal exchange rate,
St, is almost xed as in the xed exchange rate regime, as is shown later. For
the FA+RR model where capital producers rely heavily on the foreign inputs, IF;t,
to construct the new capital, we assume that the steady state share of domestic
inputs out of investment good composite, i, is set at 0:3, suggesting that 70
percent of investment goods are imported from abroad. However, the steady state
share of domestic goods in the consumption bundle, , for the FA+FR model is
set at the same level of 0:6 as in the FA model. Accordingly, in the FA+RR model,





, are calculated as 0:0288 and 0:5712, respectively. Note that the
parameters for the alternative models which are not otherwise mentioned above
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Table 3.3: Parameter Calibration (Comparison by Author)
Parameter GGN Curdia OU EAL YY FA
 0:99 0:9840 0:99 0:9963 0:988 0:99
 5 1 1 1 1:4906 1:5
' 2 2 2 1 3 3
 1 1 1 1 1:5 1:5
 0:5 0:75 0:75 0:575 0:7 0:6
 0:5 0:45 0:35 0:625 0:3 0:3
 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025 0:025
 0:001 0:0038 0:0422
 0:9728 0:9873 0:9728 0:98 0:975
 0:75 0:75 0:419 0:7 0:75
 6 6 7:6667 6 6
r 0:892 0:8058 0:7
 2 2 1:5 1:760 1:3633 1:7
y 0:75 0:019 0:6612 0:2
s f0:5; 2g 0:099 0:1475 0:2
v 0:5 0:576 0:8
y 0:956 0:9083 0:8
Rk  R 0:015 0:0063 0:0185 0:0301 0:0073 0:030
K=N 2:1 2 1:11 10 2
* GGN (Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci, 2007), Curdia (Curdia, 2007),
OU (Ozkan and Unsal, 2010), EAL (Elekdag, Alp and Lall, 2012), YY
(Yie and Yoo, 2011, mimeo), FA (the baseline model)
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have the same values as the corresponding parameters in the benchmark FA model.
3.4 Model Dynamics
In this section, we explore the transmission process of foreign shocks to an emerging
market economy under alternative economic environments. We consider the shocks
arising from foreign lendersnet worth evaluation, "v;t, the foreign interest rate,
"r;t, and foreign output, "y;t. In addition, we study the role of nancial frictions
and resource reliance to foreign country in the capital production, and the e¤ects
of exchange rate stabilisation by the central bank.
3.4.1 Transmission of Sudden Stop Crisis
We explore a transmission of a sudden stop crisis originating from foreign lenders
pessimism about the entrepreneurs in an emerging market economy. We suppose
that foreigners devalue the entrepreneurs net worth, Vt,25 so that they curtail
lending to an emerging market country or raise the external nance premium to
reect their pessimism. The situation is represented by the FA(NW) model and
the impulse responses from the model are shown in the solid lines in Figure 3.1.
To study the transmission of a sudden stop crisis, we rst trace the solid lines in
Figure 3.1, and then compare them to the dotted lines in Figure 3.1. The dotted
lines represent the impulse responses from the FA(FI) model, which supposes that
25The motivation of foreign lenderspessimism includes a doubt on the entrepreneursproduc-
tivity, the availability of foreign currency, the outlook of the nancial market situation, and so
on. In addition, note that the foreignerspessimism is not necessarily proven reasonable, ex post.
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the foreign interest rate rises unexpectedly.26 However, one needs to note that our
investigation on uctuations from alternative models aims at understanding how
an economy responds to the respective shock. Thus, the comparison here does not
have quantiative implication.
First of all, we examine the solid lines in Figure 3.1. A downturn in
foreign lendersoutlook on entrepreneurs, Vt, in (3.36), decreases their evaluation
on the entrepreneursnet worth, Nt, in (3.35). This, then, leads to a rise in the
entrepreneurs leverage ratio perceived by the foreigners, QtKt
Nt
, so that they impose
the higher external nance premium, 	t, on the entrepreneurs by (3.33), which, in
turn, raises the entrepreneurscost of foreign borrowing, Rkt+1, (i.e., required capital
returns) in (3.34). Then, confronted with the raised cost of capital investment,
Rkt+1, the entrepreneur reduces the capital demand, Kt, in (3.23), which results
in a fall in production, YH;t, and demand for domestic investment goods, IH;t, by
(3.19), (3.44) and (3.39).
Now, we turn to the demand side of the economy. The decline in factor
demands, Kt and Lt, resulting from production contraction, YH;t, depresses the fac-
tor prices, Qt and Wt, by (3.23) and (3.22), which, in turn, decreases the marginal
cost of wholesale good production, Pw;t. Then, the New Keynesian Phillips curve
in (3.54) implies a fall in the ination of the home good price, H;t, in a staggered
manner. On the other hand, the shrinkage in supply of foreign funds and the rise
in external nance premium, 	t, depreciate the domestic currency, St, by (3.34),
in the foreign currency market. Then, under the stickiness in the home good price,
PH;t, the currency depreciation raises the real foreign good price in home country,
26We obtain the results from the benchmark model similar to those in the existing literature












by (3.12) and (3.11).27 This, in turn, leads to a fall in the import demand in home
country, CF;t, and an increase in the export demand in foreign country, CH;t, by
(3.18) and (3.10), respectively. In addition, note that in spite of the fall in do-
mestic good price, PH;t, the currency depreciation would raise the domestic CPI
ination, t, due to the stickiness in the home good price, PH;t, by (3.8). Then,
the central bank would raise the domestic (nominal) riskless rate, Rnt , to stabilise
the CPI ination, by the feedback rule in (3.56). The resulting increase in the real
riskless rate, Rt, by the Fisher equation in (3.57), decreases consumption bundle,
Ct, together with the reduced labour wage, WtPt , by (3.4) and (3.5), which depresses
the consumption demand for the home goods, CH;t, in spite of the fall in the (real)
home good price, PH;t
Pt
, by (3.9). All in all, despite the expansion in the export de-
mand, CH;t, the contractions in consumption, CH;t, and investment, IH;t, decrease
the aggregate demand, which corresponds to the production contraction, YH;t, by
the economy-wide resource constraint in (3.55).
Next, we compare the impulse responses in the FA(NW) model with those
in the FA(FI) models.28 The dotted lines in Figure 3.1 show that an unexpected
rise in the foreign interest rate produces the qualitatively similar real e¤ects to a
negative shock to foreignersevaluation on the entrepreneursnet worth. That is,
27Note that CPI, Pt, is a¤ected immediately by the foreign good price, PF;t, and the nominal
exchange rate under the law of one price (LOOP), while it reects the change in the home good
price, PH;t, in a staggered manner, as the New Keynesian Phillips curve suggests. Accordingly,
a currency depreciation, St, would lead to the rises in foreign good price, PF;t, CPI, Pt, and real










28Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco (2004) and Gertler et al. (2007) take the shocks from foreign
interest rate and country risk premium, respectively, while Curdia (2007) and Ozkan and Unsal
(2010) consider the misperception shock on the entrepreneursproductivity.
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Figure 3.1: Responses to Shocks to Net Worth Evaluation and Foreign Interest
Rate
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to a negative shock in
foreignersevaluation on the entrepreneursnet worth (NW), and a positive shock
in the foreign interest rate (FI), respectively.
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an unexpected rise in the foreign interest rate may lead to the production contrac-
tion via the rise in the cost of foreign borrowing, and the overall contraction in
aggregate demand and the demand shift from domestic one to foreign one. How-
ever, the di¤erence between the two models lies in the channel from the nancial
shocks to the entrepreneurs cost of foreign borrowings and real exchange rate.
That is, while a shock to foreignersevaluation on the entrepreneursnet worth is
transmitted to the real sector via the entrepreneursleverage ratio (perceived by
foreigners) in the FA(NW) model, a shock to foreign interest rate propagates to
the real sector by directly inuencing the condition for foreign borrowing and the
nominal exchange rate in the FA(FI) model. Accordingly, the risk premium and
entrepreneursnet worth are a¤ected indirectly in the FA(FI) model, while they
play a key role for shock propagation process in the FA(NW) model. Overall, in
spite of the similar outcomes in the two alternative models, the FA(NW) model
may be assessed as providing a more systematic explanation on a sudden stop
crisis, as it relates the real uctuations in emerging market economies to a more
primitive shock, such as a change in foreignersperception and the agency problem
between foreign lenders and domestic entrepreneurs as a transmission channel.
3.4.2 Role of Financial Frictions under Sudden Stop Crisis
Next, we investigate the role of nancial frictions in the transmission of a sudden
stop, by comparing the impulse responses to an unfavourable change in foreign
lendersperception on entrepreneursnet worth in economies with the di¤erent
degree of nancial frictions (FA(NW) abd LFA(NW) models). As discussed above,
the LFA(NW) model represents an economy with a low degree of nancial frictions,
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so that it assumes a lower risk premium in the steady state, R
k
R
, and hence, a
lower sensitivity of risk premium to the entrepreneursleverage ratio,  , in (3.33)
than the FA(NW) model. Such a representation suggests that foreign lenders
in the LFA(NW) model would raise the risk premium,
Rkt+1
Rt
, less sensitively to
a rise in entrepreneurs leverage ratio, QtKt
Nt
. This means that foreigners in the
LFA(NW) model have still maintained trust in the entrepreneurs in the emerging
market economy, even if entrepreneursbalance sheet is evaluated being distorted
temporarily. As a result, the rise in the cost of foreign borrowing that entrepreneurs
face is dampened in the LFA(NW)model, so that the contraction in production and
capital demand could be reduced. In addition, the dampened size of sudden stops
limits the magnitude of the real currency depreciation, which relieves contractions
in aggregate demand.
Figure 3.2 shows the role of nancial frictions in a sudden stop crisis.
The dotted lines in Figure 3.2 represent the impulse responses to the same size of
a negative shock to foreignersevaluation on the entrepreneursnet worth in the
LFA(NW) model. In Figure 3.2, the dotted lines display dampened uctuations, as
compared to the solid lines which represent the impulse responses in the FA(NW)
model. It suggests that an economy that fails to gain foreignerstrust in normal
times, i.e., an economy with a high degree of nancial frictions, could su¤er a
sudden stop crisis more severely than an economy with foreignerscondence.29
29We may assess the degree of condence that an emerging market economy gains in the
international nancial market, by the sensitivity of risk premium to entrepreneurs leverage
ratio,  =
ln(Rk=R)
ln(K=N) . By this criterion, foreigners may decide where to withdraw their fund from,
when they are confronted with nancial stress.
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Figure 3.2: Role of Financial Frictions under a Negative Net Worth Evaluation
Shock
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to a negative shock in
foreignersevaluation on entrepreneursnet worth in the economies with standard
(FA(NW)) and lower nancial frictions (LFA(NW)), respectively.
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3.4.3 Sudden Stops and Global Recession
In subsection 3.4.1, we conrm that sudden stops of capital inow could lead to
production contraction in an emerging market economy. However, as shown in
the solid lines in Figure 3.1, which represent the impulse responses in the bench-
mark FA(NW) model, the production contraction, YH;t, under sudden stops is
short-lived, as compared to the shrinkage in capital, Kt, foreign borrowing, Bt ,
and net worth, Nt. The fast recovery of the output relative to the credit lines,
which is labeled Phoenix miracleby Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006), implies
that entrepreneurs, who face the increase of cost of foreign borrowing for capital
acquisition, try to reorganise production and nance, in such a way to hire more
labour instead of capital and to use more internal nancing rather than the ex-
ternal one. Furthermore, as shown in the solid lines in Figure 3.1, even though a
sudden stop in foreign funds depresses production and domestic demand, it tends
to encourage export demands for home goods in foreign countries via a real cur-
rency depreciation, which provides a source of the fast recovery from a sudden
stop crisis.30 However, when aggregate demand contraction in the world economy
overlaps with sudden stops in foreign fund supply, this recovery process through
an expansion in exports could be interrupted, so that the recession in the emerging
market economy could be magnied and prolonged.
We explore the transmission of this kind of global nancial crisis through
Figure 3.3. The dotted lines in Figure 3.3 represent the impulse responses when
negative shocks are imposed on both foreign lendersevaluation on entrepreneurs
30Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2005) even argue that a sudden stop could be expansionary
in business cycle uctuations. Curdia (2007) shows that a sudden stop could be expansionary
when the the sensitivity of export demand, , is su¢ ciently large.
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net worth, Vt, in (3.35) and foreign output, Y t , in (3.13) at the same time, which
we label the FA(NW+FO) model.31 In contrast, the solid lines in Figure 3.3
represent the impulse responses to a negative shock in foreign lendersevaluation
on the entrepreneursnet worth in the absence of contraction in world aggregate
demand, which is the benchmark FA(NW) model. In the FA (NW+FO) model,
the sudden stops are driven by both the foreignersnancial stress due to recession
in the world economy and the foreignersnegative outlook on the emerging market
economy due to, possibly, the vulnerability of an emerging market economy to the
uncertainty in the global economy.
Comparison between the dotted and solid lines in Figure 3.3 reveals that a
coincidence of global recession and sudden stops makes it di¢ cult for an emerging
market economy to recover from a sudden stop crisis through the export expansion
channel, so that the recession in the emerging market economy could be intensi-
ed.32 That is, in the FA(NW+FO) model, in spite of the currency depreciation,
St, due to sudden stops, the export demand for home good, CH;t, is signicantly
reduced due to a contraction in the aggregate demand in the world economy, Y t ,
by (3.18), which magnies the production contraction, YH;t, by the economy-wide
resource constraint in (3.55). The additional production contraction, YH;t, am-
plies the contractions in capital, Kt, and investment, IH;t, by (3.19), (3.44) and
(3.39). However, the contraction in export, CH;t, raises the nominal exchange rate,
St, in the foreign currency market, by (3.18). Then, the amplied domestic
31This conguration assumes that the shock processes in foreignersevaluation, Vt, and foreign
output Y t , has the same autoregressive structure, which may be lacking in reality. However it
does not impede the aim of the experiment to simulate a global nancial crisis, where sudden
stops and global recession may coincide from a perspective of an emerging market economy.
32However, one needs to note that our investigation on uctuations from alternative models
aims at understanding how the economy responds to the respective shock. Thus, the comparison
here does not have quantiative implication.
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Figure 3.3: Responses to Negative Shocks to Foreign Output and Net Worth
Evaluation
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to a negative net worth
evaluation shock without and with the global recession (FA(NW) and FA(NW+FO)
models), respectively.
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currency depreciation magnies the rise in import price, PF;t
Pt
, and a fall in home
good price, PH;t
Pt
, due to the price stickiness in home goods, by (3.8). Accordingly,
the import demand for foreign good, CF;t, is further depressed, but the consump-
tion demand for home goods, CH;t, increases, in the FA(NW+FO) model, by (3.10)
and (3.9). In sum, in case of the coincidence of sudden stops and global recession,
an emerging market economy could su¤er the prolonged and amplied recession
and experience the further demand shift from export to domestic consumption.
3.4.4 Exchange Rate Regime and Sudden Stops
We now turn to the impact of sudden stops of capital inows under alternative
exchange rate regimes: a free oating system and a xed exchange rate regime. So
far, we assume that the central bank adopts a free oating exchange rate regime.
However, as Calvo (2002) argues, given that an emerging market economy is char-
acterised by the high degree of domestic liability dollarisation(DLD), it may have
an incentive to x the nominal exchange rate, St, at a certain level, to prevent a
negative e¤ect of the currency depreciation on real activity.33 We now examine
the case where an emerging market economy adopts a xed exchange rate regime
so that the central bank seeks to stabilise the uctuations of the nominal exchange
rate, St, completely and instantly, by counteracting the motion in foreign fund
supply. That is, the central bank is assumed to adjust the nominal interest rate,
Rnt , in the feedback rule in (3.56), highly sensitively to the motion in the nominal
33Note that the entrepreneursleverage ratio, QtKtNt =
QtKt
QtKt StBt increases when the nominal











exchange rate, St. To simulate the situation where an emerging market economy
adopting a xed exchange rate regime is hit by a sudden stop, we set the Taylor
rule coe¢ cient attached on nominal exchange rate, s, in (3.56) to be 30, and
impose a negative shock in foreign lendersevaluation on the entrepreneursnet
worth, which is denoted as the FA(NW)+FR model. To investigate the role of a
xed exchange rate regime under a sudden stop crisis, the impulse responses in the
FA(NW)+FR are compared with those in the benchmark FA(NW) model, which
assigns an insignicant values to Taylor rule coe¢ cient on nominal exchange rate,
i.e., s = 0:2. Figure 3.4 displays the results of the experiment where the solid
and dotted lines represent the impulse responses in the FA(NW) and FA(NW)+FR
models, respectively.
As shown in Figure 3.4, a negative shock in foreign lendersevaluation on
the entrepreneursnet worth, Vt, results in contractions in capital demand and
output production in the emerging market economy, under both exchange rate
regimes. That is, the distortion of the entrepreneursleverage ratio, QtKt
Nt
, raises
the external nance premium, 	t =
Rkt+1
Rt
, due to the negative net worth evaluation
shock, which leads to the contractions in capital demand, Kt, investment, IH;t,
and production, YH;t. It is noteworthy that in our simulation there does not exist
signicant di¤erences in motions of risk premium, 	t, capital returns, Rkt+1, capital,
Kt, and net worth, Nt. It implies that a xed exchange rate regime may not have a
signicant stabilising e¤ect on capital demand and production in the sudden stop
crisis triggered by foreignerspessimism.
The result seems to be contradictory to the fear of oatingargument a la
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Calvo (2004), where emerging market economies
adopt a xed exchange rate regime, de facto, to prevent an unfavourable balance
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sheet e¤ect of currency depreciation. However, note that a currency depreciation is
just one source to distort the balance sheet. That is, a xed exchange rate regime
could be e¤ective as a stabilisation tool in case where the entrepreneursbalance
sheet is distorted by an exogenous currency depreciation in an emerging market
economy with a high degree of foreign debt. In contrast, for example, in case
where a distortion in entrepreneursbalance sheet (perceived by foreign lenders)
is directly driven by foreignerspessimism, the central bank is not able to stabilise
the cost of foreign borrowing e¤ectively, even though it could stabilise the nominal
exchange rate under a xed exchange rate regime.
However, the choice of exchange rate regime could a¤ect the demand side





, resulting from a sudden stop, results in the rise in nominal exchange
rate, St, under a free oating system, the deation in the CPI, Pt, takes this
adjusting role under the peg, instead of the nominal exchange rate, St.34 Then,
under the peg, the stickiness of home good price, PH;t, implies the rises in real






StPt , and the fall
in the real foreign good price, PF;t
Pt
, by (3.8). Changes in the real price structure
decreases the demands for home goods in home and foreign countries, CH;t, IH;t,
and CH;t, and increases the import demand for foreign goods, CF;t, by (3.9), (3.39),
(3.18) and (3.10), respectively. The additional contractions in demands for home
goods, CH;t, IH;t, and CH;t, leads to the corresponding contraction in home good
production, YH;t, by (3.55) and factor demands, Kt and Lt, by (3.23) and (3.22),
respectively. In such an indirect way, a sudden stop in foreign fund supply could
34A real currency depreciation eventually leads to the rises in nominal exchange rate, St, and
CPI ination, t, in a oating system, while it results in the deation of CPI, t, with the
nominal exchange rate, St, being xed under the peg.
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Figure 3.4: Responses to a Negative Net Worth Evaluation Shock under a Fixed
Exchange Rate Regime
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to a negative shock
to foreignersevaluation on entrepreneursnet worth under oating (FA(NW)) and
xed exchange rate regimes (FA(NW)+FR), respectively.
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aggravate the recession in the emerging market economy with the xed exchange
rate regime, as compared to that under a free oating counterpart. These obser-
vations point to the importance of the exchange rate regime choice as regards the
economic performance in a sudden stop crisis.
3.4.5 Heavy Foreign Input Reliance and Sudden Stops
Lastly, we investigate the e¤ect of a sudden stop when an emerging market econ-
omy relies on foreign economies in terms of resources for capital production, as
well as funds for capital acquisition, which is referred to as processing tradein the
literature.35 We suppose that the degree of capital producersreliance on foreign
input, IF;t, in investment good composite, It, is greater than householdsprefer-
ence for imported good, CF;t, out of their consumption bundle, Ct, in an emerging
market country. To simulate this, we set the steady state share of domestic input
in the investment good composite, i, in (3.37) to be 0:3, while that of domestic
good in the consumption bundle, , in (3.7) remains at 0:6, which is denoted by
the FA(NW)+RR model. Thus, in the FA(NW)+RR model, capital producers ac-
quire 70 % of their investment goods, It, from abroad, whilst households consume
the imported goods by 40 % of their total consumption bundle in the steady state.
Then, in the FA(NW)+RRmodel, the investment good price, PI;t, in (3.38) is more
a¤ected than CPI, Pt, in (3.8), by the motion in foreign good price, PF;t = StP F;t,
so that the real investment good price, PI;t
Pt
, and the real capital price, Qt, in (3.44)
moves in the same direction of nominal exchange rate, St, or foreign good price,
35Braggion et al. (2007) and Curdia (2007) report that the import of capital and intermediate
good for production of nal goods takes a much larger portion of the total import as compared
to that of consumption good.
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PF;t. In contrast, in the FA(NW) model with i =  and i = , PI;t and Pt show
the same behaviours, so that PI;t
Pt
remains at unity and the real capital price, Qt,
would not be a¤ected by the nominal exchange rate, St. Figure 3.5 shows the
e¤ect of an emerging market economys heavy reliance on foreign input when the
economy is hit by a sudden stop in foreign fund supply, where the dotted and solid
lines represent the impulse responses in the FA(NW)+RR and FA(NW) models,
respectively.
As shown in dotted lines in Figure 3.5, a negative shock to foreign lenders
evaluation of entrepreneursnet worth, Vt, results in declines in capital demand
and output and a currency depreciation in both the FA(NW) and FA(NW)+RR
models. However, in the FA(NW)+RR model, the currency depreciation has an
additional e¤ect on the cost conditions in capital production, which, in turn, a¤ects
the production cost conditions for entrepreneurs. That is, the currency depreci-
ation, St, raises the foreign good price, PF;t = StP F;t, by (3.12), which increases
the investment good price, PI;t, and CPI, Pt, by (3.38) and (3.8). However, under
the congurations for i and  in the FA(NW)+RR model, PI;t rises more than
Pt, so that the real investment good price,
PI;t
Pt
, increases. Then, capital producers
would impute the aggravated cost for capital production, PI;t
Pt
, to entrepreneurs, by
raising the real capital price, Qt, by (3.44), in the capital market. It implies the
rise in cost of purchasing capital for entrepreneurs, which makes them decrease
capital demand, Kt, by (3.23), additionally to the contraction in capital demand
due to the rise in cost of foreign borrowing. The contraction in capital demand,
Kt, leads to additional contractions in investment good composite, It, domestic
investment goods, IH;t, and output production, YH;t, by (3.44), (3.39), and (3.19),
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Figure 3.5: Responses to a Negative Net Worth Evaluation Shock under a Heavy
Foreign Input Reliance
* The solid and dotted lines represent the impulse responses to a negative shock
in foreignersevaluation on entrepreneursnet worth in the economy with standard
(FA(NW)) and high degree of foreign resource reliance (FA(NW)+RR), respectively.
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respectively.36 Furthermore, in the FA(NW)+RR model, the rise in the real in-
vestment good price, PI;t
Pt
, triggered by the currency depreciation, could raise the
real home good price, PH;t
Pt
, via the aggravated cost conditions, which leads to con-
tractions in demands for domestic goods in home and foreign countries, CH;t and
CH;t. It follows that an economy that relies heavily on foreign resources are likely
to su¤er sudden stop crises more severely via the impaired price competitiveness
for the domestic product as well as the distorted cost conditions.
3.5 Conclusion
We have explored the implication of a sudden stop crisis in an emerging market
economy: (i) what triggers a sudden stop of the international fund inows to an
emerging market economy; (ii) how an economy is a¤ected by a sudden stop; and
(iii) what pre-crisis conditions in an economy a¤ect a sudden stop crisis. To these
ends, we have used a small open economy DSGE model with nancial frictions
a la Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2007), which emphasises the information
asymmetry between foreign lenders and domestic entrepreneurs, and the positive
relation between the entrepreneurs nancial condition and the cost of foreign
borrowing that they are confronted with. In addition, following Curdia (2007) and
Ozkan and Unsal (2010), we consider that foreign lendersperception or evaluation
of the domestic entrepreneursnancial condition in an emerging market economy
could play an important role as a trigger of a sudden stop crisis.
Our main ndings are as follows. First of all, we conrm that foreigners
36However, the size of the production contraction, YH;t, is less than that of the domestic input
demand for investment, IH;t, due to the reduced steady state share of the domestic input for the
investment, IHYH , by the decrease in i.
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pessimism as to an emerging market economys nancial condition may result in
a sudden stop of foreign fund inow and real recession in the economy via the
raised cost of foreign borrowing, as an exogenous rise in foreign interest rate does.
Thus, we argue that the foreignerspessimism could be one of the sources of the
sudden stops, as the self-fullling pessimismargument in Calvo (1998) and Krug-
man (1999) suggest. Second, we uncover that while a sudden stop crisis could be
short-lived as the Phoenix miraclein Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2004) suggest,
certain characteristics that are typical of emerging market economies could make a
sudden stop crisis further aggravated. We identify such environmental conditions
as follows: (i) the presence of a high degree of nancial frictions; (ii) a coincidence
of sudden stops in capital inow and global recession; and (iii) a heavy reliance
on foreign input for capital production in an emerging market economy. That is,
in case an emerging market economy fails to gain a high degree of trust from for-
eign lenders in normal times, foreign lenders could become highly sensitive to even
temporary changes in the nancial conditions in the economy, which magnies
the unfavourable consequences of the sudden stops. Next, when a global recession
coincides with the sudden stops, the fast recovery from the sudden stop crisis via
the currency depreciation and the increased export could be interrupted due to
the lack of global demand. Lastly, if an emerging market economy relies heavily
on foreign resources for the use of producing the intermediate goods, the currency
depreciation in the process of a sudden stop crisis could even aggravate the crisis
by increasing the imported input price and distorting the production cost condi-
tions. Third, we show that the exchange rate regime choice of an emerging market
economy has an important implication as regards the economic performance in
a sudden stop crisis. In addition, our simulation results suggest that a xed ex-
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change rate regime could produce an inferior outcome to the oating counterpart
when faced with sudden stops, in contrast to the fear of oatingargument a la
Calvo and Reinhart (2002). This is due to the fact that if a rise in cost of foreign
borrowing is driven by the factors other than the currency depreciation, say, for-
eign lenderspessimism on an emerging market economy, then a xed exchange
rate regime is not an e¤ective tool to prevent a sudden stop crisis, even if it could
stabilise the nominal exchange rate. Rather, in this circumstances, the stabilised
nominal exchange rate under a xed exchange rate regime could reduce the im-
provement in price competitiveness for home good, which limits the increase in
demands for home good in a sudden stop crisis. In our simulation, this negative
impact of a xed exchange rate regime in a sudden stop crisis turns out to o¤set
its positive e¤ect of stabilising the cost of foreign borrowing.
This chapter contributes to the existing literature as follows. First, we
highlight the important roles of an unfavourable change in foreign lendersper-
ception on an emerging market economy as a trigger of a nancial crisis in the
economy and endogenous transmission mechanism via nancial frictions in foreign
borrowing contract. This is compared to the existing research where the exoge-
nous shocks such as ones arising from the foreign interest rate or the sovereign risk
premium. We argue that our consideration may provide the more primitive and
relevant source of a nancial shock in an emerging market economy and that it is
the more coherent way to transmit the foreign shocks to the business cycle in an
emerging market economy. In addition, our simulation conrms the so-called self-
fullling pessimismargument a la Calvo (1998) and Krugman (1999). Second, we
point out the potential weakness of fear of oatingargument in Calvo and Rein-
hart (2002). That is, a xed exchange rate regime motivated by the concern that
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the entrepreneursbalance sheet is negatively a¤ected by a currency depreciation
resultin in a sudden stop crisis is not likely to be an e¤ective measure in the envi-
ronment where the balance sheet is distorted directly by an unfavourable change
in the foreign lendersperspective, since they would require the higher external
nance premium on non-nancial rms in an emerging market economy even in
the absence of a currency depreciation. Furthermore, we point out that under a
xed exchange rate regime, an emerging market economy would lose the opportu-
nity to recover from a nancial crisis via the improved price competitiveness for
domestic goods and the resulting export expansion. Third, we show the so-called
process tradingargument in a general equilibrium framework which is argued in
a partial equilibrium model in the existing literature. In addition, while the pre-
vious research relying on a small open economy DSGE approach mainly point out
the positive e¤ect of a domestic currency on the export demand for an emerging
market economy, we argue that in case the emerging market economy relies heavily
on foreign inputs, the economy could fail to enjoy the recovery due to the further
distortion in the production cost conditions and the resulting aggravation of price
competitiveness for domestic goods.
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Appendix B
Appendix B1 The Model Solution
The model consists of 34 behavioural equations with 34 endogenous variables, such
as fCt, CH;t, CF;t, CH;t, Y t , YH;t, Yw;t, At, Lt, Kt, Nt, Bt , It, IH;t, IF;t, Pt, PH;t, PF;t,








t , St, St, Vt, Gtg and 7 temporary
exogenous shocks, such as f"r;t, "a;t, "v;t, "g;t, "y;t, ";t, "r;tg. Appendix B1.1
identies the nonlinear equations characterising equilibrium in the model. These
equations may be approximated around the steady state to be transformed into
the linear equations, which are presented in Appendix B1.2. Derivation and log-
linearisation process for equations are exposed in Appendix B2.
B1.1 Equilibrium Conditions
































5. Import demand for foreign good:










1  + (1  ) (PF;t)1 
 1
1  (B1.6)
















































QtKt = Nt + StB

t (B1.13)






















































Kt 1 + (1  )Kt 1 (B1.18)







20. Investment demand for foreign input:










1 i + (1  i) (PF;t)1 i
 1
1 i (B1.21)
22. Wholesale goods market equilibrium:
YH;t = Yw;t (B1.22)




YH;t = CH;t + C
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Rnt  RtEt ft+1g (B1.26)








29. Technology shock process:
At = (At 1)
a exp f"a;tg (B1.29)
30. Net worth evaluation shock process:
Vt = (Vt 1)
v exp f"v;tg (B1.30)
31. Government spending shock process:
Gt = (Gt 1)
g exp f"g;tg (B1.31)
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y exp f"y;tg (B1.32)




 exp f";tg (B1.33)




r exp f"r;tg (B1.34)
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B1.2 The Log-linearised Model
1. Consumption Euler equation:




cWt   bPt =  bCt + 'bLt (B1.36)
3. Uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIPC):
bRt = bRt + bSt+1   bSt (B1.37)
4. Consumption demand for home good:
bCH;t =    bPH;t   bPt+ bCt (B1.38)
5. Import demand for foreign good:
bCF;t =    bPF;t   bPt+ bCt (B1.39)
6. Consumer price index (CPI):
bPt =  bPH;t + (1  ) bPF;t (B1.40)
7. Law of one price (LOOP) for imported good
bPF;t = bSt + bP t (B1.41)
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8. Real exchange rate:
bSt  bSt + bP t   bPt (B1.42)
9. Export demand for home good:
bCH;t =    bPH;t   bPt   bSt+ bY t (B1.43)
10. Production function:
bYw;t = bAt +  bKt 1 + (1  ) bLt (B1.44)
11. Labour demand:
cWt   bPH;t = bYw;t   bLt + bPw;t (B1.45)
12. Capital demand:
bRkt+1 + bQt = 1  1  Rk




bQt + bKt = N
K
 bNt + 1  N
K
hbSt + bBt i (B1.47)
14. External nance premium:
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b	t =   bQt + bKt   bNt (B1.48)
15. Cost of foreign borrowing:
bRkt+1 = bRt + b	t + bSt+1   bSt (B1.49)







 bRkt   KN   1




bQt    bPI;t   bPt+  bPH;t   bPt =  bIt   bKt 1 (B1.51)
18. Capital accumulation:
bKt = bIt   (1  ) bKt 1 (B1.52)
19. Investment demand for domestic input:
bIH;t =  i  bPH;t   bPt+ bIt (B1.53)
20. Investment demand for foreign input:
bIF;t =  i  bPF;t   bPt+ bIt (B1.54)
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21. Investment good price index:
bPI;t = i bPH;t + (1  i) bPF;t (B1.55)
22. Wholesale goods market equilibrium:
bYH;t = bYw;t (B1.56)
23. New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) for home good:






 bCH;t + CH
YH
 bCH;t +  IHYH




bRnt = r bRnt 1 + (1  r) hbt + y bYH;t + s bSti+ "r;t (B1.59)
26. Fisher equation:
bRnt  bRt + Et fbt+1g (B1.60)
27. Ination of domestic consumer price index:
bt  bPt   bPt 1 (B1.61)
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28. Ination of domestic price index:
bH;t  bPH;t   bPH;t 1 (B1.62)
29. Technology shock process:
bAt = a  bAt 1+ "a;t (B1.63)
30. Net worth evaluation shock process:
bVt = v bVt 1+ "v;t (B1.64)
31. Government spending shock process:
bGt = g  bGt 1+ "g;t (B1.65)
32. Foreign output shock process:
bY t = y bY t 1+ "y;t (B1.66)
33. Foreign CPI ination shock process:
bt =   bt 1+ ";t (B1.67)
34. Foreign interest rate shock process:
bRt = y  bRt 1+ "r;t (B1.68)
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Appendix B2. Derivation and Log-linearisation of Equilib-
rium Conditions
B2.1 HouseholdsBehaviours
Appendix B2.1 discusses the derivation and linearising process for the (domestic
and foreign) householdsbehaviours: Euler equation in consumption, labour sup-
ply, uncovered interest rate parity condition (UIPC), domestic consumptions for
home and foreign goods, domestic consumer price index (CPI), and export demand
for home good in foreign countries.
Solution to HouseholdsUtilityMaximisation Problem To solve the house-
holdsutility maximisation problem described in the text, we write the problem






















Lt  Rt 1Dt 1   StRt 1Bt   ot + Tt
i
9>=>; ,
where t is the shadow price for the budget constraint at the period t, i.e., the value
in terms of utility of relaxing the budget constraint at the margin. Di¤erentiating



























The third and fourth conditions imply the evolution of the shadow price evaluated
in domestic and foreign interest rate, respectively. Combining the rst and second






which is an equation (3.5) in the text. Substitution of the rst condition to the









which is an equation (3.4) in the text. In addition, combining the third and fourth









which is an equation (3.6) in the text.
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Derivation of Domestic Consumptions for Home and Foreign Goods
















1  + (1  ) (PF;t)1 
 1
1  . Households allocation problem
between CH;t and CF;t for any given expenditure level, Zt  PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t,











 1   t [PH;tCH;t + PF;tCF;t   Zt] .




















































































where the last equality follows from the price index, Pt 

 (PH;t)
1  + (1  ) (PF;t)1 
 1
1  .
It may be rewritten as:



















Substitution of the above equations for demands for foreign goods and home goods














































so that Zt = PtCt. Substituting it into the above two optimality conditions, the















which are equations (3.9) and (3.10) in the text.
Linearisation of Domestic Consumptions for Home and Foreign Good











Ct, respectively. Note that, in the
symmetric zero ination steady state where PH = PF = P , CH = C and
CF = (1  )C. Then, by using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the consumption for home good
may be approximated around the steady state as:
CH







 bPH;t   bPt+ bCti ,
and hence,
bCH;t =    bPH;t   bPt+ bCt,
which is an equation (B1.38) in Appendix B1.2.
In addition, the domestic demand for foreign good is approximated around
the steady state as:
CF







 bPF;t   bPt+ bCti ,
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and hence,
bCF;t =    bPF;t   bPt+ bCt,
which is an equation (B1.39) in Appendix B1.2.
Linearisation of Consumer Price Index (CPI) Consider the consumer price
index (CPI), Pt 

 (PH;t)
1  + (1  ) (PF;t)1 
 1
1  in (3.8) of the text, which
may be rewritten as:
(Pt)
1  =  (PH;t)
1  + (1  ) (PF;t)1  .




= 1 and (P )1  =
 (PH)
1  + (1  ) (PF )1 . Then, using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the left hand side (LHS)
and the right hand side (RHS) of the above equations may be approximated around
the steady state as:
(LHS) ' (P )1 
h
1 + (1  ) bPti
(RHS) '  (PH)1 
h
1 + (1  ) bPH;ti+ (1  ) (PF )1  h1 + (1  ) bPF;ti .
Combining the LHS and RHS yields
bPt =  bPH;t + (1  ) bPF;t,
which is an equation (B1.40) in Appendix B1.2.
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Linearisation of Foreign Demand for Home Good Consider the foreign






Y t , in (3.18) of the text. Note that,




Y . Then, using xt ' x(1 + bxt), the foreign
demand for home good may be approximated around the steady state as:
CH






 bPH;t   bPt   bSt+ bY t i ,
so that
bCH;t =    bPH;t   bPt   bSt+ bY t
which is an equation (B1.43) in Appendix B1.2.
B2.2 EntrepreneursBehaviours of Entrepreneurs
Appendix B2.2 discusses a solution to the optimal contracting problem between
entrepreneurs and foreign lenders, and log-linearising process for their net worth
evolution.
Solution to Optimal contracting Problem37 We consider the optimal con-
tracting problem between the borrowers (i.e., domestic entrepreneurs) and the
lenders (i.e., foreign nancial intermediaries) a la Bernanke et al. (1999) and
Gertler et al. (2007).38 As discussed in the text, in the debt contract which is
characterised as RbSB = !RkQK, the foreign lenders incentive constraint to
participate in this debt contract is given by
37This part is largely based on Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler et al. (2007).
38Note that, in this section, we consider the steady state relation for analytical simplicity, so
that we drop the time subscript t o¤ from the equations.
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= R (QK  N)
and the domestic entrepreneursexpected prot is given by
[1    (!)]RkQK,
where the rate of total payment going to the foreign lenders,   (!) 2 [0; 1], and
that of their auditing cost, bG (!), are given, respectively, by:









Note that   (!) is strictly increasing and concave in !, and that bG (!) is in-
creasing in !.39 In addition, note that   (!)   bG (!) > 0 for ! 2 (0;1), and
that lim!!0 f  (!)  bG (!)g = 0, and lim!!1 f  (!)  bG (!)g = 1  b. The
optimisation problem implies that the borrowers maximise their expected prot
subject to the lender participation condition, which is given by:











!dF (!), so that   (!) = [!   F (!)!]+R !
0
!dF (!) = ! R !
0
F (!) d!.
Accordingly, we establish that  0 (!) = 1   F (!) > 0 and  00 (!) =  f (!) < 0. In addition, it
is obvious that bG





s:t: [  (!)  bG (!)]RkQK  R (QK  N) .
Divide both sides of the above equations by RN , which is irrelevant to the problem,
and denote the external nance by p (!)  Rk
R
, and the steady state leverage ratio




. Then, the Lagrangian is formulated as:
L = [1    (!)] pk +  f[  (!)  bG (!)] pk   (k   1)g .
The associated rst order conditions are
[!] :  (!) =
 0 (!)
 0 (!)  bG0 (!)
[k] : p (!) =
 (!)
[1    (!)] +  (!) [  (!)  bG (!)]
[] : k (!) = 1 +  (!)
  (!)  bG (!)
1    (!) ,
where we use k (!) = 1




Now, we investigate the properties of the above optimality conditions, un-
der some reasonable restrictions. Suppose that !f(!)
1 F (!) =
G0(!)
 0(!) is increasing in !,





is decreasing in !, implying that there exists an ! such that  0 (!) bG0 (!) R 0
40Bernanke et al. (1999) show that this condition is satised if ! follows any monostically
increasing transformation of the normal distribution.
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for ! S !.41 Accordingly, for ! < !, we establish that  (!) =  0(!)
 0(!) bG0(!) > 0.
In addition, the assumption that !f(!)
1 F (!) =
G0(!)






 0(!)2 > 0, so that G
00 (!)  0 (!)   G0 (!)  00 (!) > 0 for
any !. Thus, we see that 0 (!) = b[G
00(!) 0(!) G0(!) 00(!)]
[ 0(!) bG0(!)]2
> 0.42 In addition, it can
be shown that k0 (!) > 0, for ! < ! and that p0 (!) > 0, for ! < !.43
Next, we derive the nancial accelerator from the above opitmality condi-
tions, and establish its property. First of all, we invert the leverage ratio, k = k (!),
into ! = ! (k), where !0 (k) > 0 for k > 1. Then, substituting it into risk premium
on the external nance, p = p (!), yields the following expression for the nancial
accelerator
p = p f! (k)g = 	 (k)
with 	0 (k) > 0 for k > 1. Now, given the equilibrium value of !, it is straight-
forward to compute the implied external nance premium, p (!), and the implied
leverage ratio, k (!).
Furthermore, without loss of generality, the above expression for the ex-
41It implies that there exists an ! such that the net payo¤ to the lender,   (!)   bG (!),
reaches a global maximum at !. We may call the area where ! < ! so that  0 (!) bG0 (!) > 0,
non-rationing area; it may be called rationing area, otherwise.
42Note that lim!!0  (!) =
 0(0)






















(!) [k (!)  1] +  
0(!)
1  (!)k (!) > 0, for ! 2 (0; !) and that










> 0, for ! 2 (0; !). In addition,
we establish that lim!!0 p (!) =
 0(0)=[ 0(0) bG0(0)]




= 1 (!) bG(!)  p
 < 11 b [= lim!!1 p (!)]. It is also
established that lim!!0 k (!) =
[1  (0)]+(0)[ (0) bG(0)]



























> 0 for ! 2 (0; !) (i.e., p 2 (1; p)).
Linearisation of Net Worth Evolution First of all, note that the cost of







, in (3.34) and the entrepreneurs
balance sheet, QtKt = Nt + StBt , in (3.24) can be approximated around the zero
ination symmetric steady state where Rk = R	, and K = N +B as:
bRkt+1 = bRt + b	t + bSt+1   bSt
and
bQt + bKt = N
K
 bNt + 1  N
K
bSt + bBt  ,
respectively. Next, consider the entrepreneursnet worth evolution, Nt
Vt
= [fRktQt 1Kt 1
 Rt 1	t 1Bt 1Stg+(1  )F ], in (3.35) in the text. We establish that the steady
state relation for the net worth evolution is that N
V
= [fRkQK   R	BSg +
(1  )F ], where Q = 1 and V = 1. Then, by using the relation, xt ' x(1 + bxt),





1 + bNt   bVti .
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1 + bRt 1 + b	t 1 + bBt 1 + bSti
'  Rk (K  N)
h
1 + bRt 1 + b	t 1 + bBt 1 + bSti ,








bRkt + bQt 1 + bKt 1  KN   1

















 bRkt   KN   1
bRt 1 + b	t 1 + bSt   bSt 1+ bNt 1,
where we use bQt 1 + bKt 1 =  NK  bNt 1 +  1  NK  bSt 1 + bBt 1 in the second







 bRkt   KN   1
bRt 1 + b	t 1 + bSt   bSt 1+ bNt 1 +  1Rk
 bVt,
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which is an equation (B1.50) in Appendix B1.2.
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Chapter 4
A Bayesian Look at Small Open
Economy DSGE Model with
Financial Frictions
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have developed a small open economy (SOE) dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with nancial frictions to analyse the
impact of a sudden stop of capital inows on an emerging market country. We have
argued that: (i) a high degree of nancial frictions could make a sudden stop crisis
aggravated, since in this circumstances foreigners react susceptibly to even the
temporary and slight distortions in entrepreneursnancial condition; (ii) when an
emerging market economy relies heavily on foreign resources for capital production,
it could su¤er a sudden stop crisis more severely, as the currency depreciation in a
sudden stop crisis would raise the capital production cost additionally so that the
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capital demand is further depressed; and (iii) a xed exchange rate regime could
be inferior to a oating exchange rate system in the face of sudden stop crises, in
case a negative e¤ect of a xed exchange rate regime by limiting the improvement
in price competitiveness for home goods o¤sets the positive e¤ect by stabilising a
rise in cost of foreign borrowing. Our analysis in the previous chapter relied on
a calibrated DSGE model, where the parameter values follow from those in the
previous literature, such as Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci (2007), Curdia (2007),
and Ozkan and Unsal (2010). We have conrmed the above arguments through
the simulation and experiments based on the calibrated DSGE model.
However, in order for the above theoretical arguments to be empirically
relevant, one needs to conrm that corresponding parameters in the calibrated
model, which reect our assumption on the economys environmental conditions,
reect the real world well. More specically, it is important to empirically establish
that (i) the parameter for the sensitivity of external nance premium to entrepre-
neursleverage ratio,  , is positive and su¢ ciently large to conrm the presence
of substantial degree of nancial frictions in the economy; (ii) the steady state
share of domestic input in investment good composite, i, is smaller than that
of domestic goods in consumption bundle, , to establish that the economy relies
heavily on the foreign resources for capital production; and (iii) the Taylor rule
coe¢ cient attached on nominal exchange rate, s, is positive and su¢ ciently large
to verify that the central bank in the emerging market country seeks to stabilise
the nominal exchange rate.
However, as Beltran and Draper (2008) point out, a calibrated DSGE
model approach is not very obvious in how to calibrate the parameters, in partic-
ular for the newly emerged parameters, nor is always robust to alternative calibra-
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tion. In contrast, an estimated DSGE model would quantify the average values
of parameters based on the observed data, so that it could capture the features
of business cycle more realistically. In this sense, we estimate the small open
economy DSGE model in the previous chapter to assess how valid and plausible
the above arguments are. To estimate our DSGE model, Bayesian methods and
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm are applied. One of the virtues
of Bayesian method is that it provides a coherent way of combining prior infor-
mation about parameters with the data as viewed through the DSGE model. In
addition, as Elekdag et al. (2006) point out, it allows for a complete character-
isation of uncertainty around the parameter values by simulating the posterior
distributions.
Using the data series from the United States and South Korea and the
DSGE model in the previous chapter, we nd some empirical evidence supporting
the above arguments. First of all, we obtain the sizable estimate for the sensitivity
parameter of external nance premium to entrepreneursleverage ratio,  , which
suggests that there exists a substantial degree of nancial frictions in the economy
so that the economy could be vulnerable to a sudden stop in foreign fund inow.
Second, the steady state share of domestic inputs in investment good composite,
i, is estimated to be much smaller than that of domestic goods in consumption
bundle, , which indicates that the capital production in the emerging market
country relies signicantly on the foreign resources. Accordingly, it is plausible
that the currency depreciation in a sudden stop crisis could result in a large volume
of capital contraction due to an increase in capital production cost as well as a
rise in cost of foreign borrowing. Third, our estimation result shows that Taylor
rule coe¢ cient on nominal exchange rate, s, has a positive but small value, which
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suggests that the central bank implements the monetary policy in a way to allow
the nominal exchange rate to oat freely. Fourth, our variance decomposition
analysis indicates that the main sources of business cycle in the emerging market
economy could be foreign nancial shocks.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 outlines
the small open economy DSGE model developed in the previous chapter. In sec-
tion 4.3, we briey sketch Bayesian estimation methods and discuss the data and
priors used in the estimation. In section 4.4, we discuss the results from Bayesian
estimation and variance decompositions and check the robustness of the estimates.
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 The Model
The model estimated in this chapter is the small open economy DSGE model with
nancial frictions, which is constructed in the previous chapter. Having derived
all the equilibrium conditions in the previous chapter, this section briey reviews
them, paying attention to the parameters in the model which will be estimated.
First of all, households seek to make an optimal decisions between labour
and consumption, between consumption and savings, and between domestic and
foreign deposit, which yield the labour supply function, the Euler equation in

























where  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption, ' > 0 is the inverse elasticity of labour supply, and  2 (0; 1) is the
discount factor. By construction, we have  = 1
R
in the steady state. In addi-
tion, households allocate their consumption bundle, Ct, between home and foreign














where  2 (0; 1) is the share of domestic goods in the consumption bundle in the
steady state, i.e.,  = CH
C
and  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between CH;t




1  + (1  ) (PF;t)1 
 1
1  , (4.6)
where the import price (in domestic currency) is governed by the assumptions of





Some fraction of the domestically produced goods are consumed by the agents in








Y t , (4.8)






In equation (4.8),  2 (0; 1) and  > 1 are the share of domestic goods in for-
eign householdsconsumption bundle and the price sensitivity of export demand,
respectively, which are assumed to be identical to the corresponding values in
domestic consumers, i.e.,  =  and  = .
Second, domestic entrepreneurs produce the wholesale goods, by combin-
ing labour and capital by the production function,
Yw;t = At (Kt 1)
 (Lt)
1  . (4.10)
Then, the entrepreneurscost minimisation subject to the above production tech-

























where  2 (0; 1) and  2 (0; 1) denote a steady state share of capital in the
production function and the quarterly capital depreciation rate, respectively. In
addition, entrepreneurs are assumed to nance the capital acquisition partly by
foreign borrowing, so that the entrepreneursnancial condition is expressed as
the following balance sheet
QtKt = Nt + StB

t . (4.13)
In addition, the foreign lenders facing the agency problem would impose the risk
premium on the entrepreneurs according to the entrepreneursleverage ratio, so







In equation (4.14),  > 0 denote the sensitivity of the risk premium to the en-
trepreneursnancial condition, so that the bigger value of  relates the higher
external nance premium to the given rise in leverage ratio. Then, the cost of

















+ (1  )F   Vt, (4.16)
where  2 (0; 1) is the entrepreneurssurvival rate.






























Kt 1 + (1  )Kt 1, (4.18)
where  > 0 is the capital adjustment cost coe¢ cient. In addition, investment
good, It, used for capital production is composed of home and foreign goods, so














where i 2 (0; 1) and i > 1 are the share of domestic inputs in the investment
good composite and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign inputs,





1 i + (1  i) (PF;t)1 i
 1
1 i , (4.21)
so that the motion of the real input price, PI;t
Pt
, i.e., the cost of capital production, is
a¤ected by the values of (; ) and (i; i). For instance, under the circumstances
of the heavier reliance on the foreign input in the investment good composite
as compared to the preference over imported goods in consumption bundle, i.e.,
i <  and i = , a currency depreciation would result in an increase in the real
investment good price, PI;t
Pt
, as discussed in the previous chapter.
Fourth, retailers purchase the wholesale goods from entrepreneurs in a per-
fectly competitive manner; di¤erentiate them into their own varieties; and then
set the retail price on them under Calvo-type nominal rigidity. Retailersopti-
mal price setting behaviour yields the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) for
domestic nal goods:
H;t = (Pw;t)
Et fH;t+1g , (4.22)
with  = 
 1 and  =
(1 )(1 )

, where  captures the substitutability among vari-
eties, and  denotes the possibility of keeping the previous retail price unchanged,




and the equilibrium condition in the wholesale goods market implies
YH;t = Yw;t. (4.24)
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Domestic nal goods are sold to domestic and foreign households, capital producers
and government, so that the resource constraint for domestic nal goods is given
by
YH;t = CH;t + C

H;t + IH;t +Gt. (4.25)
Fifth, the government conducts monetary and scal policies. The cen-
tral bank adjusts the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor-type


















exp f"r;tg , (4.26)
where the nominal interest rate, Rnt , is linked to the real riskless rate, Rt, by the
following Fisher equation
Rnt  RtEt ft+1g , (4.27)




In equation (4.26), r 2 (0; 1) is the weight on the nominal interest rate in the
previous period, and  > 1, y > 0, and s  0 are the policy parameters
attached to the CPI ination, output gap, and the nominal exchange rate. In
the free oating exchange rate regime, s is equal to zero, but, in practice, many
emerging market countries, which announce to adopt a free oating system, are
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thought of actually seeking to stabilise the value of domestic currency to some
degree, so that s > 0.
Lastly, there are seven exogenous shocks in the model, such as "r;t, "a;t,
"v;t, "g;t, "y;t, ";t, and "r;t, which are assumed to be all Gaussian white noises.
The shocks arising from the technology, At, net worth evaluation, Vt, government
spending, Gt, foreign output, Y t , foreign interest rate, R

t , and foreign CPI in-
ation, t , are assumed to obey the stationary rst-order autoregressive process,
given by
At = (At 1)
a exp f"a;tg , (4.29)
Vt = (Vt 1)
v exp f"v;tg , (4.30)
Gt = (Gt 1)













 exp f";tg , (4.34)
where jaj < 1, jvj < 1, jzj < 1,
y < 1, jj < 1, and jrj < 1 are the
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persistence parameters in each shock process.
4.3 Estimation Methodology
A DSGE model can be estimated by using Bayesian methods, as described in An
and Schorfheide (2007) and Canova (2011). In this section, we outline Bayesian
methods for estimating the DSGE model and discuss prior densities and data to
be used for estimation.1
4.3.1 State-space Representation
In order to be estimated, a DSGE model should be rstly solved. A DSGE model
can be solved following the procedure described in Uhlig (1999): (i) identifying
equilibrium conditions to construct a non-linear rational expectations (RE) sys-
tem; (ii) approximating the non-linear equations around the steady state to trans-
form the non-linear rational expectations (RE) system into the rst order linear
one; (iii) solving the rst order linear rational expectations (RE) system by us-
ing the numerical method, as shown in Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Klein
(2000); and (iv) writing the rational expectations (RE) solution in the state-space
representation, discussed below.
Technically speaking, our DSGE model belongs to a non-linear rational
expectations system with 34 endogenous variables and 7 exogenous shocks, which
can be approximated around the steady state to obtain the linear rational expec-
1More detailed discussion about Bayesian MCMC estimation methods for a DSGE model are
presented in Appendix C2.
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tations system as listed in Appendix B1.2. Then the rational expectations (RE)
solution to the DSGE model can be represented by the following state-space form:
E fxt+1g = Fxt +Gzt+1
yt = H
0xt + vt (4.35)
where xt is 34  1 vector of the state variables, zt is 7 dimensional structural
shocks, yt is observed variables, and vt is the measurement errors. As shown in
(4.35), the state-space representation is made up of two equation blocks: state
transition equations and observation equations. The transition equations govern
the evolution of the state vector, xt by F and G, which are 34  34 and 34  7
matrices of functions of structural parameters in the model, respectively. The
observation equations relate the observables, yt, to the state variables, xt, through
the 7 34 matrix H 0.2 In addition, structural shocks, zt, and measurement errors,
vt, are assumed to be two independent Gaussian white noise series, i.e., zt 
N (0; Q) and vt  N (0; R). The intuitive description on the estimation process
by using the state-space represenation in (4.35) is as follows. When the economy
represented by the 34 dynamic equilibrium conditions listed in Appendix B1.2 is
hit by some of the 7 structural shocks, 34 endogenous variables in the economy, i.e.,
the state variables, yield the general equilibrium path over time by the transition
equations. Then, the generated movements of state variables are evaluated by the
2We have 7 observables, as discussed below. Now that we have the same number of observables
as the structural shocks, we can evaluate the likelihood function of the observed data. However,
if we included more observables than structural shocks in the measurement equations, the model
would be stochastically singular, as Ingram et al. (1994) and Ireland (2004) point out. In
this case, the model predicts that certain combinations of the structural variables would be
deterministic and be at odds with the data.
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measurement errors at each time. Then, the prior beliefs about the parameter
values are rectied by the. Bayesian MCMC algorithm, which will be discussed in
more detail in the subsequent part.
Having represented the rational expectations (RE) solution to the DSGE
model, we may apply Bayesian method and Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
procedure to estimate the DSGE model.
4.3.2 Bayesian Estimation
The aim of implementing Bayesian method is to characterise the posterior density
of the parameters. By Bayestheorem, the posterior density of parameters, p (jy),
is obtained by combining the likelihood for the data, L (yj), and the prior density
of parameters, p (), given by:
p (jy) = L (yj) p ()R L (yj) p () d , (4.36)
where  is the parameter vector and y is the observed data. Given that the DSGE
model is linear and the shocks are all independently and normally distributed, the
likelihood of the data, L (yj), can be calculated by applying the Kalman lter to
the state-space representation of the model in (4.35), given by:



















where T is the number of periods, Ny is the number of observables, vt = yt H 0xtjt 1
is the prediction error for the observables, and 
tjt 1 = H 0tjt 1H + R is the
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associated covariance matrix.3
Having obtained the likelihood function, L (yj), the posterior density of
parameters, p (jy), can be estimated by a simulation method such as Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. As discussed by Schorfheide (2000), the
procedure follows a two-step approach. In the rst step, the initial guess of the
posterior mode, m, and the associated covariance matrix, m, are found by a
numerical optimisation routine which maximises the posterior kernel, L (yj) p ().4
In the second step, a sequence of the parameters, j, is generated by an MCMC
method, such as Random Walk Metropolis-Hastings (RWMH) algorithm, which is
used to build the shape of the posterior density, p (jy). That is, (typically) starting
from the posterior mode, m, for each step of the random draw, j = 1; : : : ; N , a
candidate sample, j , is drawn from a proposal density, 

j  N (j 1; c2m), with
c denoting a scale factor, and then, the jump from j 1 to 

j is accepted with the




L  yjj p  j
L (yjj 1) p (j 1)
)
, (4.38)
and rejected with 1   r. In this fashion, the algorithm constructs the empirical
posterior density, ep (jy), which converges to the true posterior density, p (jy), as
the number of the chains approaches to the innity.5 Finally, based on the em-
3The value of each term is obtained from the Kalman lter recursion for the given initial
values x1j0 and 1j0. As discussed in Appendix C2.1, they are calculated as: xt+1jt = Fxtjt and
t+1jt = FtjtF 0 + GQG0, where xtjt = xtjt 1 + tjt 1H(H 0tjt 1H + R) 1(yt  H 0xtj 1) and
tjt = tjt 1   tjt 1H(H 0tjt 1H +R) 1H 0tjt 1.
4The covariance matrix, m, is the inverse of the negative Hessian matrix computed at the










5As shown in Johannes and Polson (2004), the sequence generated by the MCMC algorithm
is the Markov chain, by construction, so that the empirical posterior density from any starting
point, 0, converges to the true posterior density, by the ergodic theory for Markov chains.
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pirical posterior density, ep (jy), the estimates for mean, variance, and condence
interval are calculated as




h (j) ep (jjy) , (4.39)
where h () is a function of the posterior estimator of the parameters, and Nsim is
the number of iterations net of those in the burn-inperiod, which are discarded
to avoid the potential dependency of the chains on the starting points.
In our estimation, we generate multiple chains of 100; 000 replications, dis-
carding the rst 20 percent of the iterations, Nsim = 100; 000 20; 000 = 80; 000. In
addition, following Brooks and Gelman (1998), we generate 3 parallel sequences
to check the convergence of the generated draws. We adjust the scale factor, c,
attached on covariance matrix in the jumping distribution, m, to attain the ac-
ceptance rate, r = 0:25, following Roberts, Gelman and Gilks(1997) suggestion.
4.3.3 Data
The model is estimated using seven quarterly data series from the United States
and South Korea (Ny = 7). South Korea is chosen because it is an emerging market
economy that experienced a sudden stop crisis in 1997-98 and was a¤ected by the
global nancial crisis in 2007-2008, and the United States is adopted because the
economic relationship between the Unite States and South Korea is very close and
the size of the US economy is so large that it could be considered the world economy
from a perspective of South Korea. For the United States, the data consist of the
real gross domestic product (GDP), the consumer price index (CPI), and the rate
of return for 3-month treasury bond (TB), which correspond to foreign output,
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Y t , foreign CPI ination, 

t , and foreign interest rate, R

t , respectively. For South
Korea, the observed variables are the real GDP, the CPI, the rate of return for
3-year corporate bond with rating of AA-, and the won/dollar nominal exchange
rate, which are linked to domestic output, YH;t, domestic CPI ination, t, capital
returns, Rkt , and the nominal exchange rate, St.
6 The annual rates of the US TB
and South Koreas corporate bond are converted into the corresponding quarterly
rates. All the data are detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter to obtain the
stationary series,7 and measured in terms of the percent deviation from the steady
state (i.e., the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott trends) to be conformable to our
log-linearised DSGE model. The sample runs from 1995:Q1 to 2013:Q1 (T = 73).
Figure 4.1 shows the movements in some main macroeconomic variables
during the sample period, which include the real GDP and TB rate in the US,
the won/dollar exchange rate, and GDP, corporate bond rate, investment and
export in South Korea.8 During the sample period, South Korea experienced two
nancial crisis episodes: the currency crisis in the late 1990s (1997:Q3-1999:Q2)
and the global nancial crisis in the late 2000s (2008:Q3-2010:Q2). The crisis
periods are represented by the shaded areas in Figure 4.1. The prominent features
6US data on GDP, CPI, and TB rate are extracted from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
in the Department of Commerce (www.bea.gov), the Bureau of Labour Statistics in the De-
partment of Labour (www.bls.gov), and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(www.federalreserve.gov), respectively. South Korean data are collected from the Bank of Korea
(ecos.bok.or.kr).
7The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter is used to isolate a cycle(or deviation from the trend),
ct, from the original time series, zt, which is assumed to be I(1). Thus, ct = zt   t, where





(zt   t)2 + 
 42t+12i, where 4j is the j-th order di¤erence operator and  is a
weight on the trend. The choices for  are conventionally recommended to be 100 for the annual
data, 1600 for the quarterly data, and 14400 for the monthly data.
8Figure 4.1 displays how economic variables move in crisis period, which are represented by
the shaded area. Note that not all the variables in Figure 4.1 are the same as the data series
used in estimation.
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Figure 4.1: Actual Time Series in the US and South Korea
* Vertical axes represent the percent deviation of the variables from the corresponding
HP trends, and horizontal axes represent years.
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Table 4.1: Parameters calibrated
Description Value
;  home and foreign discount factors 0:99
R;R home and foreign interest rates in the steady state 1:0101
 substitutability between home and foreign goods 1:5
i substitutability between home and foreign inputs 1:5
 capital share in production function 0:3
 capital depreciation rate 0:025
 entrepreneurssurvival rate 0:975
 capital adjustment cost coe¢ cient 1:2
 elasticity of substitution among retail goods 6
CH=Y H export-to-output ratio in the steady state 0:2
G=Y H government spending-to-output ratio in the steady state 0:2
of the crisis periods are widened risk spreads9, a dramatic depreciation of the Ko-
rean won, and sharp and signicant contractions in foreign borrowing, investment
and GDP in South Korea.
4.3.4 Priors for the Parameters
In this part, we discuss our prior beliefs on the parameters. First of all, follow-
ing the practice of Bayesian estimation, we x some parameters throughout the
estimation procedure, by calibrating them in line with the existing literature. Cal-
ibrated parameters are listed in Table 4.1, where the values are identical to those
in the previous chapter. The discount factors in home and foreign countries,  and
, are all set at 0:99, so that the corresponding steady state value of quarterly
riskless rates are calculated as R(= 1

) = 1:0101 and R(= 1
 ) = 1:0101. The
substitutability between home and foreign goods in consumption bundle and in-
9The risk spread is measured by the gap between the Korean capital returns (represented
by the rate of returns for 3-year corporate bond with rating of AA- ) and the US interest rate
(represented by the 3-month US TB rate).
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Table 4.2: Priors for the Parameters
Description Domain Shape Mean S.E.
 intertemporal elasticity of consumption (0;+1) gamma 1:5 0:2
' elasticity of labour supply (0;+1) gamma 3 0:5
 sensitivity of risk premium (0;+1) gamma 0:05 0:04
K=N capital-to-net worth in the steady state (1;+1) gamma 2 0:3
 probability of not adjusting retail price (0; 1) beta 0:75 0:2
 share of home good in consumption (0; 1) beta 0:6 0:2
i share of domestic input in investment (0; 1) beta 0:6 0:2
r persistence of interest rate in Taylor rule (0; 1) beta 0:7 0:2
 Taylor rule coe¢ cient on ination (1;+1) gamma 1:7 0:3
y Taylor rule coe¢ cient on output gap (0;+1) gamma 0:2 0:1
s Taylor rule coe¢ cient on exchange rate (0;+1) gamma 0:2 0:1
 persistence of net worth evaluation shock (0; 1) beta 0:7 0:1
g persistence of government spending shock (0; 1) beta 0:7 0:1
r persistence of foreign interest rate shock (0; 1) beta 0:7 0:1
y persistence of foreign output shock (0; 1) beta 0:7 0:1
 persistence of foreign ination shock (0; 1) beta 0:7 0:1
a persistence of technology shock (0; 1) beta 0:7 0:1
"v S.E. of net worth evaluation shock (0;+1) inv. gam. 0:03 inf.
"g S.E. of government spending shock (0;+1) inv. gam. 0:03 inf.
"r S.E. of foreign interest rate shock (0;+1) inv. gam. 0:03 inf.
"y S.E. of foreign output shock (0;+1) inv. gam. 0:03 inf.
" S.E. of foreign ination shock (0;+1) inv. gam. 0:03 inf.
"a S.E. of technology shock (0;+1) inv. gam. 0:03 inf.
"r S.E. of monetary policy shock (0;+1) inv. gam. 0:03 inf.
vestment inputs in investment good composite,  and i, respectively, are all set to
be 1:5. We x the capital share in the production technology, , quarterly capital
depreciation rate, , and entrepreneurssurvival rate, , at 0:3, 0:025, and 0:975,
respectively. Capital adjustment cost coe¢ cient, , and elasticity of substitution
among varieties, , are pinned down at 1:2 and 0:6, respectively. The steady state






, are assumed to be all 0:2.
Next, we choose the prior densities for the estimated parameters by con-
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sidering the theoretical restrictions for the parameters. Table 4.2 shows the priors
for the estimated parameters, and Table C2 in Appendix C1 compares the pri-
ors in the existing literature. Following the conventions, gamma distributions are
used for the parameters bounded to be positive, such as , ',  , K
N
, , y, and
s, and beta distributions are adopted for parameters for fractions or probabil-
ities, such as , , i, r, v, a, g, r, y , and  , since they are bounded
between 0 and 1. Prior means for the estimated parameters are taken from the
calibrated model in the previous chapter, which are standard in the business cycle
literature, such as Elekdag et al. (2006), Adolfson et al. (2007), Adjemian et al.
(2007), Yie and Yoo (2011) and Lee and Rhee (2013), as shown in Tables C2 in
Appendix C1. The inverse of intertemporal elasticity of consumption, , and the
inverse elasticity of labour supply, ', are assumed to be centered at 1:5 and 3,
respectively. The steady state value of entrepreneursleverage ratio, K
N
, and the
sensitivity of external nance premium to the leverage ratio,  , are assumed to
be distributed around 2 and 0:05, respectively. The prior means for Taylor rule
coe¢ cients, , y, and s, are set at 1:7, 0:2, and 0:2, respectively, where the
strong grip for ination and weak grips for output and exchange rate reect the
fact that the Bank of Korea has adopted ination targeting and free oating ex-
change rate regime since 1998. We assume that the interest rate smoothing factor
in Taylor rule, r, and domestic retail price stickiness parameter, , are centred
at 0:7 and 0:75, respectively. The share of home goods in consumption bundle
and that of domestic input in investment good composite,  and i, are assumed
to be all distributed around 0:6, so that the real investment good price, PI;t
Pt
, and
capital price, Qt, would not be a¤ected by the currency depreciation, St. The
prior means for persistence coe¢ cients, such as v, g, a, r, y, and  , are
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all set to be 0:7. In addition, Gaussian shocks, such as " , "r, "g, "a, "r , "y, and
", are all assumed to follow the inverse gamma distributions with prior means of
0:03. Lastly, we choose relatively large values for the prior standard error of each
parameter, to allow for the uncertainty about the prior belief on parameters.10
4.4 Estimation Results
Given the prior densities and the actual data as discussed above, our DSGE model
are estimated by using Bayesian MCMC methods. In this section, we discuss
the estimation results, which include the Bayesian estimates for the parameters,
variance decomposition based on the estimates, and the robustness of Bayesian
estimates.11
4.4.1 Bayesian Estimates
Bayesian estimates for the parameters are summarised in Table 4.3, along with the
95 percent posterior condence intervals (C.I.), which serve to measure the uncer-
tainty surrounding these estimates. In addition, Figure 4.2 displays the empirical
posterior densities constructed by the MCMC methods (which are shown in red
solid lines), together with the corresponding priors (shown in gray solid lines) and
posterior modes (shown in blue dotted lines).
10The large values of prior standard errors suggest that the priors have fairly at shapes. As
Adjemian et al. (2007) argue, in case the data are very informative about the parameter, the
loose priors could be well suited for the estimation of DSGE model.
11In addition, Appendix C3 presents a discussion of convergence of MCMC sequence, and the
associated test result for our model.
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Table 4.3: Parameter Estimates
Prior Posterior
Mean S.E. Mode t-stat. Mean 95% C.I.
 1:5 0:2 1:3575 6:0141 1:4283 [1:0493; 1:7893]
' 3 0:5 2:2296 5:2108 2:2298 [1:5011; 2:8983]
 0:05 0:04 0:0775 2:2972 0:0839 [0:0242; 0:1368]
K=N 2 0:3 1:4083 10:8268 1:4601 [1:2194; 1:6866]
 0:75 0:2 0:8567 45:7865 0:8565 [0:8353; 0:8979]
 0:5 0:2 0:9960 291:8509 0:9926 [0:9860; 0:9996]
i 0:5 0:2 0:0959 9:3891 0:0941 [0:0745; 0:1120]
r 0:7 0:2 0:8710 24:0719 0:8543 [0:7955; 0:9204]
 1:7 0:3 1:6516 6:8351 1:7052 [1:3430; 2:0830]
y 0:2 0:1 0:2943 3:3169 0:3747 [0:2124; 0:5422]
s 0:2 0:1 0:0308 2:6724 0:0410 [0:0189; 0:0637]
 0:7 0:1 0:88884 30:1717 0:8715 [0:8118; 0:9390]
g 0:7 0:1 0:8751 3:9698 0:7052 [0:4155; 0:9959]
r 0:7 0:1 0:2451 4:8527 0:2523 [0:1624; 0:3405]
y 0:7 0:1 0:8457 20:4507 0:8422 [0:7752; 0:9080]
 0:7 0:1 0:8632 14:8380 0:8103 [0:7094; 0:9150]
a 0:7 0:1 0:8751 22:2254 0:8629 [0:7992; 0:9282]
"v 0:03 inf. 0:0291 3:8630 0:0343 [0:0172; 0:0496]
"g 0:03 inf. 0:0138 2:4660 0:0292 [0:0062; 0:0659]
"r 0:03 inf. 0:1291 10:7472 0:1331 [0:1128; 0:1533]
"y 0:03 inf. 0:0055 12:2611 0:0056 [0:0048; 0:0064]
" 0:03 inf. 0:0060 12:0405 0:0060 [0:0052; 0:0068]
"a 0:03 inf. 0:0269 4:5157 0:0295 [0:0194; 0:0402]
"r 0:03 inf. 0:0047 3:6309 0:0060 [0:0033; 0:0087]
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First of all, our estimation results indicate the presence of substantial de-
gree of nancial frictions in the small open economy. That is, the sensitivity of the
external nance premium to the entrepreneursleverage ratio,  , is estimated as
0:0839, and its 95 percent condence interval ranges between 0:0242 and 0:1368,
which is away from zero and statistically signicant. These estimates suggest that
foreign lenders might raise the risk premium by over 0:08 percent when they per-
ceive one percent of the rise in entrepreneursleverage ratio. As discussed in the
previous chapter, the raised risk premium due to the perceived distortion of entre-
preneursleverage ratio would lead to contractions in capital demand and output
production, which portrays a typical sudden stop crisis episode in emerging mar-
ket countries. In addition, a posterior mean value for the steady state leverage
ratio, K
N
, is estimated as 1:4601 with a 95 percent condence interval covering
from 1:2194 to 1:6866, implying that the quarterly risk premium in the steady








= 1:0323. The estimated annual risk pre-
mium, 13:6(= 100  (1:0323)4) percent seems to be quite high as compared to the
corresponding historical average, 6:3 percent in our sample period. However, it
may reect the impact of a nancial crisis when the risk premium between the
associated rates exceeded 18:9 percent in 1998:Q1, as Elekdag et al. (2006) argue.
In short, the large values of the Bayesian estimates for the sensitivity of external
nance premium to entrepreneurs leverage ratio and the steady state risk pre-
mium suggest that there may exist a substantial degree of nancial frictions in the
economy, and that the economy would be vulnerable to foreign nancial shocks.
Second, on top of the channel through the cost of foreign borrowing, our
estimation results suggest that a sudden stop crisis could be aggravated by the
additional channel through the capital production cost. We have argued that the
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heavier reliance on the foreign inputs in investment good composite relative to
foreign goods in consumption bundle could raise the real capital production cost,
PI;t
Pt
,12 and the real capital price, Qt, when the domestic currency is depreciated in
a sudden stop crisis, so that the capital demand could be further discouraged by
the increased capital price. Our estimation results reveal that this scenario could
be actually realised in the economy. That is, the posterior means for the share of
domestic goods in consumption bundle and investment good composite,  and i,
are inferred as 0:9926 and 0:0941, respectively, implying that capital producers rely
heavily on foreign input to produce the capital good, while households consume
domestic goods much more than imported foreign goods. This environment may
support our argument on a processing tradein a sudden stop crisis empirically.
Third, we obtain an empirical characterisation of the central banks mon-
etary policy rule in the economy. The mean values of coe¢ cients on CPI ina-
tion, output gap and nominal exchange rate in Taylor rule, , y and s, are
estimated as 1:7052, 0:3747, and 0:0410, with 95 percent condence intervals of
(1:3430; 2:0830), (0:2124; 0:5422) and (0:0189; 0:0637), respectively. In addition,
the posterior mean and 95 percent condence interval for the ination smoothing
factor, r, are inferred as 0:8543 and (0:7955; 0:9204), respectively. The large
estimates for policy coe¢ cients on CPI ination but small value for that for coe¢ -
cient on nominal exchange rate indicate that the central bank adjusts the nominal
interest rate sensitively in response to CPI ination, but it reacts less sensitively
to the motion in nominal exchange rate. This implies that the central bank may
implement the monetary policy in a way to respect the ination targeting and the
12Recall that this is because, under this condition, PI;t is more strongly a¤ected than Pt by
the rises in nominal exchange rate and foreign good price, due to the large portion of foreign
good price and the stickiness in domestic price.
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Figure 4.2: Priors and Posteriors
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free oating exchange rate regime, so that the degree of fear of oatas in Calvo
and Reinhart (2002) is not substantial in the economy.
Lastly, we turn to the estimates for the remaining parameters. Our esti-
mated mean values for the inverse of intertemporal sensitivity, , and the inverse
of labour supply, ', are 1:4283 and 2:2298, respectively, which are in the range of
values commonly used in calibration-based studies. The posterior mean for Calvo-
type price stickiness parameter, , is estimated to be 0:8656, with a 95 percent
condence interval covering the range between 0:8353 and 0:8979. Accordingly,
the average duration of retail price lasts 1
1  = 7:4405 quarters, i.e., almost two
years, which is longer than that in the calibration-based model, where  = 0:75
and 1
1  = 4 quarters, i.e. one year, conventionally.
Overall, we obtain reasonable estimates in the sense that all of them are
statistically signicant and most of them are in the range of estimates in the
existing studies relying on Bayesian methods to estimate the DSGE model, such
as Elekdag et al. ( 2006), Adolfson et al. (2007), Adjemian et al. (2007), Yie and
Yoo (2011) and Lee and Rhee (2013), as shown in Table C3 in Appendix C1. In
addition, some of our estimates turn out to be away from the prior means, such as
',  , K
N
, , , i, y, and s, which suggests that the data are quite informative.
That is, the observed data rectify the prior beliefs about parameter values by
the Bayesian MCMC algorithm yielding the posterior estimates which are quite
di¤erent from the priors.
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4.4.2 Variance Decomposition
In this part, we discuss the results of variance decomposition, which explains how
important a shock is in business cycle dynamics. Variance decomposition results
are calculated from the impulse responses to each shock based on the parameter
estimates in subsection 4.4.1. Table 4.4 presents the contribution of shocks on the
uctuations in main economic variables in percent.
As shown in Table 4.4, the variation in domestic output, YH;t, is mainly
explained by foreign lendersevaluation shock on entrepreneursnet worth, "v;t,
(88:14 percent of the overall variance), and foreign interest rate shock, "r;t, (5:28
percent), while the roles of shocks from foreign output, "y;t, domestic monetary
policy, "r;t, and domestic scal policy, "g;t, are relatively small, which are estimated
as 0:90, 0:85, and 0:01 percents, respectively. The main drivers for uctuations of
production factors, such as capital, Kt, and labour, Lt, are also the shocks from
foreignersevaluation, "v;t, and foreign interest, "r;t, which account for 87:23 and
6:91 percents for the former and 69:63 and 12:08 percents for the latter, respec-
tively. This suggests that one of the main sources of the business cycle in the
emerging market economy could be foreign nancial shocks.
In addition, the non-negligible roles of "v;t and "r;t, are conrmed for the
external nance premium, 	t, and capital returns, Rkt , capturing 25:84 and 72:03
percents of the overall variance for the former, and 60:09 and 35:57 percents for the
latter. The shocks from foreignersnet worth evaluation, "v;t, and foreign interest
rate, "r;t, also account for 77:65 and 7:41 percents for the variance of the foreign
borrowing, Bt , respectively, and 86:93 and 5:19 percents for the variance of the
nominal exchange rate, St, respectively. These indicate that it could be a main
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Table 4.4: Variance Decomposition (in percent)
"v;t "r;t "y;t ";t "r;t "g;t "a;t
YH;t 88:14 5:28 0:90 3:77 0:85 0:01 1:06
Kt 87:23 6:91 1:45 3:77 0:29 0:00 0:35
Lt 69:63 12:08 4:11 3:23 2:47 0:01 8:48
	t 25:84 72:03 1:33 5:32 0:36 0:00 0:20
Rkt 60:09 35:57 3:25 0:15 0:21 0:00 0:73
St 86:93 5:19 0:60 6:33 0:50 0:00 0:44
Bt 77:65 7:41 7:33 6:73 0:43 0:00 0:45
Nt 88:27 5:36 4:11 1:58 0:22 0:00 0:46
CH;t 89:25 4:68 0:66 4:70 0:36 0:00 0:36
CF;t 85:22 7:97 0:92 5:23 0:73 0:00 0:24
CH;t 80:40 1:32 11:95 5:32 0:63 0:00 0:38
IH;t 52:17 30:27 15:45 1:62 0:07 0:00 0:42
IF;t 48:82 35:18 13:53 1:93 0:12 0:00 0:42
t 74:00 12:54 3:75 0:73 1:93 0:00 7:05
H;t 74:04 12:41 3:81 0:75 1:89 0:00 7:10
channel of foreign nancial shock to propagates to the domestic production.
Furthermore, we nd that the demand side of the emerging market econ-
omy is a¤ected by the foreign output shock, "y;t, and foreign ination shock, ";t,
as well as the foreign nancial shocks, "v;t and "r;t. The foreign output shock, "y;t,
and foreign ination shock, ";t, explain 11:95 and 5:32 percents of variations in
the export demand, CH;t, respectively, and 15:45 and 1:62 percents of variations
in the demand for domestic investment good, IH;t, respectively. However, the im-
pacts on the emerging market economy of the foreign real shocks, such as "y;t, and
";t, and the domestic shocks such as "r;t, "g;t and "a;t, are found to be limited, as
compared to the foreign nancial shocks, such as "v;t, and "r;t.
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4.4.3 Robustness of the Result
We evaluate the robustness of our estimation result by reestimating the model
with alternative and less informative priors. In the alternative model, the uniform
distribution is assigned to the parameters bounded between 0 and 1, such as , r,
v, g, r, y, , and a, instead of beta distribution in the baseline model.
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In addition, the normal distribution with mean of zero and standard deviation of
0:5 is assumed for the Taylor rule coe¢ cient on the nominal exchange rate, s,
instead of gamma distribution in the baseline model, and the uniform distribution
bounded 0 and 0:1 is taken for the sensitivity parameter of the external nance
premium to entrepreneursleverage ratio,  , instead of gamma distribution. We
implement otherwise the same estimation procedure as that in the baseline model.
Table 4.4 compares the priors and the estimation results in the alternative model
with those in the baseline model.
First of all, the posterior means of  and K
N
are estimated as 0:0499 and
1:9381, respectively, in the alternative model, as compared to 0:0839 and 1:4601,
respectively, in the baseline. Despite a fall in the posterior mean for  , and
a rise in that for K
N









= 1:0348, to that in the baseline model, so that we may
maintain the argument that there exists a substantial degree of nancial frictions
in the economy. Second, the alterative model estimates the posterior means for the
steady state share of home goods in consumption bundle, , and that of domestic
input in investment good composite, i, as 0:7775 and 0:4568, respectively, so that
13Note that, under the uniform distribution bounded between 0 and 1, the prior information
on the mean value of the parameter cannot be considered other than 0:5, unlike under the beta
distribution.
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Table 4.5: Robustness of Result
Alternative Model Baseline Model
Prior Posterior Prior Posterior
Shape Mean Mean 95% C.I. Shape Mean Mean
 gamma 1:5 1:4620 [1:4455; 1:4871] gamma 1:5 1:4283
' gamma 3 2:6842 [2:6122; 2:8017] gamma 3 2:2298
 uniform 0:05 0:0499 [0:0429; 0:0554] gamma 0:05 0:0839
K=N gamma 2 1:9381 [1:8739; 2:0081] gamma 2 1:4601
 uniform 0:5 0:5418 [0:4959; 0:5784] beta 0:75 0:8656
 uniform 0:5 0:7775 [0:7431; 0:8104] beta 0:6 0:9926
i uniform 0:5 0:4568 [0:4376; 0:4759] beta 0:6 0:0941
r uniform 0:5 0:5868 [0:5628; 0:6268] beta 0:7 0:8543
 gamma 1:7 1:7155 [1:6732; 1:7529] gamma 1:7 1:7052
y gamma 0:2 0:1881 [0:1770; 0:1973] gamma 0:2 0:3747
s normal 0:0 0:0155 [0:0146; 0:0161] gamma 0:2 0:0410
 uniform 0:5 0:5401 [0:4140; 0:6467] beta 0:7 0:8715
g uniform 0:5 0:5634 [0:5314; 0:6022] beta 0:7 0:7052
r uniform 0:5 0:2682 [0:2184; 0:3428] beta 0:7 0:2523
y uniform 0:5 0:5040 [0:4744; 0:5240] beta 0:7 0:8422
 uniform 0:5 0:5746 [0:5034; 0:6215] beta 0:7 0:8103
a uniform 0:5 0:6124 [0:5754; 0:6389] beta 0:7 0:8629
"v inv. gam. 0:03 0:0813 [0:0626; 0:0986] inv. gam. 0:03 0:0343
"g inv. gam. 0:03 0:0581 [0:0487; 0:0683] inv. gam. 0:03 0:0292
"r inv. gam. 0:03 0:1299 [0:1104; 0:1498] inv. gam. 0:03 0:1331
"y inv. gam. 0:03 0:0078 [0:0067; 0:0089] inv. gam. 0:03 0:0056
" inv. gam. 0:03 0:0062 [0:0054; 0:0070] inv. gam. 0:03 0:0060
"a inv. gam. 0:03 0:0190 [0:0160; 0:0220] inv. gam. 0:03 0:0295
"r inv. gam. 0:03 0:0368 [0:0314; 0:0423] inv. gam. 0:03 0:0060
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the latter is still much smaller than the former. Thus, our second argument that
the economy relies heavily on the foreign input to produce the capital goods, so
that the sudden stop crisis could be amplied by the currency depreciation via the
distortion in capital price, is also robust to the change in priors. Third, Taylor
rule coe¢ cient on the nominal exchange rate, s, is estimated as 0:0155 under
the normal prior, which is still positive but very small. Thus, our third argument
that the central bank implements the monetary policy in a way to respect a free
oating exchange rate regime well, could be maintained even under the looser prior.
Overall, even though there are some quantitative di¤erences for some parameter
estimates between the two alternative models, Bayesian estimates are broadly
similar across models, as shown in Table 4.4. It suggests that our arguments are
robust to priors taken for Bayesian estimation, and strongly backed up by the
data.
4.5 Conclusion
We use Bayesian methods to estimate the small open economy DSGE model with
nancial frictions and to evaluate the empirical validity of arguments in the pre-
vious chapter. Combining data from the US and South Korea and the model
proposed in the previous chapter by Bayesian methods, we obtain the signicant
Bayesian estimates with the right signs for the key parameters, which support our
arguments empirically.
First of all, we obtain the empirical evidence for the presence of a substan-
tial degree of nancial frictions in the economy, which implies that the economy
could be vulnerable to the foreign nancial shocks. Second, the data uncover that
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capital producers rely heavily on the foreign inputs in the emerging market coun-
try, as compared to the householdsconsumption on foreign goods, which suggests
that a sudden stop crisis could be amplied by the currency depreciation via the
deterioration of capital price. Third, the positive but very small value of the esti-
mate for Taylor rule coe¢ cient on nominal exchange rate indicates that the central
bank in the economy implements the monetary policy in a way to allow the nom-
inal exchange rate to oat freely. Fourth, the result from variance decomposition
implies that the main source of business cycle in the emerging market economy
comes from foreign nancial shocks. Lastly, comparison of the estimation results
from the alternative models with di¤erent priors suggests that the estimation result
that we obtain are robust to the change in the prior belief about the parameters.
The above empirical ndings result in the following practical implications.
First, the policy authorities are advised to try to reduce the degree of nancial
frictions in the economy to make the economy more robust to foreign nancial
shocks. Second, since the economys heavy reliance on the foreign inputs could be
an obstacle to a rapid recovery from a sudden stop crisis, the authorities should try
to reduce the degree of reliance on the foreign inpults by making the intermediate
goods on its own or diversifying the sources of foreign inputs. Third, even though
the estimation does not nd the strong evidence that the economy adopts a xed
exchange rate regime, the authorities could be advised to conduct the exchange
rate policy in more market friendly way because a xed exchange rate regime could
provide an inferior performance in a sudden stop crisis.
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Appendix C
Appendix C1 Priors and Posteriors in the Literature
Table C1 Model and Data in the Literature
Data source Model type
EJT South Korea SOE NK with FF
ALLV Euro area SOE NK without FF
APM Euro area Closed NK without FF
YY US & South Korea SOE NK with FF
LR US & South Korea SOE NK with FF
* EJT: Elekdag et al. (2006); ALLV: Adolfson et al. (2007); APM: Adjemian et al.
(2007); YY: Yie and Yoo (2011, mimeo); LR: Lee and Rhee (2013).
** SOE NK with FF: small open economy New Keynesian DSGEmodel with nancial
frictions; SOE NK without FF: small open economy New Keynesian DSGE model with-
out nancial frictions; Closed NK without FF: closed economy New Keynesian DSGE
model without nancial frictions.
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Table C2 Priors in the Literature
EJT ALLV APM YY LR
 0:99 0:999 0:99 0:988
 B (0:6; 0:1) 0:69 0:7
 5 N (1:5; 0:2)
 G (3; 1) N (1; 0:38) G (1:5; 0:2)
' G (3; 1) 1 G (3; 0:5)
 0:37 0:29 0:3 0:3
 B (0:07; 0:03) G (1; 0:5) N (0:07; 0:2)
 N (7:7; 1:5) N (4; 2) IG (0:5; 0:5)
 G (8; 3) 4:3 6
 B (0:6; 0:1) B (0:68; 0:05) B (0:75; 0:05) B (0:7; 0:1) B (0:65; 0:1)
r B (0:8; 0:2) B (0:8; 0:05) N (0:75; 0:1) B (0:7; 0:1) B (0:8; 0:1)
 G (3; 0:5) N (1:7; 0:1) N (1:5; 0:05) G (1:5; 0:2) N (1:5; 0:05)
y G (1; 0:8) N (0:13; 0:05) N (0:13; 0:1) G (0:4; 0:2) N (0:13; 0:05)
s N (0; 0:05) N (0:05; 1)
K=N G (2; 0:3) G (2; 0:1)
CH=Y H 0:25 0:3
::: B (0:5; 0:25) B (0:85; 0:1) B (0:85; 0:1) B (0:7; 0:2) B (0:8; 0:1)
" IW (1; 0:75) B (0:85; 0:1) U (2; 1:2) IG (0:01; inf) IG (0:005; 0:1)
* The density functions are represented as follows: B = beta, G = gamma, N =
normal, U = uniform, IW = inverse wishart, and IG = inverse gamma. The rst
number in the parenthesis is the mean and the second one is the standard error.
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Table C3 Posterior Means in the Literature
EJT ALLV APM YY LR BL
 0:741 1:9591 1:4906 1:4283
' 1:889 1:8004 3:3139 2:2298
 0:048 0:0038 0:0099 0:0839
K=N 1:759 1:3141 1:4601
 0:387 0:891 0:9098 0:5246 0:461 0:8656
 0:689 0:9926
r 0:054 0:881 0:8058 0:903 0:8543
 2:307 1:730 1:5762 1:3633 1:494 1:7052
y 0:054 0:104 0:125 0:6612 0:118 0:3747
s 0:040  0:009 0:1475 0:0410
a 0:987 0:886 0:3236 0:774 0:8629
r 0:825 0:8471 0:791 0:2523
"a 0:765 0:0754 0:021 0:0295
"v 0:08 0:0343
"r 1:176 0:0010 0:002 0:1311
"r 0:579 0:135 0:0029 0:002 0:0060
* BL: posterior means in the baseline model
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Appendix C2 Bayesian MCMC Methods
In this part, we present the procedure of Bayesian MCMC methods for estimating
a DSGE model. It includes the state-space representation of a DSGE model, the
Kalman lter for the likelihood for data, numerical methods for the posterior mode,
the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) Algorithm for the posterior density, and
the diagnostic for convergence of MCMC.
C2.1 State-space Representation and Kalman Filter14
The log-linearised DSGE model can be solved by the solution method in Blan-
chard and Kahn (1980), Klein (2000), and others. Then, the rational expectations
solution to a linear system can be represented by the following state transition
equation:
E fxt+1g = Fxt +Gzt+1,
where xt is a vector of endogenous variables, zt is a vector of structural shocks,
and the matrices F and G are functions of the models parameters. The state
transition equation governs the time evolution of the state vector, xt. In addition,
to estimate the model, we allow for the following observation equation:
yt = H
0xt + vt,
where yt is a vector of observed variables and vt are measurement errors. The
observation equation links the observables, yt, to the state variables, xt, through
14This part is based on Hamilton (1994), Tsay (2005), Beltran and Draper (2008), and Canova
(2011).
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the matrix H 0. We assume here that zt and vt are two independent Gaussian white
noise series, i.e., zt  N (0; Q) and vt  N (0; R), respectively.
Then, the Kalman lter, proposed by Kalman (1960), updates the state
variable from xtjt 1 to xtjt, recursively, by using the newly available data, yt. The


































0 jyt 1g = H 0tjt 1H +R. In addition, the
property of multivariate normal distribution15 allows the above distribution to be
reduced to the distribution of xt conditional on the observation of yt, and yt 1,
given by
xtjyt; yt 1  N (xtjt;tjt),
where xtjt = xtjt 1 + tjt 1H(H 0tjt 1H + R) 1(yt  H 0xtjt 1) and tjt = tjt 1  
tjt 1H(H 0tjt 1H+R) 1H 0tjt 1. Then, the knowledge of xt given yt can be used
15It can be shown that the random vectors x and y, whose joint distribution is multivariate




, and (ii) V ar(xjy) =
xx   xy 1yy yx.
218































= FtjtF 0 +GQG0.
































= H 0t+1jtH +R.
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Consequently, the Kalman lter is summarised as the prediction equations for the
observables and the updating equations for the state variables, as:
vt = yt  H 0xtjt 1,

tjt 1 = H 0tjt 1H +R,
xt+1jt = Fxtjt,
t+1jt = FtjtF 0 +GQG0,
where xtjt = xtjt 1 + tjt 1H(H 0tjt 1H + R) 1(yt  H 0xtjt 1) and tjt = tjt 1  
tjt 1H(H 0tjt 1H +R) 1H 0tjt 1.
In addition, the Kalman lter algorithm can be used to evaluate the like-
lihood function of the observables. Given a DSGE model and data, the likelihood
function under the assumption of the independent and identical normal distribu-
tion is
p (y1;    ; yT jF;G;H 0; Q;R) = p (y1jF;G;H 0; Q;R)
TY
t=2
p (ytjF;G;H 0; Q;R)
= p (y1jF;G;H 0; Q;R)
TY
t=2
p (vtjF;G;H 0; Q;R)
where y1  N (H 0x1j0;




H 0tjt 1H + R. Consequently, assuming that x1j0 and 1j0 are given, and taking
the logarithms, we have the log likelihood function of data, as:
































where N = dim (yt).
C2.2 Posterior Density and Posterior Mode
Having obtained the likelihood for data, L (yj), the Bayes theorem relates the
prior density for the parameters, p () and the likelihood function, L (yj), to the
posterior density of the parameters, p (jy), according to:
p (jy) = L (yj) p ()R L (yj) p () d
where  is the vector of unknown parameters and y is the observed data. In addi-
tion, since the data, y, are xed, the marginal distribution, p (y) =
R L (yj) p () d,
does not depend on , so that, instead of the posterior density, p (jy), posterior
kernel, K (jY ), can be used for estimation, given by
K (jy)  L (yj) p () / p (jy) ,
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where/ implies the proportionality. In addition, the log posterior kernel, logK (jy),
can be expressed as the sum of the log likelihood, logL (yj), and the log prior,
log p ():
logK (jy) = logL (yj) + log p () .




logK (jy) = arg max










= 0.16 Furthermore, by using a rst order Taylor
expansion, the optimality condition can be approximated around the initial guess



















@2 log p (0)
@@0

(   0) = 0
so that the posterior mode, m, is obtained as:.
























= 0, suggests that if logL (yj) is at
so that @ lnL(yj)@ is close to zero, then m is dominated by the prior, p (); while if log p () is
at so that @ log p()@ = 0, then m is dominated by the data.
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C2.3 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods17
In practice, a posterior density is estimated by using the simulation methods,18
such as Monte Carlo integration, Importance sampling (IS), and Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm. The strategy of the MCMC method is to gener-
ate the random draws for the parameters, , from the proposal posterior density,
which are accepted or rejected according to the relative value of the target den-
sity at the candidate point, j , to that at the current point, j 1. Then, the
algorithm constructs an empirical histogram, which converges to the true poste-
rior density as the iteration approaches to the innity, by the ergodic property
of the Markov chain.19 The well known examples of the MCMC method are the
Gibbs sampler, the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm, and the random walk
Metropolis-Hastings (RWMH) algorithm, among which we outline the RWMH
procedure.
17This part is based on Johannes and Polson (2002), Tsay (2005), Gamerman and Lopes
(2006), and Greenberg (2012).
18Di¢ culty in applying the analytical approach arises from the fact that the integrals for the
posterior density do not generally have a closed-form solution.
19AMarkov chain of the sequence fxig has the property that p (xi+1jxi; xi 1; : : :) = p (xi+1jxi),
where i refers to an index of Monte Carlo interation. That is, the next state depends only on
the current state and not on the sequence of events that precedes it. A Markov chain is known
to be irreducibleand aperiodic. In other words, the chain can enter any state from any state
but the visits to state i can occur only at irregular times. It can be shown that if an irreducible
and aperiodic chain has a proper invariant distribution, p (jy), then it is unique and stationary
distribution of the chain. That is, limj!1 prob [j j0; y] = p (jy). See Meyn and Tweedie (2009)
for details.
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<Step 1> The algorithm is initialised by setting the number of iteration,
j = 1; : : :M , and specifying a starting value, 0, which can be drawn from the
proposal distribution, (or jumping distribution,) N (m; c2m), where m is the
posterior mode, m is the inverse of negative Hessian matrix computed at m, and
c is the scale factor.
<Step 2> Then, we evaluate the log likelihood for data, L (yj), and prior
for parameter, p (), at the starting point, 0, which involves: (i) evaluating p (0)
for given 0; (ii) using the numerical methods such as Kleins (2000) method to
solve the model for given 0; and using the Kalman lter to evaluate L (yj0).
<Step 3> Next, a candidate sample, j , is drawn from a proposal density,









, are evaluated by the above procedure. Then, kernel values,
K (jy) = L (yj) p (), evaluated at the current point, j 1, and the candidate,
j , are compared, so that the algorithm returns j = 








; and it returns j = j 1, with 1  r.
<Step 4> If j < M , then the algorithm proceeds from j to j + 1 and
repeats the procedure from <Step 3>. If j = M , then the algorithm stops, and,
based on the constructed posterior density, ep (jy), the posterior estimates are
calculated as E fh () jyg = 1
M
PM
j=1 h (j) ep (jjy), where h () is a function of the
posterior estimates.
C2.4 Convergence of MCMC
In theory, the empirical posterior density, ep (jy), generated by the MCMC algo-
rithm, converges to the true posterior density, p (jy), as the iteration approaches
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to the innity. This is because the ergodic theory for Markov chains implies that
the sequence generated by the MCMC algorithm converges to the true density
wherever it starts, as shown in Johannes and Polson (2004). However, in practice,
the problem is how fast the convergence occurs. If the sequence lacks convergence,
it is still a¤ected by the starting value, 0, so that the true posterior density, p (jy),
may not be considered to be well represented by the simulated draws, ep (jy). In
contrast, as argued by Brooks and Gelman (1998), if the sequence converges, at
least two things should occur: (i) the empirical posterior density should remain the
same within a sequence; and (ii) it should be the same across sequence. Based on
the idea, Brooks and Gelman (1998) propose the diagnostic to check the conver-
gence, which consists of between varianceand within varianceWithin variance





















respectively, where 	ij is the ith draw out of I in the jth sequence out of J , 	j
is the mean of jth sequence, and 	 is the mean across all available data. In
this setup, the convergent sequence requires between varianceto go to zero, i.e.,
limI!1 bB = 0 and within varianceto settle down at a constant, i.e., limI!1cW =
0. DYNARE reports the convergence test result using the red lines and blue lines,
where the former represents the within variance, cW , and the letter depicts the
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variance as a whole, cW + bB. Thus, the convergence of the Markov chain requires
(i) red and blue lines to get close; and (ii) red lines to settle down at a constant.
Figure C1 displays multivariate diagnostic for convergence in our baseline
model. Each panel in Figure C1 represents withinand within+betweenvari-
ances, which is constructed based on an 80 percent condence interval around the
parameter mean; based on a variance; and based on third moments, respectively.
Figure C1 shows the red (solid) lines and blue (dotted) lines take almost the same
path, implying that there does not exist a signicant di¤erence among parallel
sequences from the early stage of iterations. However, the two lines settle down
at a constant after 30; 000 iterations pass, which suggests that the random draws
within sequence converges to the true posterior density, p (jjy), after 30; 000 iter-
ations pass. In other words, the empirical posterior density, ep (jjy), constructed
through over 30; 000 iterations of random draws could be considered the true
posterior density, p (jjy), in our simulation.
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Figure C1 Multivariate Diagnostic for Convergence
* Horizontal axis in each panel represents the iterations and verial axis represents




This thesis aims at enhancing our understanding of the nancial crises by using
New Keynesian DSGE frameworks with nancial frictions. Our main interests lie
in the following issues: (i) the source and the transmission mechanism of a nancial
crisis; (ii) the role of pre-crisis conditions on the impact of a nancial crisis; and
(iii) the e¤ectiveness of policy measures to ght a nancial crisis. To these ends, we
have constructed New Keynesian DSGE models with nancial frictions for closed
and small open economies, conducted a set of simulations and experiments, and
estimated parameters in the model by using Bayesian MCMC methods and data
from the US and South Korea.
Our main ndings can be summarised as follows. In Chapter 2, we nd
that a collapse in borrowers net worth and a distortion in their balance sheet
could trigger a nancial crisis, by reducing the bankerscredit supply and raising
the cost of external nance. Such an e¤ect of a negative shock to borrowersnet
worth on credit supply and cost of external nance turns out to produce a similar
outcome to the conventional negative shock to capital quality in non-nancial
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rmstechnology. This is because a negative shock to capital quality decreases the
borrowersnet worth by the reduced capital returns, which results in a distortion
in bankersbalance sheet and a production contraction in the real sector of the
economy. Based on the observation, we argue that a fall in the e¢ ciency of the
capital in non-nancial rmstechnology is one of the events causing a distortion
in bankersbalance sheet, which would lead to a nancial crisis in the end.
In addition, we have evaluated the e¤ectiveness of diverse policy measures
in a nancial crisis in Chapter 2. First of all, our simulation results indicate that
conventional expansionary monetary and scal policies could relieve the business
cycle uctuations in a nancial crisis, as long as they are properly working. How-
ever, under certain circumstances, such as zero lower bound (ZLB) of the nominal
interest rate, the central bank is unable to adjust the nominal interest rate prop-
erly, so that a conventional monetary policy would not be an e¤ective tool to ght
a nancial crisis. In addition, an expansionary scal policy could be less e¤ective
in stabilising the economy in a nancial crisis. This is because an expansionary
scal policy tends to increase the interest rate, which decreases the bankerscredit
supply by reducing the protability from nancial intermediation as well as dis-
couraging the capital demand by the crowding-out e¤ect. In contrast, the credit
market intervention by the central bank could e¤ectively attenuate a nancial cri-
sis by either restoring the private bankersnancial intermediation or relieving the
cost of external nance for non-nancial rms. We have proposed two alternative
operating rules that the central bank could follow when it implements the credit
market intervention. That is, the central bank could either inject the public fund
into the private bankersbalance sheet to encourage the private nancial inter-
mediation or supply the public fund directly to non-nancial rms to relieve the
229
contraction in capital demand. Comparison of the impulse responses under these
two rules indicate that the credit market intervention by any of these two rules
produce the similar outcomes in a nancial crisis. The similarity between the two
rules is supported by the nancial accelerator mechanism which positively links
the external nance premium to the bankersleverage ratio.
Under the setting of a small open economy, Chapter 3 points out that
foreign lendersnegative perception on entrepreneursnancial conditions in an
emerging market economy could lead to an actual nancial crisis, even if their
pessimism turns out to be groundless. That is, when foreign lenders have a nega-
tive evaluation of the domestic entrepreneursnet worth, it could cause a sudden
stop crisis in an emerging market economy with a high degree of foreign currency
denominated debt via the reversal of capital out of the economy and the spike in
the cost of foreign borrowing, as the self-fullling pessimismargument in Calvo
(1998) and Krugman (1999) suggests. A foreigners negative perception of the
entrepreneursnet worth has a similar e¤ect on production to an exogenous rise in
the foreign interest rate, in that both shocks increase the cost of foreign borrowing
and reduce the foreign fund supply for capital investment. The di¤erence between
the two lies in that the latter directly increases the cost of foreign borrowing, while
the former does so via the distortion of the entrepreneursbalance sheet. Hence, a
change in foreignerspessimism may reect the more primitive source of a sudden
stop crisis than an exogenous shock to the foreign interest rate.
In addition, Chapter 3 has explored the role of a number of pre-crisis
conditions in the transmission of the nancial crisis, such as (i) the degree of
nancial frictions, (ii) the coincidence of global recession and a sudden stop, (iii)
the degree of the economys reliance on the foreign resources in capital production,
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and (iv) the choice of exchange rate regime. First, we have uncovered that the
presence of a high degree of nancial frictions in an emerging market economy could
lead to large business cycle uctuations when the economy is hit by a sudden stop.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the degree of nancial frictions is negatively related to
foreign lenderstrust in an emerging market economy in normal times. Thus, if
foreign lenders do not have a su¢ cient trust in an emerging market economy, they
would react susceptibly to even a temporary and slight distortion in entrepreneurs
balance sheet (perceived by foreign lenders), so that they would reduce the credit
supply or impose the high risk premium on entrepreneurs. This implies that an
emerging market economy that fails to gain the trust from foreign lenders in normal
times would experience a severer sudden stop crisis. Second, we have shown that
if an emerging market economy faces a global recession at the same time when
it is hit by a sudden stop, the nancial crisis in the economy could be amplied
and prolonged. The standard economics has predicted that while a sudden stop
raises the cost of foreign borrowing and contractions in production and capital
investment, it also could encourage the export demand in foreign countries via the
domestic currency depreciation and the improved price competitiveness of domestic
goods. However, our simulation results imply that when a sudden stop coincides
with a global recession, the increase in export demand is restricted by a contraction
in the overall aggregate demand in foreign economies, so that the sudden stop crisis
in the emerging market economy could be aggravated. Third, we have found that
the degree of an emerging market economys reliance on foreign input in capital
production could also a¤ect the severity of a sudden stop crisis. That is, if an
emerging market economy relies heavily on foreign input in capital production as
compared to the householdspreference over foreign goods, a currency depreciation
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in a sudden stop crisis could lead to a rise in the real capital price, which could
aggravate the cost condition for producing domestic goods. In such a case, an
emerging market economy could su¤er a severer production contraction in a sudden
stop crisis by the rise in factor price as well as the rise in cost of nance. Fourth,
our simulation results point to the importance of the choice of the exchange rate
regime for the business cycle uctuations in a sudden stop crisis. The conventional
fear of oatingargument a la Calvo and Reinhart (2002) suggests that emerging
market economies with large foreign currency denominated debts actually seek to
stabilise the nominal exchange rate even though they announce that they adopt a
free oating exchange rate regime. However, we have shown that a xed exchange
rate regime could produce the inferior performance in a sudden stop crisis to a
free oating exchange rate regime. That is, the stabilised nominal exchange rate
under a xed exchange rate regime could reduce a possible increase in export
demand for domestic goods by limiting the improvement of price competitiveness
of domestic goods in a sudden stop crisis, while it could relieve a rise in cost of
foreign borrowing. Our simulation result shows that the negative e¤ect of a xed
exchange rate regime on the business cycle uctuation could o¤set the positive
e¤ect.
In Chapter 4, we have evaluated the empirical validity of the theoretical
arguments in Chapter 3, by estimating the small open economy DSGE model in
Chapter 3 by the Bayesian MCMC methods and data from the US and South
Korea. First, we have obtained the sizable estimates for sensitivity parameter
of external nance premium to entrepreneursleverage ratio, implying that there
exists a high degree of nancial frictions in the emerging market economy. This
suggests that the economy could be highly vulnerable to foreign lendersevaluation
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on the economys nancial condition. Second, the steady state share of domestic
input in capital producers investment good composite is estimated to be much
smaller than that of domestic goods in householdsconsumption bundle, which
suggests that capital producers in the economy rely heavily on foreign resources.
In this circumstances, it is plausible that the economy su¤ers a severe and pro-
longed contraction by the aggravated capital price as well as the spike of the cost
of foreign borrowing if it is hit by a sudden stop. Third, the Taylor rule coe¢ -
cient attached on the nominal exchange rate is estimated to be negligible, which
indicates that the central bank in the economy does not adjust the nominal in-
terest rate that much to stabilise the nominal exchange rate. This suggests that
the fear of oatingargument could be irrelevant to analyse nancial crises in the
South Korean economy. Fourth, our results from variance decomposition indicate
that the main sources of business cycle uctuations in the economy come from
foreign nancial shocks, such as shocks to foreign lendersperception on the econ-
omys nancial condition and foreign interest rate. However, the domestic and
foreign factors such as shocks to foreign output and domestic interest rate are less
important in explaining the uctuations in the economy.
Overall, the thesis establishes that the economys business cycle could stem
from distortions in the microeconomic conditions in the nancial market such as
borrowersnancial soundness (perceived by the lenders), and that it could be
a¤ected by the economys environmental conditions, such as the degree of nancial
frictions, the degree of reliance on foreign inputs, and the choice of exchange
rate regime. Accordingly, from a theoretical perspective, these ndings point to
the importance of the microeconomic conditions in the economys macroeconomic
performance. They also suggest that researchers, who want to enrich DSGEmodels
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in terms of the reality, need to consider the problems that the economic agents face
in reality and try to equip the models with the optimal behaviours as solutions
to the problems. In addition, from a practical perspective, the policy authorities
should consider the microeconomic problems agents face for the policy to be more
e¤ective. That is, they need to try to design the policy rule in a microfounded way
since the economic agents are rational. In addition, in order to relieve or prevent
a nancial crisis, the economy needs to improve the environmental conditions.
Specically, the economy is required to gain the credibility in nancial markets in
normal times to reduce the degree of nancial frictions; it.should reduce the degree
of reliance on foreign resources in terms of production factors as well as nance;
and it would rather conduct a monetary policy in a market friendly way in order
to avoid a potential negative e¤ect of a xed exchange rate regime on the business
cycle in an economy hit by a sudden stop.
As summarised above, this thesis has analysed important issues as to -
nancial crises, but it has also some limitations. For example, our analyses are
mainly based on the investigation and comparison of the impulse responses of di-
verse shocks under alternative environments. Even though this approach o¤ers
many interesting insights about the transmission of a anancial crisis, comparison
of uctuations to alternative shocks does not provide the quantitative implication
in a strict sense. In addition, our study could be improved by reecting the more
realistic aspects of the recent nancial crisis episodes, such as zero lower bound
(ZLB) of the nominal interest rate. Moreover, taking the recent increase in the size
or importance of South Korean economy into account, we could conduct the crisis
experiments by a two country DSGE model rather than our small open economy
DSGE model. In addition, our Bayesian estimation based on the US and South
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Korean data could be lacking in providing the general evidence for the arguments
put forward in this thesis. Clearly, it is of great importance to check the general
validity by enlarging the sample and accumulating the episodes. These are the
issues for future research.
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